APPENDIX B

A HISTORY OF MAORI REPRESENTATION IN PARLIAMENT

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CONTENTS

FOREWORD

Our terms of reference required us to consider the nature and basis of Maori representation in Parliament. Members of the Commission considered that, before attempting to make any recommendations, it was essential to have a full understanding of the history of Maori representation. Members also believed knowledge of the history to be essential for those who will in due course consider the recommendations in our Report. Unless decisions concerning Maori representation are made in the context of our history, and with knowledge of the aspirations of the Maori people, past misunderstandings are likely to continue.

The Commission therefore decided to ask Professor M. P. K. Sorrenson to prepare a history to be appended to our Report. We are indeed indebted to him for this concise, learned and illuminating history which displays so clearly the extent of his knowledge and research. The history has been of significant help to us. We believe it will also be of great value to all who in future need to consider any aspects of Maori representation.

The history includes a commentary and graphs prepared by Professor Robert Chapman. The value of these is acknowledged in Professor Sorrenson's Preface to the history but we would also like to express our appreciation to Professor Chapman for making them available.

The views expressed in the history and the Annex are, of course, those of the authors.

The Hon. Mr Justice Wallace,

Chairman, Royal Commission on the Electoral System.

PREFACE

The terms of reference of the Royal Commission on the Electoral System include an inquiry into the nature and basis of Maori representation in Parliament. This brief history is intended to provide a background for that inquiry.

The 4 Maori seats in Parliament were first introduced by the Maori Representation Act, 1867, a measure that was regarded as a temporary expedient until Maori acquired the necessary property qualifications to exercise their franchise in the normal way laid down by the New Zealand Constitution Act of 1852. But the 4 Maori seats have lasted to this day. Much of my discussion concerns this odd constitutional fact. I have also examined the performance of Maori members in Parliament and, so far as this has proved possible, in the Maori communities. And I have attempted to place Maori representation in Parliament in the wider perspectives of New Zealand history, more particularly the relations between Maori and pakeha since 1840, and the continuing attempts by Maori to retain their identity and autonomy as a minority in a colony that came under the control of local pakeha colonists within 3 decades of annexation. In that situation Maori clung desperately to their 4 seats in Parliament as a guarantee that their voice would be heard and, when they occasionally got representation in Cabinet, of influencing the executive arm of Government. Though never keen on retaining separate Maori representation, pakeha members of Parliament have so far grudgingly conceded the Maori right to retain it.

I am particularly grateful to Professor Robert Chapman for allowing me to include as an Annex his commentary and graphs on "Voting in the Maori Political Sub-System, 1935–1984". This is the fruit of many years' research on Maori voting behaviour and is the most comprehensive analysis ever attempted. Although I make passing reference to Professor Chapman's main findings in my own essay, his should be read as an independent study of much significance for the Commission's deliberations on Maori representation.

I should also like to thank the Hon. Mr Justice Wallace and members of the Commission for their helpful comments and advice on the first draft of this essay; Paul Harris and Lewis Holden, Research Officers for the Commission, for providing me with material; Spencer Lilley, my research assistant, for cheerfully attending to my many requests; and Julian Sorrenson for assistance with the computing.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The indigenous inhabitants of New Zealand, who came from eastern Polynesia a thousand years before the first European settlers, had no common name for themselves. But after the arrival of the Europeans they began to use the adjective "maori" from the phrase "tangata maori" (ordinary person) to distinguish themselves from the Europeans (pakeha). It was a sign that the hitherto divided tribes were feeling a common identity. Despite their frequent warfare, Maori tribes did have ways of making peace, carried out at intra-tribal hui and cemented by speechmaking, marriages between important persons, and exchanges of gifts. In Maori society there was a well established authority structure headed by chiefs who jealously guarded and enhanced their mana (prestige, authority) against rivals. In these respects it could be said that Maori society was highly political. As European visitors soon found, it was necessary to respect the mana of chiefs. Negotiations had to be conducted according to Maori ways.

With the arrival of European explorers, traders and missionaries, Maori quickly took advantage of new commercial opportunities, especially to obtain better weapons. From early in the nineteenth century, the country was racked by vicious warfare as chiefs who first got arms overwhelmed their less fortunate rivals. Hongi Hika and other Ngapuhi chiefs from the Bay of Islands defeated the Ngatiwhatua of Kaipara and Waitemata, and raided far to the south: through the Hauraki Gulf to Waikato, the Bay of Plenty and the East Coast, and down the West Coast to Taranaki. Te Wherowhero organised the Tainui tribes of Waikato in resistance to Ngapuhi but in turn followed them into Taranaki. Te Waharoa of Ngatihaua campaigned against Arawa of Rotorua. The Ngatitoa chief, Te Rauparaha, led his people from Kawhia, through Taranaki, to the Cook Strait where, from a base on Kapiti Island, he laid waste to the Maori communities of both sides of the Strait, and even as far south as Canterbury. This tribal warfare caused many casualties, led to wide-ranging migrations, complicated land claims, and created long-lasting enmities which influenced later Maori responses to Europeans. By 1830 some tribes like Ngapuhi in the north, Waikato in the central North Island, and Ngatitoa in the south were in a commanding position, and needed to be treated with respect by European negotiators; others, like Ngatiwhatua and Taranaki, were greatly weakened, and ready to welcome Europeans as protectors. At this time the missionaries, who had first settled at the Bay of Islands in 1814, emerged as successful negotiators and peacemakers. It was a role that Henry Williams, the head of the Church Missionary Society in New Zealand, performed effectively when war weariness and an emerging balance of arms encouraged some chiefs to listen to the message of peace, even to accept conversion to Christianity. By 1840 large numbers of Maori had adopted Christianity, often without the aid of European missionaries. Scriptural tracts, made available in large quantities in the Maori language in the 1830s, provided literate Maori

with a new source of inspiration and a new political language for negotiations with the pakeha.

So long as Maori had merely to contend with a few resident missionaries, pakeha traders, or whalers, there was no great external threat to their authority in New Zealand. But in the 1830s the situation began to change quite dramatically. As European trade and settlement increased, so the British authorities in Sydney and London became concerned with lawlessness of British subjects in New Zealand. Hitherto the British had disclaimed authority in New Zealand. Though James Cook had proclaimed British sovereignty over the country in 1770, no action was taken to make that claim effective. Indeed 3 British statutes relating to New South Wales and Tasmania in 1817, 1823 and 1828 had specifically described New Zealand as "not within His Majesty's dominions".[1] But although the British recognised Maori sovereignty over New Zealand, they became increasingly aware of the need to protect Maori from the excesses of British subjects in the country. Thus James Busby was appointed British Resident in New Zealand in 1833. Stationed at Waitangi in the Bay of Islands, Busby had no force at his command and therefore no effective authority over pakeha or Maori. He was often ridiculed or humiliated by chiefs. Yet some of his actions had a rather more enduring significance than has usually been admitted. In 1834 Busby persuaded 25 chiefs at Waitangi to adopt a national flag, so that New Zealand-made ships could be registered for the trans-Tasman trade. That flag was used by later assemblies of Maori leaders as a symbol of a continuing Maori identity.[2] In 1835 Busby embarked on a more ambitious piece of diplomacy. He again assembled northern chiefs at Waitangi, this time to combat an alleged threat that the self-styled Baron de Thierry was about to establish a personal kingdom in New Zealand, and persuaded 35 of them to sign a "Declaration of Independence". They asked for British protection. Later several chiefs from the south added their signatures to the document. Busby saw the assembly as the first stage in the creation of a Maori Parliament, modelled on that at Westminster. This too was to have a continuing significance in Maori political history: several later Maori parliamentary assemblies were regarded as direct successors to Busby's pioneer assembly.[3] But for the British Government it was to have a more immediate consequence. Since Britain recognized the "Declaration of Independence"—yet another acceptance of Maori sovereignty—she was soon to find it necessary to treat with the chiefs of the United tribes and others for the transfer of that sovereignty. Thus the Treaty of Waitangi was conceived.

In the last years of the 1830s British intervention in New Zealand had become unavoidable. There was an influx of British settlers and speculators from across the Tasman, some of whom claimed to have purchased large areas of land from the Maori. There were rumours of

[1] P.Adams, *Fatal Necessity: British Intervention in New Zealand, 1830-1847*, Auckland, 1977, pp.52-3.
[2] C.J.Orange, *The Treaty of Waitangi: a study of its making, interpretation and role in New Zealand history*, PhD thesis, University of Auckland, 1984, pp.77-83.
[3] Ibid., pp.83-94.

French colonisation and intervention in New Zealand, though these were much exaggerated. Above all, there were the activities of E.G. Wakefield and his New Zealand Association (later the New Zealand Company) which finally forced the hand of the British Government. Wakefield proposed to establish colonies of British settlers in New Zealand and in May 1839 despatched a land-buying expedition, led by his brother William. For some time the Government had been considering a recommendation from Captain William Hobson for a limited form of intervention: the annexation of certain settled ports as "trading factories" to be controlled by a British consul. But with the despatch of the Wakefield expedition, Hobson's proposals were expanded and Hobson was sent to New Zealand to negotiate with Maori for the cession of the "whole or any parts" of the country. He soon found that it was indeed necessary to negotiate for the whole of the country.

CHAPTER II

THE TREATY OF WAITANGI AND THE BRITISH ANNEXATION OF NEW ZEALAND

Before Hobson's departure from Sydney for New Zealand in January 1840, Governor Gipps issued 3 proclamations. The first extended the boundaries of New South Wales to include territory that Hobson might acquire in New Zealand. The second appointed Hobson Lieutenant-Governor of such territory. And the third laid down that no titles to land puchased in the future would be recognised unless derived from the Crown. Commissioners were to be appointed to investigate previous purchases.[4]

Hobson's instructions made it clear that he was to treat with Maori for the transfer of sovereignty and to respect their rights to land. But he did not arrive in New Zealand with a ready-made treaty. That was hastily drawn up by Hobson, his secretary, J.S. Freeman, and Busby, on Hobson's arrival at the Bay of Islands early in February 1840. It was translated into Maori by the Church Missionary Society leader, Henry Williams, and his son, Edward. Then it was discussed with an assembly of northern chiefs at Waitangi on 5 February and signed by 45 of them the next day. Over the next 7 months copies of the treaty were hawked around the country and another 500 signatures were obtained, including 39 signatures on an English language version obtained at Waikato Heads and Manukau.

These are the real Treaties of Waitangi—in that they are the versions signed by various Maori leaders. But it has been the latter, English language, version that has usually been regarded by New Zealand governments, and generally by pakeha New Zealanders, as the official version—as, for instance, when it was reprinted by Government in 1869[5] and again as recently as 1975, when it was included as a Schedule to the Treaty of Waitangi Act. In one respect it has also been regarded by Maori as providing an important guarantee. The second article of the English language version promised Maori the "full exclusive and undisturbed possession of their Lands and Estates Forests Fisheries and other properties", whereas the Maori version merely promised them "te tino rangatiratanga o o ratou wenua o ratou kainga me a ratou taonga katoa"—the chieftainship of their lands, their villages, and all their property, but not specifically their forests and fisheries. With the reprinting of the English version in 1869, Maori were encouraged to look to this version of the Treaty as a guarantee of their traditional rights to forests and fisheries, both fresh-water and coastal. But otherwise they have, through the years, looked to the Maori version, as they have understood it, as the guarantee of their rights and status in New Zealand.

The semantic differences between the 2 versions are the source of a larger difference in interpretation between Maori and pakeha that has

[4]A.H. McLintock, *Crown Colony Government in New Zealand*, Wellington, 1958, pp.54-5.
[5]Orange, pp.452-3.

been accumulating ever since the Treaty was signed. As Ruth Ross has written, "the Treaty of Waitangi was hastily and inexpertly drawn up, ambiguous and contradictory in content, chaotic in its execution".[6] It was impossible to translate into the Maori language words like "sovereignty" which had a precise constitutional meaning in English but no equivalent in Maori. Moreover it would have been extremely unwise to have attempted to do so: if the Maori chiefs had been fully informed of the real implications of the transfer of sovereignty, they would not have signed the Treaty. The British, having previously recognised Maori sovereignty over New Zealand, now needed them to sign it away. So sovereignty was translated as "kawanatanga"—not an indigenous Maori term but a transliteration of "governorship" which had been in common usage in the 1830s both in relation to temporal rulers like Pontius Pilate and Governors of New South Wales, and in missionary publications of the Scriptures where it was frequently used to emphasise spiritual authority.[7] In explaining Hobson's mission to the Maori at Waitangi, Henry Williams stressed the Governor's protective function: Hobson (on behalf of Queen Victoria) was to exercise the kawanatanga to impose law and order on, and thus protect the Maori from, the horde of pakeha colonists now pouring into the country. But Williams carefully avoided telling the chiefs that the new Governor's exercise of sovereignty would diminish their own authority, their mana, since they too would be subject to British law in the new colony. As Ross pointed out, the omission of mana from the text of the Treaty, and from the discussions over sovereignty at Waitangi, "was no accidental oversight".[8] But to the British, and in due course their settler successors in the Government of New Zealand, the imposition of British law was an essential consequence of annexation and a fundamental, if long delayed, objective of Maori policy. Moreover the chiefs were reassured by the promise of the second article of the Treaty to guarantee their rangatiratanga—their chieftainship—of their lands, villages and other properties. Some chiefs thought this meant that, although the shadow—the sovereignty—had gone to the Queen, the substance—their chieftainship—had been preserved. It was only later that they discovered that the real position was the reverse, and that British Governors and later settler Governments were using the powers of sovereignty to subject the chiefs and their land to British law. True, Maori were also being accorded the rights and privileges of British subjects, as promised in the third article of the Treaty, but those rights were of little avail when Maori found themselves in a minority in their own country and in Parliament.

In the early years of the colony the Treaty had a precarious existence. It was savagely attacked by the New Zealand Company which resented Hobson's inquiry into its land claims. One spokesman, Joseph Somes, patronisingly dismissed it as a "device for amusing and pacifying

[6]'Te Tiriti o Waitangi: Texts and Translations', *New Zealand Journal of History*, October 1972, p.154.
[7]Orange, pp.145-6.
[8]'Te Tiriti o Waitangi', p.141.

savages".[9] In 1844 a House of Commons Committee, influenced by Company supporters, recommended that the Treaty guarantee of Maori ownership of land be confined to land under occupation and cultivation. Fortunately the British Government did not implement the recommendation.[10] In the same year Governor FitzRoy abolished the Crown's right of pre-emption, laid down in the second article of the Treaty, and allowed settlers to buy land directly from Maori on payment to the Crown of a fee, initially 10/- per acre but subsequently reduced to 1d. FitzRoy was recalled and his successor, Captain George Grey, restored pre-emption. Grey also made it clear that Maori title to land, based on well-defined tribal or hapu boundaries and effective occupation and usage of cultivations, forests and fisheries, encompassed the whole country. But for the rest of his governorship Grey largely satisfied settler demands for Maori land by establishing an effective system of Crown purchase and buying huge areas of Maori land, especially in the South Island and the southern and eastern North Island, usually at very cheap prices.[11] Moreover the Crown's monopoly on the purchase of Maori land was written into the 1852 Constitution Act: section 73 laid down that it would not be lawful "for any Person other than Her Majesty...to purchase...from the aboriginal Natives Land...belonging to or used or occupied by them in common as Tribes or Communities...".

So far, apart from the temporary aberration of FitzRoy's abolition of pre-emption, the Treaty guarantee of Maori land rights had been upheld. But the position was not so reassuring in relation to other aspects of the Treaty. In numerous ways the introduction of government regulations and the rule of law began to inhibit the mana of chiefs. In 1842 a Bay of Islands chief, Maketu, was arrested, tried and hanged for the murder of a European woman, her 2 children and another child—a salutary exhibition of the majesty of British law in New Zealand. But there were other instances where Maori chiefs refused to accept the new laws. The most notable case was Hone Heke's rebellion in the North, since Heke deliberately challenged the sovereignty of the Crown in his repeated assaults on the flagstaff and his sacking of Kororareka. Though Heke was the first to sign the Treaty, he soon became disillusioned over its operation. He resented government regulations which restricted the cutting of timber on Maori land, and the imposition of customs duties at the Bay of Islands which drove away many of the visiting whalers and thus reduced the profitability of trade. He was persuaded—by republican American whalers—that it was the flag, the symbol of the Queen's authority, that was the cause of his trouble. Heke's revolt can therefore be seen as the first serious Maori challenge to British sovereignty in New Zealand.[12] But his rebellion was quelled by British arms, aided, it should be noted, by a loyalist section of the Ngapuhi tribe from Hokianga under Tamati Waka Nene. It was an earnest of things to

[9]Quoted by Adams, p.184.
[10]Ibid., pp.185-6.
[11]Ibid., p.187.
[12]Orange, pp.310, 320-32.

come, as other chiefs, singly or in combination, resisted the further assertion and extension of British sovereignty, and once again British and colonial troops, also supported by Maori loyalists, quelled their rebellion. It was also a reminder of a continuing Maori attempt to retain and assert a degree of political independence, outside the constitutional structures erected in New Zealand to accommodate the demands of British colonists for the political and civil privileges they had enjoyed at home.

Since their arrival in New Zealand the colonists had been demanding representative institutions. Although New Zealand had originally been proclaimed a dependancy of New South Wales, Letters Patent were issued on 16 November 1840 designating the country a separate colony and Hobson was appointed Governor and Commander-in-Chief. He was responsible to the British Secretary of State for the Colonies but in the colony he was in effect an autocrat. However he could call on the advice of his Executive Council which consisted of himself and his 3 senior officials, the Colonial Secretary, the Attorney-General, and the Colonial Treasurer. He also appointed a Legislative Council which had power to enact laws and ordinances for "the peace, order, and good government" of New Zealand. This consisted of himself, the same 3 officals, plus 3 nominated Justices of the Peace.[13] But the nominees were regarded as the Governor's creatures, the Legislative Council seldom met, and there was soon a widespread settler demand for representative government. This was actively supported by New Zealand Company spokesmen at home. In 1846 Earl Grey, a sympathiser of the Company, passed the New Zealand Constitution Act through the British Parliament. This provided a complicated 3-tier system of government with elected municipal corporations at the bottom, then 2 elected provincial Houses of Representatives, and finally, for the whole country, a General Assembly composed of a nominated Legislative Council and an elected House of Representatives. It was an excessively complicated system of government for a mere 13,000 Europeans. Moreover, the far more numerous Maori population were excluded since the franchise was confined to male occupants of a tenement who could read and write English.[14] It was this failure to provide for Maori representation that gave Governor Grey an excuse not to implement the new constitution. He predicted that any attempt to impose it on a reluctant Maori population would lead inevitably to a costly war.[15] Governor Grey's views were accepted and Earl Grey suspended the constitution for 5 years. In that time, according to his own reckoning, Governor Grey brought prosperity and peace to the country, while also setting the 2 races on the road to amalgamation. Grey also played a significant part in drawing up a new constitution, passed by the British Parliament in 1852.

[13]McLintock, p.101.
[14]Ibid., p.287.
[15] Governor Grey to Earl Grey, 3 May 1847, Great Britain Parliamentary Papers, Cmd. 892, 1847-8, p.44.

CHAPTER III

THE NEW ZEALAND CONSTITUTION ACT, 1852

The new constitution provided for a 2-tier system of government, with 6 elected Provincial Councils, each presided over by an elected superintendent, and a General Assembly with a nominated Legislative Council and an elected House of Representatives. The franchise for the Provincial Councils and the House of Representatives was granted to all males over 21 who had a freehold estate within the electorate valued at £50, or a leasehold with an annual value of £10, or a tenement with an annual rental of £10 in a town or £5 in the country. This provision did not specifically exclude Maori males from the franchise but, since most of their property was communal and unregistered, few were able to vote. The provincial councils had power to legislate, provided their laws were not repugnant to the law of England and legislation of the General Assembly. In addition, 13 matters were reserved for legislation by the General Assembly, including the sale of Maori land, and laws which imposed disabilities or restrictions on Maori which were not also imposed on Europeans. In addition there were some restrictions on the powers of the General Assembly in relation to Maori matters. The Crown's right of pre-emption over the purchase of Maori land was preserved. The civil list reserved an expenditure of £7,000 per annum for Maori purposes. Section 71 of the Constitution Act provided for the setting apart by Letters Patent of certain districts within New Zealand in which Maori laws, customs and usages, not repugnant to general principles of humanity, were maintained "for the Government of themselves, in all their Relations to and Dealings with each other". But this important provision, which would have allowed Maori in proclaimed districts a large measure of self-government, was never implemented. Finally, the constitution was silent on the important matter of responsible government, including responsibility for Maori affairs.

Although Grey arranged for the election of the provincial superintendents and councils before he left the colony in 1853, the General Assembly was not constituted until 1854. The members immediately demanded responsible government. The new Governor, Colonel Thomas Gore Browne, had to await instructions from the Secretary of State. When these arrived in 1856, he conceded responsibility for domestic affairs but not for Maori affairs. E.W. Stafford of Nelson formed the first responsible ministry. It was also the first stable ministry, lasting for 5 years. But within that time there was a prolonged struggle between the Ministry and the Governor over the control and conduct of Maori affairs. The Ministers and their supporters became increasingly critical of the failure—as they saw it—of Browne and his officials to purchase sufficient Maori land for the rapidly increasing demands of settlement. During the last years of his governorship, Grey had established an efficient system of land purchase under Donald McLean, who remained as Native Secretary and Chief Land Purchase Commissioner under Browne. But Browne lacked Grey's skill in dealing with Maori and became greatly dependent on

McLean, much to the chagrin of the Ministry. In the later 1850s McLean and his assistants found it increasingly difficult to purchase Maori land, particularly in Taranaki and Waikato where Maori were co-ordinating their resistance to land sales. In Waikato they created a pan-tribal anti-land selling league with the selection of a Maori King in 1858. The settlers, resentful of the slowness of the Government to purchase Maori land, campaigned for the abolition of pre-emption. In 1859 the General Assembly passed a Native Territorial Rights Bill which abolished Crown pre-emption and allowed settlers to purchase land directly from individual Maori.[16] It was disallowed by the British Government as an infringement of the Treaty of Waitangi; but it was an earnest of things to come, once the settlers had got responsibility for Maori affairs.

Although access to Maori land was the prime object of settler politicians, it was not their sole concern. They also wanted to extend law and order into Maori districts—to bring Maori, as well as their lands, under British law as rapidly as possible. There was never any support in the General Assembly for applying s.71 of the constitution. Grey had made a start towards extending British law to Maori districts by appointing several Resident Magistrates. In the later 1850s the Stafford Ministry pressed Browne to expand this system and he appointed F.D. Fenton a travelling magistrate to Waikato. Fenton made two circuits into Waikato in 1857 and 1858. He merely stirred up Maori opposition, provoking the Kingites into finally proclaiming Potatau Te Wherowhero as their King. On McLean's advice, Browne withdrew Fenton. The Ministers claimed that, because Browne had failed to govern the Maori, they were erecting their own Government. It was all part of the guerrilla war that the politicians were waging for control of Maori affairs. In 1858 Browne gave them some ground by allowing one of the Ministers, C.W. Richmond, to be designated Minister for Native Affairs, but Browne himself retained final responsibility. It was an unsatisfactory compromise and was not resolved until, on Colonial Office instructions, responsiblity for Maori affairs was transferred to the local Ministry in 1861.[17] But by then war had broken out over the Governor's bungling of the Waitara purchase in Taranaki.

[16] M.P.K. Sorrenson, "The Maori King Movement, 1858-1885", in Robert Chapman and Keith Sinclair (eds.), *Studies of a Small Democracy*, Auckland, 1963, pp.38-39.
[17] Ibid., pp.33-4.

CHAPTER IV

THE MAORI KING MOVEMENT, WAITARA, AND THE WARS

The outbreak of war at Waitara in 1860 was the culmination of tensions between pakeha and Maori that had been accumulating in the later 1850s. When the provincial governments gained responsibility for land settlement in 1856, they introduced vigorous policies of colonisation, and immigrants poured into the country. Around 1858 the European population passed that of the Maori, whose numbers were steadily declining. There was growing pressure from settlers and politicians for the Government to increase its purchases of Maori land. Within Maori communities, there was widespread unease; European colonisation was threatening their very existence. Government land purchase activities caused or exacerbated intra-tribal and intra-hapu disputes, which sometimes flared into fighting. The dilemma was discussed at a series of pan-tribal hui which attempted to stop the flow of blood by erecting an anti-land-selling league. At the same time a broader, nationalistic movement to elect a Maori King was in progress.

Although the idea of a Maori King was not new, it was not taken up seriously until the 1850s. In 1852 two young Otaki chiefs, Tamihana Te Rauparaha and Matene Te Whiwhi, led an embassy around the North Island asking one paramount chief after another to accept the kingship. They were not immediately successful, but the idea gained support as pressure for the sale of Maori land mounted. In 1856 at a meeting at Poukawa on the southern shore of Lake Taupo, the Tuwharetoa chief, Te Heu Heu, threw his weight behind the movement, and urged the renowned Waikato chief, Potatau Te Wherowhero, hitherto an ally of the Government, to accept the Kingship. Like a true rangatira, Te Wherowhero was reluctant to accept; but pressure on him increased. In 1857 the gifted Ngatihaua chief, Wiremu Tamehana, took the lead, and prevailed on Te Wherowhero to accept the kingship. At a series of meetings in Waikato, he was proclaimed King. Although support for the King was strongest among Waikato tribes claiming descent from the Tainui canoe, there was active or passive support from a wider circle of tribes, more particularly when the outbreak of war over Waitara led to the accession of the main Taranaki tribes.

The King movement was the most important development in the deepening crisis in race relations. It was an effective land league—in that all chiefs who owed allegiance to the King accepted his veto over their sale of land. It was also the most substantial attempt so far by Maori leaders to establish a separate, autonomous political authority; an attempt to restore, indeed to extend, the mana of the chiefs, apparently guaranteed at Waitangi, but which had been gradually eroded by the extension of government authority. The Maori King was thus a Maori answer to Fenton's magistracy and all that it implied. Nevertheless the King's supporters still envisaged a limited form of Maori autonomy,

summed up in the statement, "The King on his piece; the Queen on her piece; God over both; and Love binding them to each other".[18]

The involvement of some Waikato Maori in the Taranaki war meant that sooner or later the war was likely to spread to Waikato. But in 1861 the Kingmaker, Wiremu Tamehana, intervened and brought about a truce. Sir George Grey arrived back in New Zealand for a second term later in the year and formed a "peace" ministry, headed by Sir William Fox. Although the British Government had agreed to transfer responsibility for Maori affairs to the local ministry, Grey as Commander-in-Chief of the British forces in New Zealand, had considerable scope to influence policy, and he was no man to give away authority lightly. Between them, Grey and Fox introduced civil institutions into Maori districts—in an attempt to provide Maori with the "law and order" and good government they were said to be lacking. As Grey told the Kingites, he intended to "dig around" the King "till he falls".[19] He sent John Gorst as a Civil Commissioner to Te Awamutu, right in the heart of the King's domain; and he paid handsome salaries to chiefs who collaborated by becoming assessors to his magistrates. Moreover, despite his protestations of peace, Grey continued preparations for war: as more British regiments arrived, some troops were put to work constructing a military road through the Hunua ranges to the Waikato river. Others were sent to Taranaki where the war was resumed over the disputed Waitara and Tataramaika blocks in 1863. But Taranaki was a side-show and Grey soon shifted the main front to Waikato. In July he set General Cameron on the invasion, having trumped up a Maori plot to invade Auckland. He threatened the supporters of the King with confiscation of their land, unless they surrendered. Since Grey ordered the invasion before his threat of confiscation was released, the King's supporters had little alternative but resistance. The King's forces, greatly outnumbered by the combined weight of British and colonial troops, were progressively defeated—at Meremere, Rangiriri and Orakau—before the British forces were diverted to Tauranga where, after their reverse at Gate Pa, they overcame the King's Ngaiterangi allies at Te Ranga.

Although the British regiments were gradually withdrawn after this, the war was far from over. Encouraged by the Hau Hau faith, many Maori continued the resistance in southern Taranaki, the eastern Bay of Plenty, and the East Coast; and in the later sixties sometimes turned the tables as the guerrilla leaders—Titokowaru on the west coast and Te Kooti on the east—won some stunning victories over colonial troops, until they were finally forced to take refuge in the bush of the interior. In 1872 Te Kooti escaped to the King Country where King Tawhiao, since the defeat at Orakau, had reigned over a still intact kingdom. Tawhiao laid down his arms in 1882, and the King Country was ceremonially opened to the Main Trunk railway in 1885, but the King movement was to persist as an autonomous Maori political organisation, though it no

[18]Paora Te Ahura, Rangiriri meeting, *New Zealander*, 6 June 1857.
[19]Quoted J. Gorst, *The Maori King*, London, 1864, p.324.

longer had a separate territory. Nevertheless the King and his supporters soon became involved in the pakeha political system.

During the wars that system had sought to take advantage of the military victories in the field, achieved largely by British regiments. It is notable that much of the parliamentary legislation of the war years, though intended primarily to serve settler interests, was described as being designed to give better effect to the promises of the Treaty of Waitangi. Even the most outrageous pieces of legislation—the New Zealand Settlements Act,1863, which provided for the confiscation, and the Suppression of Rebellion Act, 1863, which allowed the suspension of *habeas corpus*—were regarded as necessary measures to deal with British subjects in rebellion against their Queen. The preamble of the Native Land Act, 1862, which abolished the Crown's right of pre-emption, as laid down in the second article of the Treaty of Waitangi, said that the act was designed to give better effect to the Treaty. The act created a Native Land Court to individualise Maori land tenure as a preliminary to sale to European settlers. But individualisation was also necessary to provide Maori landowners with an effective qualification for the franchise, since the Law Officers of the Crown had ruled in 1859 that Maori communal tenure did not qualify them.[20] The Native Rights Act, 1865, was also described as a necessary clarification of Maori rights as British subjects which were promised in the third article of the Treaty. Ostensibly, therefore, the colonial politicians, now in control of Maori affairs, were also giving full effect to the Treaty—as they interpreted it. But in granting Maori the rights and privileges of British subjects, the politicians were also requiring them to accept the full responsibilities of citizenship, including a submission to British law—a law that was increasingly being made in New Zealand.

[20]Enclosure in Newcastle to Browne, 19 December 1859, Appendices to the Journals of the House of Representatives (AJHR), 1860 E-2, pp.7-8.

CHAPTER V

THE MAORI REPRESENTATION ACT, 1867

Whether or not Maori should have a share in the making of the law was a question that was not resolved until 1867. Previously, most discussions in Parliament assumed that elected Europeans could represent Maori who were not yet sufficiently educated to take their place in Parliament. Nevertheless there was one debate which very nearly resulted in Maori being offered fair representation. In August 1862 the Canterbury politician, J.E. Fitzgerald, moved 5 resolutions in the House dealing with Maori affairs. The first of these laid down that the object of law and policy should be the "entire amalgamation of all Her Majesty's subjects in New Zealand into one united people"; the second required that the Assembly assent to no law which did not accord each race equal civil and political privileges; and the other 3 resolutions asked for the Maori to be brought into Government, with fair representation in both Houses, Provincial Councils, juries and the courts. But Fitzgerald's majestic oratory could not persuade the House to accept all of his resolutions. The first 2, with their emphasis on the principle of amalgamation and restatement of the object of the third article of the Treaty of Waitangi, were accepted. But the third, which required fair political representation, was narrowly defeated, by 20 votes to 17, and Fitzgerald withdrew the remaining resolutions.[21] It was evident that European politicans were reluctant to allow Maori more than a token representation in Parliament, or other institutions of Government, even though the population balance was now running substantially in the European favour, due largely to the gold rushes in the South Island.

When Maori representation was again discussed in Parliament, it was brought up in relation to more insistent demands for representation for the goldfields districts of the South Island. In 1863 a Select Committee on Representation recommended that 13 new seats be created, 10 for the South Island and 3 for the North, 2 of which were to be for Europeans elected by Maori voters. But the proposals were not passed into law. There were further discussions in 1865, again prompted by demands for representation for the diggers. This time George Graham, an Auckland member, made the somewhat revolutionary proposal that Maori be granted a universal male franchise—but merely to elect 5 European members to represent them. However, Fitzgerald, who was now Minister for Native Affairs, preferred to proceed along the lines already foreshadowed when the Native Land Act was passed in 1862. He repealed that act and replaced it by a considerably modified and apparently simplified system of individualising Maori land titles, through the agency of a European-styled Native Land Court, which in due course would provide Maori landowners with the necessary property qualifications for the franchise. But it was evident, particularly in view of continuing warfare over much of the North Island, that it would take a long time for the court to individualise Maori land titles. Fitzgerald therefore established a Commission to report on conferring a temporary

[21]New Zealand Parliamentary Debates (NZPD),1861-3, pp.483-513.

franchise on Maori, pending the conversion of their titles to Crown grants.[22] Significantly, this Commission was to have a Maori majority: 20 to 35 Maori members as against 3 to 5 Europeans. Frederick Weld, the Premier, hoped that it would become a "kind of constituent assembly" of Maori chiefs, including Wiremu Tamehana and perhaps even the Maori King. Though some loyal chiefs were appointed, Fitzgerald lost office soon afterwards and his successor, Colonel Russell, failed to proceed with the Commission.[23] Instead he talked of appointing 3 Maori chiefs to the Legislative Council and 6 representatives (he expected them to be Europeans) to the Lower House. But that proposal was abandoned when Russell lost office in a Cabinet re-shuffle.

It was not the new Ministry, but an old expert in Maori administration, Donald McLean, now Superintendent of Hawke's Bay, who brought forward the next proposal for Maori representation in Parliament. Once more Maori representation was considered as a *quid pro quo* for increased representation for the South Island goldfields. McLean's Bill provided for 3 Maori representatives for the North Island and 1 for the South, while a Government Bill provided for 2 seats for Westland, thus preserving the existing balance between the 2 Islands. McLean introduced his Bill with a brief speech which indicated that he saw Maori representation as essentially a peace measure, though he also reminded the House that Maori owned three-quarters of the North Island and paid a considerable amount of tax.[24] He repeated the last point in moving the second reading of the Bill, noting that a population of some 47,000 Maori were contributing some £47,000 to Government revenue. With South Island demands for representation satisfied, there was no opposition to the Bill. However one or two members who supported it feared that Maori members, unable to understand English, would have difficulty following the complicated procedures of the House, but feared that if Europeans were allowed to represent the Maori voters, there would be, as A.S. Atkinson put it, "a great chance of their getting a very undesirable class of men in that House".[25] It was this fear that led to an important amendment to the Bill, making it clear that the members were to be chosen "from amongst and by the votes of the Maoris inhabiting each of the [electoral] districts". Only 2 members objected to the Bill on the ground that it constituted what Hugh Carleton described as "special legislation for the Native race". He thought it sufficient for the Maori to obtain their franchise through the existing system whereby they obtained Crown titles to their land under the Native Land Act, 1865; but Carleton did not press the point and vote against the Bill.[26] When McLean proposed the third reading of the Bill, W.H. Reynolds raised the point again and moved that the third reading be postponed for 6 months, but he got no support.[27]

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[22]W.K. Jackson and G.A. Wood, "The New Zealand Parliament and Maori Representation", *Historical Studies, Australia and New Zealand*, October 1964, p.386.
[23]Alan Ward, *A Show of Justice*, Canberra, 1974, p.188.
[24]NZPD, Vol.2, 1867, p.336.
[25]Ibid., p.461.
[26]Ibid., p.463; also James Paterson, ibid., p.465.
[27]Ibid., p.655.

There was rather more opposition to the Bill in the Legislative Council and 3 of the 17 members present voted against the second reading. Like Carleton in the House, G.A. Mantell expressed opposition to "special representation".[28] Colonel Whitmore hoped that the Bill would be "the last instance...of this exceptional legislation" but he accepted it because it was to be a temporary measure.[29] There was also, as might have been expected, opposition to the proposed manhood suffrage in the Maori electorates. Already in the existing seats there was, as Mantell complained, "a franchise narrowly approaching it, but he was sorry to see the principle openly adopted".[30] Other members saw it as objectionable "class legislation", which, as J.A. Menzies put it, "even a chartist almost could desire".[31] J.H. Harris, a fellow Otago Member, was even more vitriolic. The franchise, he complained, was being granted to "a people utterly unable to appreciate it—a people who ... were, in fact, not amenable to our laws, and who were only nominal subjects of the Crown; who were, in some cases, its open enemies; and who were totally incapable of legislating either for themselves or others".[32] But there was very little support for such views. Major Richardson, who proposed the second reading, feared that if Harris's views were bruited about they "would effectively stop any healing process which had been hoped for from the Bill".[33] Further opposition was voiced when the Bill came back for the third reading, but the opponents did not press for a vote.[34]

"In this way", as Alan Ward has written, "an important feature of the New Zealand constitution, remaining to this day, stumbled into being".[35] But of course no one at the time expected the system of separate representation to endure. The act was to remain in force for a mere 5 years. It was a temporary expedient, similar to the special representation previously granted to the Pensioner settlements at Auckland and the new seats now being granted to the diggers of Westland. It was a useful way of rewarding Maori loyalists and placating Maori rebels, while also assuring critics in Britain that the colonists would look after Maori interests. In Britain the Aborigines Protection Society had been pressing the Colonial Secretary to urge the New Zealand Government to return the confiscated lands, recognise the Maori King, and establish an independent Maori council to control Native Affairs.[36] But the New Zealand Government had no intention of heeding such demands; it was easier to concede 4 Maori seats in the House. Thus no high principle was involved in Maori representation. But it was still hoped that in due course, when Maori had obtained the necessary property qualifications, they would vote on a common roll and the 4 Maori seats would disappear. Those who already had such

[28]Ibid., p.813.
[29]Ibid., p.812.
[30]Ibid., p.814.
[31]Ibid., p.815.
[32]Ibid.
[33]Ibid., p.816.
[34]Ibid., pp.975-7.
[35]p.209.
[36]Sheila McLean, *Maori Representation, 1905-1948*, M.A. thesis, University of Auckland, 1949, p.5.

qualifications were eligible to vote for European seats, thereby exercising a double vote since they were also eligible to vote for a Maori seat. This privilege apart, the Maori were considerably under-represented: some 50,000 Maori were given 4 seats, whereas some 250,000 Europeans had 72. But there was no way that the European members would contemplate allowing Maori to have the 14 or 15 seats in the House that were due to them on a population basis, since that would allow them too much power to make and break Governments. In later years there was much concern when a mere 4 Maori members occasionally held the balance of power.

The 1867 Act was received without enthusiasm by the press, with the *New Zealand Herald* complaining that Maori representation would have been better obtained through the existing system of individualising land titles and thus giving Maori landowners the vote.[37] The *Daily Southern Cross* feared that the Maori members, ignorant of English, would be used by the Government of the day to pass obnoxious measures and "a great deal of ear-wigging would be done".[38]

The Maori Representation Act was a short measure of 12 sections. Its preamble explained that, because of the peculiar nature of Maori land tenure, few Maori had so far been able to register and vote for elections to the House of Representatives and the Provincial Councils; therefore it was expedient to make temporary provision for them to do so. The Act defined a Maori as "a male aboriginal inhabitant of New Zealand of the age of twenty-one years and upwards and shall include half-castes". It provided for the election of 4 members to represent the Maori race, one each for the electorates of Northern, Eastern, Western and Southern Maori. The boundaries were described in the Schedule. Northern Maori was to comprise all territory northwards of the Tamaki stream which divided the Manukau and Waitemata harbours. The remainder of the North Island was given over to Western and Eastern Maori which were bisected by a line running from the Wairakei stream in the Bay of Plenty along the boundary of Arawa territory to Titiraupunga, thence to and through Lake Taupo to the summit of the Ruahine range to Turakirae in Cook Strait. Southern Maori was to comprise the South Island, Stewart Island and adjacent islands. Section 6 of the act laid down that the representatives were to be chosen by and from the eligible electors in the 4 seats "who shall not at any time theretofore have been attained or convicted of any treason felony or infamous offence"—a provision which meant that Maori in rebellion against the Crown could be disenfranchised. Other provisions related to the issuing of writs, the alteration of boundaries, and the conduct of elections (ss.7-10). Section 11 provided for the election of "one or more" Maori members to Provincial Councils—a provision that was never implemented in the 8 years before the provincial system was abolished. Finally, the act was to remain in force for 5 years.

[37] 30 August 1867.
[38] 2, 9 September 1867.

CHAPTER VI

MAORI REPRESENTATION IN PARLIAMENT: THE FIRST PHASE, 1867-1887

The elections for the 4 Maori members were carried out in 1868, under the supervision of the Native Department and Resident Magistrates. There was no general poll since it was feared that this would excite tribal jealousies and swamp the influence of chiefs. William Rolleston, the Under-Secretary of the Native Department, told McLean that he wanted to avoid registration of Maori voters and polling "all over the country". Instead he would have a meeting at one place in the electorate where the "number of resident natives who in the event of a poll would turn the election in favour of the local candidate. I would take care that each tribe sent a number of influential men & when they were assembled I would put the case before them—the necessity of their agreeing as a race to send their best men & of sinking their tribal jealousy with this object. I would have a good feast and a good talk and I think there would be little doubt of the thing going off well".[39] Rolleston's ideas were soon given legal form when the Governor issued a proclamation, published in the *Gazette,* setting out the regulations for the election of the Maori members. These provided for the appointment of Returning Officers, the notification of polling places, the issuing of writs specifying the time and place of nomination, the calling for a show of hands by voters in the event of there being more than one nomination, and the holding of a poll should this be demanded. Such a poll was to be held a month later at specified polling places and the electors were to vote by declaration, with the Returning Officer writing down the name of the desired candidate and a Maori associate initialling the vote.[40] There was little secrecy about the system, though it remained in force for 70 years. Then another notice in the *Gazette* announced the polling places: 11 for Northern Maori, 14 for Western, 12 for Eastern, and 11 for Southern Maori.[41]

In the event Rolleston very nearly succeeded in avoiding elections. For Northern Maori the only nomination was F.N. Russell, a half-caste who had the support of Ngapuhi but not of Ngatiwhatua. Their leader, Paora Tuhaere, refused to recognise Russell, "lest we should be twice put into a false position by that nation the Ngapuhi".[42] For Western Maori the only nominee was Mete Kingi Paetahi, a loyalist chief from lower Waikato who most certainly did not have the support from the Waikato followers of the King. Since Paetahi was an assessor and thus, as a civil servant, technically disqualified from sitting in Parliament, a special act was necessary to validate his election. In Eastern Maori there was a contest. The nomination of the Ngatiporou candidate, Mokena Kohere, arrived at Napier too late but there was a show of hands for 2

[39]Rolleston to McLean, 17 December 1867. I am grateful to Alan Ward for providing me with a copy of this letter from the McLean Papers MSS 362, Alexander Turnbull Library.
[40]*The New Zealand Gazette,* 1868, pp. 103-4.
[41]Ibid., p. 111.
[42]Quoted by Ward, p. 210.

Ngatikahungunu candidates in which Tareha Te Moananui defeated Karaitiana Takamoana by 34 votes to 33. For Southern Maori 3 Kaiapoi men were nominated, a poll was demanded and John Patterson was elected.[43]

In view of the narrow basis of their support and their Kupapa (loyalist) affinities, it would not have been surprising if the Maori members were mere ciphers for the Government. But this did not prove to be the case. On their arrival in Parliament the Maori members were determined to speak and an interpreter had to be brought into the House. Mete Kingi, the former government assessor, angrily refuted suggestions that he or the other Maori members could be "bought".[44] They sometimes held the balance of power when European factions in the House were evenly divided; in the 1868 session 2 of the Maori members supported McLean when he moved a vote of censure against the Government on its Maori and defence policies, and the Government only survived with the Speaker's casting vote. In 1872 Stafford needed Maori votes to form a ministry; and he lost office a month later because he lost that Maori support. In return for their votes 2 of the Maori members, Wi Katene and Wi Parata, were appointed to the Executive Council.[45]

There was also more Maori interest in the 1871 election. All 4 Maori seats were contested and 2 ineffectual members, Russell for Northern Maori and Patterson for Southern Maori, were replaced by Wi Katene and H.K. Taiaroa respectively. We get some idea of the involvement of Maori in the election process from a report by the Deputy Returning Officer at the Bay of Islands, E.M. Williams, of polling day at Waimate North. It was an all-day hui, attended by some 700 men, women and children. Four candidates had been nominated, though one of them withdrew on the day. At Waimate 353 men voted; another 40-50 declined to do so. Williams described the meeting as orderly and harmonious: "Much interest has been manifested by the Natives in this present election, an active canvass has been maintained, and a strong muster brought to the poll". Although the local candidate, Hone Peti, topped the poll at Waimate, the seat was won by Wi Katene who had the support of the Rarawa tribe and the Hokianga section of Ngapuhi.[46]

Elections for the Maori seats were still dominated by tribal considerations and it was common for tribes that missed out to press Parliament to increase the number of Maori seats. Rival pakeha political factions also became involved, sometimes by backing different candidates for the Maori seats. A notable case was the election for Eastern Maori in 1871 when McLean backed Te Moananui and his rival, H.R. Russell, supported Takamoana who won the contest. Takamoana moved 3 resolutions proposing Maori representation in the Legislative Council and on the Executive Council, and an increase of representation in the House to 12. Only the first of these resolutions was passed and, as a result, Mokena Kohere and Wiremu Ngatata were appointed to the

[43]Ibid.
[44]Ibid., p. 210.
[45]Ibid.
[46]Williams to D. McLean, 15 February 1871, AJHR, 1871 F-6A, p.11; and Ward, p.344.

Legislative Council.[47] Thereafter there were usually 2 Maori representatives in the Council until its abolition in 1950.

In 1876 Taiaroa introduced a Bill providing for an increase in Maori representation in the House to 7 members, but the Bill was not passed.[48] In the same year H.M. Rangitakaiwaho and 394 others of the Ngatikahungunu tribe petitioned Parliament asking for Maori representation to be "in the same proportion as the representation is of the European race by European members" and for the Maori electorates to be based on tribal boundaries—a plea that was still being reiterated 110 years later.[49]

Sometimes rival European factions recruited Maori with the necessary property qualifications to vote in tightly contested European electorates. The fact that such Maori were exercising a double vote led to some pakeha criticism.[50] In 1879 most of the Maori votes on the European rolls were eliminated when their householder franchise was abolished. Now Maori could only vote in European electorates if they had a £50 freehold or were ratepayers, whereas the same act gave Europeans the adult male franchise. But there was no move to abolish the Maori seats lest the resulting flood of Maori voters onto the European rolls put too many North Island seats in jeopardy. According to Jackson and Wood, "any actual move towards amalgamation...aroused fears as great in the 1870s and 1880s as in the 1850s".[51] The 1867 Act was to remain in force for 5 years; but in 1872 it was extended for another 5 years; and in 1876 it was extended indefinitely. In time, it was assumed, miscegenation and the steady decline in Maori population, along with the rapid increase in the European population, would mean that it would no longer be dangerous to amalgamate Maori and pakeha representation. But, so far as Maori were concerned, their special representation came to be seen as their only guarantee that they would be represented at all.

Although the evidence is scanty—neither the government publications nor the newspapers published the full results in Maori elections prior to 1890, let alone reported electoral proceedings—it seems that Maori were gradually participating more fully in the electoral process. One indication of this is the steady increase in the number of polling places established for each election, no doubt at the insistence of Maori communities. For the 1875 election 13 polling places were established for Northern Maori, 21 for Western, 18 for Eastern and 14 for Southern Maori.[52] By 1887 the numbers had risen to 35 for Northern, 86 for Western, 61 for Eastern and 25 for Southern Maori.[53] Usually a local schoolhouse or courthouse was used, but quite often a chief's house or a runanga house was chosen. Moreover polling booths were now

[47]NZPD, Vol.10, 1871, pp.471-76; see also Appendix 5.
[48]Ibid., Vol. 22, 1876, p.230.
[49]AJHR, 1876 J-6, pp.1-2; for recent pleas see, for instance, the submissions of the Maori workshop on representation in Parliament at the Turangawaewae conference, 10-13 May 1985, to the Royal Commission on the Electoral System.
[50]Jackson and Wood, p.389.
[51]p. 388.
[52]*The New Zealand Gazette*, 1875, p.799.
[53]Ibid., pp. 1032-33.

established in some of the most remote settlements in the North Island, an indication that participation in elections was no longer confined to the Kupapa or loyalists. For the 1886 by-election for Western Maori 5 polling places were established in the King Country. In the event the King party tribes split their votes, with Ngatimaniapoto supporting the Ngatiraukawa candidate, Hoani Taipua, and the King and his Waikato tribes supporting Major Wiremu Te Wheoro, a former Kupapa who had also previously held the seat. Taipua polled a total of 1,158 votes to Te Wheoro's 516, a result that gave the government agent some smug satisfaction as "showing how small now is Tawhiao's following within the Western Maori electoral district".[54] By 1887 polling places were established at Ruatahuna, Fort Galatea and Lake Waikaremoana on the fringes of the Urewera country.[55] Three years later a polling place was established at Hetaraka Te Whakaunua's house at Maungapohatu, in the heart of the Urewera, and the hapless Deputy Returning Officer, J.T. Large, was sent off on a 15-day trek from Lake Waikaremoana to record the votes. But he found on arrival that Te Whakaunua and his people had gone off to Whakatane and that those who remained "expressed indignation at a polling place being established under their sacred mountain". He was told to count the trees for votes but eventually persuaded a few of the men to cast their votes. And, despite getting lost and injured, he concluded that it was all worthwhile: "it has undoubtedly the effect of maintaining friendly relations between the government and this isolated tribe".[56] With this effort it could be said that all of the Maori tribes, if not all of their eligible voters, had been brought into the electoral process.

Although there is insufficient electoral data to present a full analysis of Maori voting behaviour in this period, there seems little doubt that tribal considerations were uppermost in the selection and support for candidates. They were sufficient, according to Ward, to "render invalid an analysis of Maori elections according to the normal criteria of psephology".[57] There were enough rivalries to ensure that elections never went uncontested, with Government being put to considerable expense and bother to collect what was often a mere handful of votes from remote polling places. Election to Parliament had become a matter of considerable personal and tribal mana.

But in Parliament the Maori voice was often ineffectual on matters of vital importance to them. Their members invariably opposed the Native Land Acts that were designed to facilitate settler purchase of Maori land; but their protests were ignored.[58] Although all 4 Maori members sat on the Native Affairs Committee, set up in 1872 to handle the flood of Maori petitions that poured into the House, they were invariably out-voted on large issues—like the return of the confiscated lands—but

[54]G.T. Wilkinson to T.W. Lewis, 19 May 1887, AJHR, 1887 Vol. II, G-1, p.5.
[55]Ibid., 1887, p.1033.
[56]Enclosure in G. Preece to T.W. Lewis, 16 December 1890, MA 23/15, National Archives.
[57]p.344.
[58]M.P.K. Sorrenson, *The purchase of Maori lands, 1865–1892*, MA thesis, Auckland University College, 1955, p.229.

sometimes won favourable decisions on lesser matters. According to Ward, the committee "was one institution which helped...to prevent the Maori from quite despairing of the parliamentary system".[59] Yet for the Maori members, despair and despondency must have been common for much of the time. Unable to speak English and therefore unable to follow the normal cut and thrust of parliamentary debates, and very often ignored or ridiculed when they did speak on important Maori matters, the Maori members were little more than a token representation that enabled the pakeha members to salve their consciences while also relieving the Maori of much of their remaining land and autonomy.

Since Maori members were largely powerless in Parliament, it seemed to many Maori that they would better protect their interests by remaining outside the European system. Indeed some Maori groups had remained outside the system for some time after the last shots in the New Zealand wars. After the battle of Orakau the Maori King and his Waikato supporters had taken refuge south of the confiscation line along the Puniu river in Ngatimaniapoto territory, henceforth known as the King Country. Here, for more than 20 years, Tawhiao resisted all Government overtures for the opening of the King Country to land sales and the law, and the approaching Main Trunk railway, always insisting on a complete return of the confiscated Waikato lands. As was the case before the war, the Kingites were trying to preserve local autonomy. In 1884 Tawhiao came out of the King Country and led a Maori delegation to England to present a petition to the Queen asking her to "grant a government to your Maori subjects...that they may have power to make laws regarding their own lands, and race, lest they perish by the ills which have come upon them".[60] Once more the Kingites were hoping that s.71 of the Constitution Act would be applied to them. The British had long been sympathetic to this plea—Newcastle, as Secretary of State for the Colonies, had recommended it to the New Zealand Government in 1861, but that plea could be ignored since Newcastle had also agreed to the transfer of responsibility for Maori affairs. In 1884 Tawhiao and his deputation were politely referred back to the Government in Wellington, and that Government had no intention of applying s.71 to the King Country or any other Maori district. In any case by 1884 the due processes of law—more especially the operations of the Native Land Court—were effectively eroding the King's independence. By that time, the leading Ngatimaniapoto chiefs, anxious not to let Tawhiao and his Waikato followers establish a title by occupation to land in the King Country, had agreed to allow the Native Land Court to adjudicate the external boundaries. They were duly rewarded when the court in the Rohepotae judgement of 1888 upheld their titles. In 1885 Ngatimaniapoto allowed the Main Trunk railway to enter the King Country—thus ceremonially opening it to European enterprise—and Tawhiao and his Waikato supporters withdrew, thereafter to follow a peripatetic existence, moving from one reserve to

[59]p.271
[60]Quoted by John A. Williams, *Politics of the New Zealand Maori*, Seattle, 1969, p.43.

another within the confiscated block. Although territorial autonomy was no longer possible for the King movement, it still attempted to maintain political autonomy while also participating in the election of members for Western Maori. In the last years of his life Tawhiao continued to resist Government offers of a pension and a seat in the Legislative Council; and he continued to issue proclamations warning Europeans that they too were subject to "the laws of the Government of the kingdom of Aotearoa".[61]

Though the King's independent stand earned him much Maori sympathy, if little practical support, there were other centres of independency. The Urewera, home of Te Kooti's Ringatu supporters, also remained beyond the pale of pakeha law, though Te Kooti himself lived in the King Country until he was pardoned in 1883. There was yet another centre of independency: that of the prophet Te Whiti who organised passive resistance to the European occupation of the Taranaki confiscated lands from his settlement at Parihaka. For a while in the late 1870s and early 1880s Te Whiti commanded more support than the Maori King. He caused a succession of pakeha politicians to over-react. Passive resisters were arrested and imprisoned in droves. *Habeas corpus* was suspended. Then in 1881 the Native Minister, John Bryce, led 1500 heavily armed militia on Parihaka and Te Whiti, along with his chief lieutenant, Tohu Kakahi, were arrested, and held without trial for 15 months in the South Island. It was a heavy-handed demonstration of the pakeha determination to bring all Maori within the reach of the law.

But even within those Maori districts ostensibly under the law there remained some degree of autonomy. Maori communities, particularly at the level of hapu and whanau, remained very much to themselves, guided, for most domestic matters, by acknowledged chiefs and local runanga (committees). Maori matters continued to be regulated by tribal law and custom, though this was considerably modified by Christian codes. It was only when they had to deal with local pakeha, whether settlers or officials, that Maori had to abide by pakeha law. There was also a huge amount of intra-tribal activity, perhaps most conspicuously the annual hui held by the King movement and by Te Whiti, but also in other tribal districts. These gatherings were intensely political: though tribal rivalries and animosities remained, Kingites rubbed shoulders with Kupapa, and policies were thrashed out to combat the insistent pakeha demand for land, the operations of the Native Land Court, and legislation emanating from Wellington. There was an important attempt to institutionalise these proceedings when the Ngatiwhatua chief, Paora Tuhaere, a man with an impeccable loyalist record, tried to reconvene the Kohimarama conference in 1869. Ten years later he summoned a Maori Parliament at Orakei. The movement gathered force in the 1880s with a series of hui culminating with a meeting at Waitangi in 1889 at which a Maori Union of Waitangi was formed.[62] Significantly, this

[61]Quoted by Williams, p.45.
[62]Ibid., p.50.

meeting looked back to that earlier assembly at Waitangi, some 50 years ago, at which Maori chiefs thought that they had preserved their power and authority. Now the chiefs would attempt to regain that authority, hopefully from the Parliament in Wellington, but if not from a Parliament of their own. And they looked to their representatives in Wellington, particularly the member for Northern Maori, Hirini Taiwhanga, to assist them with this new endeavour.

CHAPTER VII

MAORI REPRESENTATION IN PARLIAMENT: THE SECOND PHASE, 1887-1935

In 1887 two talented English-speaking Maori won seats in the House: Hirini Taiwhanga for Northern Maori and James Carroll for Eastern Maori. Taiwhanga was educated at St John's College in Auckland, and then worked as a surveyor and government assessor. He was no stranger to politics, having contested every election for Northern Maori since 1871. According to Ward, he was "too excitable and radical" for Ngapuhi in the 1870s but he gradually won their trust in the next decade through involvement in the Maori Parliament and Treaty of Waitangi movement.[63] However Taiwhanga was much distrusted by Europeans, mainly because of his organisation of Tawhiao's visit to England in 1884. Taiwhanga quickly made his mark in the House and in 1888 was involved in a famous "stonewall" when he attempted to delay the passing of a Native Land Bill designed to facilitate settler purchase of Maori land.[64] But Taiwhanga's one-man filibuster was soon put down and the Bill was passed. His colourful contribution to Parliament ended with his death on the eve of his re-election in 1890. In 1893 the equally gifted and rather more stable Hone Heke, a nephew of the leader of the 1845 rebellion, won Northern Maori and represented the electorate until his death in 1909.

James Carroll, the new member for Eastern Maori, was to play a more substantial role in Parliament than either of the members for Northern Maori. Carroll was part Irish, part Maori. Though he had only 2 years of formal schooling, Carroll was employed as a clerk in the Lands Department and then as Native Interpreter to the House of Representatives. It was here, no doubt, that Carroll began to acquire his knowledge of parliamentary procedure and debate that made him one of the finest speakers in the House. He stood unsuccessfully against Wi Pere for Eastern Maori in 1884 but defeated him in 1887. Carroll held the seat until 1893 when he switched to the European seat of Waiapu until 1908 and then to Gisborne which he held until 1919. To hold his seat he had to tend the interests of pakeha electors while also trying to protect the welfare of Maori. As a staunch supporter of the Liberal party, Carroll was soon appointed to Cabinet: as Member of the Executive Council Representing the Native Race in 1892, Minister for Stamp Duties in 1896, and Minister for Native Affairs in 1899, holding that office until the Liberals were defeated in 1912.

As Minister for Native Affairs, Carroll gained an unprecedented degree of Maori support for his policy and legislation.[65] His Maori Councils Act of 1900 provided for the establishment of 11 tribal councils and below these numerous village committees. The councils were given authority to impose sanitation, control liquor, and promote health reform

[63]p.291.
[64]NZPD, Vol.63, 1888, pp.448-51.
[65]G.V.Butterworth, "Maori land legislation: the work of Carroll and Ngata", *The New Zealand Law Journal*, August 1985, pp.242-9.

and education—belated recognition of the long-standing Maori demand for local government by tribal runanga. It was also a shrewdly conceived means of cutting Maori support for a larger form of autonomy, then being powerfully advocated by the Kotahitanga or Maori Parliament movement. In 1900 Carroll passed another important piece of legislation, the Maori Lands Administration Act, which established Maori-controlled land boards to develop Maori land and lease any surplus. The act had the signal effect of halting alienation of Maori land—only 6,773 acres of land had been leased to Europeans by 1905. There was a hue and cry from the press and Parliament, and Carroll was forced to amend the act, placing the land boards under European control and giving them power compulsorily to lease Maori land. Then in 1907 the Stout-Ngata Commission was appointed to determine how much land should be retained for Maori use and how much could be made available for European settlement. The Commission examined some 3,000,000 acres of Maori land, and recommended that some 600,000 acres be made available for European settlement, mainly by leasehold. Threatened by a seepage of back-blocks farmer support to the rising Reform Party, Carroll and the Liberals were having to meet the incessant European demand for Maori land in the North Island.

Although Carroll was personally opposed to separate Maori representation in Parliament,[66] he was party to several legislative changes that helped to perpetuate that system. In 1893 the Liberal Government extended the franchise to women, including Maori women who voted for the Maori seats. At the same time the Liberals ended the dual Maori vote whereby Maori registered on the European rolls by virtue of property qualifications could also vote in a European constituency. When property qualifications were abolished in 1896, it was laid down that Maori could vote only in Maori electorates. Only half-castes, hitherto required to vote for the Maori seats, were now given a choice. Thus the electoral systems were segregated and any hope of a single amalgamated system, originally envisaged when the 1852 Constitution Act came into force, was left to the piecemeal process of miscegenation. The 4 Maori seats were more firmly established than ever.

Ironically, Carroll was to ensure that those seats were more effectively occupied than ever before—by bringing his "young colts",[67] the gifted men of the Young Maori party, into Parliament. The first was Apirana Ngata, who defeated Wi Pere for Eastern Maori in 1905. Born at Waiomatatini in 1874, educated at the local Native school, Te Aute College in Hawke's Bay, and Canterbury and Auckland University Colleges, where he took degrees in Arts and Law, Ngata was the most gifted Maori of his generation. He was destined to become one of the great parliamentarians of this century. He held Eastern Maori for 38 years, in that time becoming "Father" of the House. In 1909, following the sudden death of Hone Heke, Carroll managed to facilitate the

[66]NZPD, Vol.134, 1905, p.37.
[67]A.T.Ngata to P.H.Buck, 29 June 1931, Ramsden MS Papers 196/312, Alexander Turnbull Library.

election of another Te Aute graduate, Pita Te Rangihiroa, better known as Peter Buck.[68] Then in 1911 the third of the Te Aute College old boys, Maui Pomare, like Buck a trained doctor, entered Parliament as member for Western Maori. Buck had graduated from Otago Medical School but Pomare had attended the Seventh Day Adventist Medical College at Battle Creek, Chicago. It was possibly this American experience that led Pomare to differ from Buck and Ngata in his approach to the place of Maori in New Zealand society. Pomare was an outspoken assimilationist, and wanted Maori to become pakeha as rapidly as possible, whereas Buck and Ngata were more cautious, more sympathetic to Carroll's taihoa (by and by) policy. Though all three were members of the Young Maori party, this was never a political party in the European sense. While Ngata and Buck remained loyal to the Liberals, Pomare supported Massey's Reform Party.

In contrast to Carroll and the Te Aute trio, the members for Southern Maori were undistinguished. Southern Maori had become a family fief, held by Tame Parata from 1885 to 1911, by his son Taare until 1918, then by J.H.W. Uru until 1921 and his son Henare until 1928. The Paratas and the Urus seldom intervened in debates, except on the long-standing grievance of the Ngaitahu—the failure of successive Governments to set aside adequate reserves or make sufficient compensation following the original purchase of the Canterbury block. But their persistence was eventually rewarded when a Commission was established to investigate the grievance in 1925.

The contribution of the three giants of the Young Maori party to Parliament cannot be adequately summarised in a few paragraphs.[69] Buck can be discussed first since he spent only 5 years in Parliament. As would be expected, Buck was mainly interested in medical matters; indeed in 1913 he took leave from Parliament to carry out inoculations against a small-pox outbreak in his constituency. He was not as strict a party man as Ngata and at times spoke out sharply against Liberal legislation which he saw as facilitating European acquisition of Maori land. On one occasion he lamented that soon the only soil left to the Maori "will be what they have under their finger nails".[70] However his commitment to politics was gradually giving way to a consuming passion for anthropology. Buck took advantage of parliamentary recesses to visit the Cook Islands in 1911 and Niue in 1913. Even in the House, he had the habit of poring over anthropology books instead of contributing to Hansard.[71] Buck was also well aware of what he called the "absolute impotency" of Maori members, "when a policy measure is going through that is inimical to them".[72] But Buck, like Carroll, was not committed to separate representation and in the 1914 election stood for the European seat of the Bay of Islands. He very nearly won it, failing by

[68]P.H.Buck, "He Poroporoaki—A Farewell Message", in E. Ramsden, ed., *Sir Apirana Ngata Memorial Tribute*, Wellington, 1951, p.63.
[69]The fullest discussion is in McClean, pp.11-89.
[70]NZPD, Vol.167, 1913, p.413.
[71]T.E.Y.Seddon to E.Ramsden, 4 April 1953, Ramsden MS Papers 196/333.
[72]NZPD, Vol.167, 1913, p.825.

only 108 votes. He soon went off to the war—as Medical Officer to the Maori Pioneer Battalion—and never again returned to politics.

Pomare, by contrast, remained in Parliament from his election to Western Maori in 1911 until his death in 1930. His assimilationist views and support for Reform gave him a rapid entry into Massey's Cabinet, if not to high office. He was appointed as Member of the Executive Council Representing the Native Race in 1912, but not to the portfolio of Native Affairs which was handed first to W.H. Herries and then to Gordon Coates. However Pomare did become Minister for the Cook Islands in 1916, Minister of Health in 1923, and Minister of Internal Affairs in 1928. Pomare's "desertion" of his Young Maori party colleagues earned him their bitter enmity. Their differences were sharply revealed in the debate over the Native Land Amendment Bill—designed to facilitate European freeholding of leases of Maori land—in 1913. Ngata and Buck attacked the Bill with Buck saying that "under the cloak of enabling the Maori to individualize his land...the Government is only taking a step in denuding him of his land".[73] But Pomare replied that individualisation of titles was "one of the chief essentials to the solution of the Native land problem....Communism has been the death-trap of the Native race". Ngata interjected that this was just "pakeha clap-trap". But Pomare continued: "No amount of communism will save any race....If the Maori tomorrow were dispossessed of all his land, and began to go on his own initiative and commenced to work, he would be a better citizen than continuing to be a spoon-fed Native...the only way to salvation of the Maori is by individual effort....I say there should be one law for the Pakeha and for the Maori....We have one King, one country and we should have one law".[74] And so the interchange proceeded with what one historian has called "some of the bitterest remarks ever made by one Maori to another on the floor of the House of Representatives".[75]

But in later years there was some reconciliation between Pomare and Ngata. They worked together to recruit Maori volunteers during the war. After the war, when Pomare had more mana in Cabinet and the sympathetic Coates was Minister for Native Affairs, Pomare and Ngata persuaded the Government to investigate a number of long-standing Maori land grievances, including the confiscations carried out during the wars of the 1860s. A Royal Commission recommended compensation. It was Pomare's finest achievement. Just before his death Pomare persuaded his Taranaki people to accept an annual payment of £5,000 and Ngata, now Minister for Native Affairs, persuaded his Cabinet to approve. As Ngata explained, "My honour was involved in the Parliamentary affirmation of the settlement...but the financial situation was most difficult and [Prime Minister] Forbes on the eve of departure for London. A fortnight before the arrival of [Pomare's] ashes I wrapped my resignation round the kaupapa [proposal] and handed both to Forbes. At 5 p.m. of the day he left...the settlement received his formal

[73]NZPD, Vol.167, 1913, p.412.
[74]Ibid., pp.407-8, 412.
[75]McClean, p.36.

approval and that of Cabinet".[76] Despite their earlier antagonism, Ngata and Buck were generous in their summation of Pomare's contribution to Maori politics. Ngata said that "he had made it possible to weld the Tai-hauauru peoples together for the most important developments ahead of them. He talked in parables, indulged in 'whakatauki' and so on, because probably greater definiteness would have disappointed his people. To some extent he filled the role of Carroll who propounded general ideas in terms indefinite and elastic enough to cover practical schemes of more prosaic minds. As with Carroll he was able to hold the interest and support of many of the elders of the Western tribes up to the last". Buck in reply referred to Pomare's "oracular method of speech based on the methods of Te Whiti....Carroll found it useful for, like the Delphic oracle, the utterances were left to the people to interpret in the way that suited them best. If it did not come off, it was the interpretation that was wrong and not the original utterance".[77]

Ngata's achievements in Parliament tower over those of his fellow Maori members. He entered Parliament as Carroll's protege and in his early years loyally served his chief on Commissions of Inquiry, in the Native Affairs Committee, and in drafting legislation and steering it through the House. He was assiduous and hard-working, and, unlike Carroll and Buck, steered clear of Bellamy's and the social whirl of Wellington. Tom Seddon, who sat on the Native Affairs Committee with Buck and Ngata, gives us an inside view of the Committee at work. He described it as "the friendliest in the House". It was presided over by Carroll, "always smiling indulgently at the three of us", with Ngata "all the while most vigilant and prompting his chief".[78]

Perhaps Ngata's greatest achievement at this stage of his parliamentary career was his part in drafting the 1909 Native Land Bill with the Solicitor-General, Sir John Salmond. The Bill consolidated some 50 years of Maori land legislation and "laid the foundations of modern Maori land law".[79] Although the Bill freed up existing restrictions on European purchase of Maori land, it also imposed new controls by giving the land boards authority to approve alienations and, in the case of land owned by ten or more individuals, requiring the approval of a meeting of assembled owners. But the Bill also provided for the development of Maori land by encouraging assembled owners to form incorporations or consolidate their individual interests, thus giving legal sanction to the land reforms that Ngata was already carrying out with his Ngatiporou people. Ngata and Carroll cleverly slipped the massive Bill through the House in the dying stages of the 1909 session. On 15 December at 11.30 pm Carroll suddenly proposed the second reading; Massey tried to stonewall with a speech lasting an hour and a half; but the 441 clauses of the Bill were pushed through before a few uninterested members. The Bill received its third reading the following

[76]Ngata to Buck, 20 September 1930, Ramsden Papers 196/312.
[77]Ngata to Buck, 16 July 1930; and Buck to Ngata, August mm 1930, Ramsden Papers 196/312.
[78]Seddon to Ramsden, 4 April 1953, Ramsden Papers 196/333.
[79]Butterworth, p.248.

day.[80] It was left to Ngata to bring the act into operation. Between them Carroll, Ngata and Salmond had gone a long way to satisfying Maori owners on the one hand and European purchasers on the other, although the emphasis on leasing rather than outright purchase was to give the Opposition, with their demand for freehold and condemnation of Maori "landlordism", a rallying cry that would contribute to their election victory in 1912.

Ngata's star was still rising. He was taking over more responsibilities from Carroll, having attained Cabinet rank with his appointment in 1909 as Member of the Executive Council Representing the Native Race. He was set to succeed Carroll as Minister for Native Affairs but that succession was long delayed since the Liberals lost office in 1912 and did not regain it, in the guise of the United party, until 1928.

In the meantime Ngata had remained loyal to the Liberal Opposition. But this did not stop him from working very closely with Coates who said in 1925, "Mr Ngata was not a party man....We form a little Parliament of five, myself as Native Minister and the four Maori members. It is all done in private but we appreciate Mr Ngata's help very much indeed".[81] In this way Ngata was able to persuade Coates and his Reform Government to back his land development schemes and a variety of other measures for Maori welfare. Coates twice offered Ngata the portfolio of Native Affairs, but he remained loyal to the Liberal party.[82] Then, to Ngata's great surprise,[83] the erstwhile Liberals, now renamed United, won enough seats in the 1928 election to form a Government—with Labour's tacit support. Ngata was suddenly propelled into office as Native Minister.

Ngata was now 54 but he entered upon his long-awaited responsibilities with the verve and energy of a man of half his age. Although he had begun land consolidation and development schemes among his own tribe before the First World War and these reforms spread gradually to other tribes after the war, it was not until he got into office that Ngata had the opportunity to push rapidly ahead. Ngata took personal responsibility for many of the schemes, making decisions on all manner of things with a network of tribal leaders on the ground. The departmental officers and accountants in Wellington were unable to keep up with the paper work. Ngata was critical of bureaucratic red tape[84] and looked on land development, not so much from a clinical commercial viewpoint, but also as a way of regenerating Maori culture through local tribal leadership. He preferred to use local Maori leaders with mana, like Te Puea Herangi in Waikato, than trained European farm supervisors. Above all, Ngata was determined to increase expenditure and get as many land development schemes under way as rapidly as possible. This was ultimately to be his undoing, since he was increasing expenditure on Maori land development at the very time that an acute

[80]Ibid.,p.248.
[81]*New Zealand Herald*, 4 November 1925, quoted by McClean, p.59.
[82]Ngata to Buck, 17 December 1928, Ramsden Papers, 196/310.
[83]Ibid.
[84]NZPD, Vol.225, 1930, p.684.

depression was forcing the Government (with his approval) to cut expenditure in other fields. As a result of pressure from the National Expenditure Commission, Ngata's powers over the Native Land Court and the Maori Land Boards were curtailed in 1932. But the critics were still not satisfied. The following year the Auditor-General refused to endorse the accounts for the Maori land development schemes and was supported by the Public Accounts Committee. In the face of mounting public criticism, much of it barely disguised racism, Prime Minister Forbes decided in 1934 to appoint a Commission of Inquiry. Headed by Mr Justice Smith, the Commission took a very hard line: the land development schemes were closely scrutinised, along with all items of expenditure; some of Ngata's subordinates were found to have been involved in corrupt practices—one was subsequently prosecuted—and Ngata himself was criticised for high-handed administrative actions, as well as having used his position to favour his tribe and his family. The Commission said that "it was necessary to appreciate that the Native Minister was himself a Maori. The psychological factors in the situation...were the result of tribal habits of thought and feelings to which he was himself subject. These habits involved the care of his own tribe and the support of any other tribes who assisted him....The Minister, although ... a member of a tribe, was, as a Minister of the Crown, bound to refrain from using state funds, without lawful authority, in the interests of his tribe....We regret to state that the Native Minister failed not infrequently in these matters".[85]

During the course of the inquiry Ngata said little, except when called to give evidence, but he did say privately to Buck that "an administrative system with strong pakeha leanings will not be happy unless the instruments of its will are of its own colour and outlook", adding, with uncharacteristic rancour: "one has learnt how to eat mud, to endure vilification and to slave under the mana of other men so long as the objectives of one's life are furthered".[86] When the report came out Ngata merely noted that the Commission had "adopted a hostile attitude right through, supporting the complaints of the Audit Department" and that the report lacked the "breadth of vision" that he had expected.[87] Ngata loyally took responsibility for the criticisms and tendered his resignation. But Buck, writing from the Bishop Museum in Hawaii, was much more outspoken on the "frenzy" of government officials when Ngata had dared "to set them aside and break through their taboo restrictions....So long as the pakeha can patronise, he will say nice things about a noble [Maori] race but when it comes to direct competition, jealousy of race is very evident...as manifested against you".[88] On the pakeha side Ngata had few supporters—the most notable was Professor I.L.G. Sutherland[89]—but numerous critics. The *New Zealand Herald* bluntly proclaimed that after what the Commission

[85]Report of the Native Affairs Commission of Inquiry, AJHR, 1934 G-11, p.39.
[86]Ngata to Buck, 27 November 1933, Ramsden Papers, 196/313.
[87]Ngata to Buck, 11 February 1934, Ramsden Papers, 196/313.
[88]Buck to Ngata, 29 November 1934, Ramsden Papers, 196/313.
[89]See *The Maori Situation*, Wellington, 1935, pp.76-85.

had found, no Maori should ever be put in charge of Maori affairs again.[90]

The affair cannot be examined at greater length, but it is worth noting that it revealed more sharply than anything before or afterwards the inability of the pakeha establishment—Parliament, the bureaucracy, the judiciary, and the press—to bend procedures to allow a Maori Minister to do things in a Maori way. But the Commission and its report provided the Labour Opposition with a golden opportunity to lambast the beleaguered Coalition Government. Labour were soon to be rewarded in the 1935 election and Ngata spent his remaining years in Parliament in the Opposition—until he was himself defeated in 1943.

Ngata's parliamentary career demonstrated more clearly than those of any of his colleagues both the opportunities but also the ultimate limitations of the existing system of Maori representation in Parliament. A trained lawyer with a brilliant mind and an unrivalled command of English, Ngata was able to foot it with any of his pakeha colleagues or rivals in Parliament. He was also a loyal party man who frequently put party before his personal interests and often compromised the larger interest of the Maori people. Before the First World War he could only hinder, not stop, the alienation of Maori land; and even after the war, when there was a more sympathetic pakeha attitude to Maori needs, it was a long time before he got Government to fund Maori land development. Even then, Ngata sometimes accepted lower standards for Maori than were being applied to pakeha—for instance, lower unemployment benefits. But, as the Commission of Inquiry demonstrated, there was a limit to how far a Maori Minister of Native Affairs could go before setting off a pakeha backlash.

Yet it was in the period considered here, from 1887-1935, which spans the high points of the careers of Carroll and his Young Maori party proteges, that the system of Maori representation in Parliament became firmly fixed in the New Zealand political system. For Carroll and his young colts brilliantly demonstrated that Maori members could operate the system as well as any of the European members. Their success allowed Europeans a little reflected glory, since the Young Maori party, helping to foster a Maori renaissance, were also giving pakeha New Zealanders an opportunity to claim success in race relations, if not yet in amalgamating the races. All provided, of course, that those Maori members did not overstep the limits, as Ngata unfortunately did.

The abolition of the Maori seats was occasionally discussed. Carroll sometimes spoke in favour of it, saying in 1905 that the Maori would be better off without special representation and would receive more attention if they voted on the general roll.[91] In that debate several European members spoke to the same effect, but significantly Hone Heke defended special Maori representation by referring to the Cape Colony where a common roll was in existence and there was a widespread European fear that the more numerous non-Europeans

[90] 1 November 1934.
[91] NZPD, Vol.134, 1905, p.37.

would eventually control the Parliament.[92] Europeans in New Zealand held no such fears, despite a recent up-turn in Maori numbers, since they constituted a mere 5.6% of the population.

Although European members saw the abolition of the Maori seats as ultimately desirable in the interests of assimilation, any such abolition meant that Maori voters would have to be registered on the common roll. For many years no Government was prepared to grasp that nettle. An act of 1914, providing for the preparation of Maori rolls, remained a dead letter for 35 years. In 1919 the Electoral Department made a half-hearted attempt to prepare a roll, based on the declaration votes recorded in 1914. Posters calling on them to enrol and enrolment forms were sent to post offices and other places where Maori were likely to congregate. A mere 796 enrolled. The Chief Electoral Officer considered that the task was hopeless, unless the Government made registration compulsory.[93] Since the Government was unwilling to pass such legislation, there was a stalemate. Each time there was a request for the preparation of rolls, the Chief Electoral Officer, in typical "Yes Minister" fashion, raised numerous difficulties or said that "it was very doubtful whether the time was opportune".[94] Although the United Party election manifesto for 1928 promised that Maori rolls would be prepared, the inaction continued. Eventually, in response to several requests from the member for Southern Maori and Maori electors, the Chief Electoral Officer reiterated his opinion that the "time was not opportune". Forbes referred the advice to Ngata who agreed that the preparation of Maori rolls was "not practicable"[95]—and there the matter rested until the Labour Government grasped the nettle in time for the 1949 election.

Since Maori elections were conducted without a roll of registered voters and as semi-public affairs lacking an effective guarantee of secrecy, there was bound to be criticism from time to time. In 1908 one of the judges presiding at the hearing of an election petition over the Northern Maori seat roundly condemned the existing practice, which allowed a vote by a show of hands if a poll was not demanded. As a result, the Legislative Amendment Act of 1910 abolished this system and required voting by declaration for all Maori elections. Each Maori voter had to declare for one of the candidates before a Returning Officer and a Maori associate who could, if necessary, act as an interpreter. At the time the Prime Minister, Sir Joseph Ward, said that "more time should be given to the Maoris before we compel them to adopt the European system of elections".[96] In the debate the Leader of the Opposition, W.F. Massey, had spoken of the need to abolish the Maori seats and complained that the Southern Maori seat represented no more than 2,000 Maori people, compared with the average European seat in the South Island which represented some 12,000 persons.[97] But

[92]Ibid., pp.34-7.
[93]J.Hislop to Massey, 19 July 1920, EL 19/15/3, National Archives.
[94]Hislop to Massey, 20 October 1920, EL 19/15/3; reply prepared by G.G.Hodgkins to question by H.E.Holland in House, 8 September 1928, EL 19/6.
[95]Hodgkins to Forbes, 23 July 1934, and Ngata to Forbes, 31 July 1934, EL 19/6.
[96]NZPD, Vol.153, 1910, p.656.
[97]Ibid., p.663.

he did not attempt to abolish the seats when he came to power. Nor did the Liberals when they returned to office as the United Party in 1928, though they could scarcely do so with Ngata number 3 in Cabinet.

The success of the Young Maori party leaders in Parliament also meant the gradual demise of autonomous, extra-parliamentary Maori political movements. The most notable of these was the Kotahitanga movement which at its height at the end of the nineteenth century claimed, with some exaggeration, to have the support of 37,000 Maori.[98] The ideal of Kotahitanga, or Maori unity with autonomy, had a long but tenuous history. It began with Busby's confederation of northern chiefs, continued through the King movement, the Kohimarama conference of 1860, took more tangible form with Paora Tuhaere's Parliament at Orakei in 1879, and culminated in the formation of a "Maori Union of Waitangi" in 1899. Over the next 2 years, hui at Waiomatatini, Omahu and Wanganui supported the proposal. In 1891 the Arawa people petitioned the Queen for a separate Maori Parliament, "as your Majesty has already concluded with us the glorious bond of union in the Treaty of Waitangi".[99] The petition was bound to fail since the Queen would not intervene in New Zealand politics; it was necessary for the Maori leaders to take their project to the New Zealand Parliament in Wellington. Meeting at Waitangi in April 1892, they agreed to form a Maori Parliament. This was to be composed of a lower house of 96 elected members, and an upper house of 50 members, chosen by the lower house. It was thus similar to the European Parliament in Wellington, although the electoral districts were based on tribal boundaries. The Maori Parliament held its first session at Waipatu in Hawke's Bay later in the year. It continued to meet annually in different Maori settlements for the next 11 years.

The Maori Parliament had a very considerable measure of support, more particularly from the loyalist or Kupapa tribes, the very people who had long been involved in electing members for the 4 Maori seats. But it failed to gain the adherence of Te Whiti's followers at Parihaka or the King movement. In 1894 the Kingites decided to set up their own Parliament, or Kauhanganui, at Maungakawa near Cambridge. However it soon became evident that the pakeha Parliament in Wellington would brook no rival. Although that Government did not interfere with meetings of either the Kingite Kauhanganui or the Kotahitanga Parliament, any attempt by the Maori Parliaments to exercise authority which resulted in a breach of the law was suppressed. Thus when Kerei Kaihau, a follower of the Maori King, decided to destroy survey pegs for a government road in Waikato—because "he recognised no laws but King Tawhiao's"[100]—he and his followers were promptly arrested and jailed at Mt Eden.

As befitted their loyalist status, the supporters of the Kotahitanga Parliament had a more law-abiding approach. They sought recognition

[98]Williams, p.60.
[99]Quoted by Williams, p.51. Significantly, Arawa had not signed the Treaty.
[100]Quoted by Williams, p.46.

of their Parliament from the pakeha Parliament, and worked through their elected representatives in the 4 Maori seats. At the second meeting of the Maori Parliament in 1893, a Federated Maori Assembly Empowering Bill was drafted and was sent with a petition to the Native Minister, A.J. Cadman, for passage through the General Assembly in Wellington. Cadman did not deign to put it before the House. So in 1894 the Maori Parliament prepared a draft Native Rights Bill which left the constitutional details of the Maori Parliament to be worked out later. This time the member for Northern Maori, Hone Heke, presented the measure as a Private Member's Bill. But most of the European members present walked out of the House so that there was no longer a quorum to debate the Bill. Heke presented it again during the 1896 session but it was defeated on a vote.[101]

Clearly, the European members were unwilling to recognise any form of Maori autonomy, just as they had always been unwilling to set aside Maori districts under s.71 of the Constitution Act. The most that they were prepared to concede was Carroll's Maori Councils Act of 1900, with its very limited powers of local government. Although Carroll had been initially sympathetic to the Maori Parliament movement, he had decided by the end of the century that Maori must rely on the European Parliament and the young Ngata agreed with him. It was their opposition and their Maori Councils Act that effectively destroyed the Maori Parliament, although it continued to meet for several more years. So did the Kingite Kauhanganui, although as early as 1886 the Kingites had thrown their support behind Major Te Wheoro in the Western Maori by-election. Later they supported Henare Kaihau and when he let them down transferred their allegiance to Pomare in 1911. Moreover the third Maori King, Mahuta, was inveigled into taking a seat in the Legislative Council in 1903 and was for 3 years a Member of the Executive Council, though his was essentially a token membership. Maori autonomy was a lost cause but with the appearance of the Young Maori party at least there was the compensation that Maori were now being very effectively represented in Parliament. Thereafter, with the exception of the prophet Rua Kenana in the Urewera, Maori leaders invariably attempted to prosecute their causes in the Wellington Parliament.

The most notable case was that of Tahupotiki Wiremu Ratana.[102] He first gained prominence as a faith healer from 1918 and then as the founder of the church which still bears his name. But Ratana soon took on a political function, although he never himself stood for Parliament. In 1922 his son Tokouru stood for Western Maori and came within 800 votes of unseating Pomare. Ratana's supporters lodged a petition against Pomare's election, alleging corruption and partisanship on the part of the Returning Officers, but the petition was dismissed.[103] T.W. Ratana took up and popularised various Maori causes, including a

[101]Ibid., pp.55-6.
[102]For assessments of Ratana see J.M.Henderson, *Ratana: the Man, the Church, the Political Movement*, Wellington, 1963; and R. Ngatata Love, *Policies of Frustration: the Growth of Maori Politics; the Ratana/Labour Era*, PhD thesis, Victoria University of Wellington, 1977.
[103]Love, p.229.

demand for the ratification of the Treaty of Waitangi. Like Tawhiao and Te Rata before him, he led a delegation to England to seek a resolution of Maori grievances from the Crown. He began to promote the interests of the morehu—the landless and unemployed Maori who were now rapidly increasing in number, despite Ngata's land development schemes. In 1928 Ratana announced that he intended to capture the "Four Quarters"—the 4 Maori electorates. Although Ratana candidates were unsuccessful in the 1928 election, they ran second in the 4 electorates and Eruera Tirikatene failed only by the casting vote of the Returning Officer to win Southern Maori. Ngata somewhat misread the result by informing Buck that "the wave of Ratanaism which has been steadily receding since 1922, will have its backward pace accelerated".[104] In 1931 the Ratana candidates again came second in all 4 electorates, but Tirikatene did take Southern Maori in a by-election in 1932. Then in 1935 Ratana gained his second seat when his son Tokouru won Western Maori, and Ratana candidates came second in the other 2 electorates. Moreover the two Ratana members now joined the Labour Party and supported the new Government in the House.[105]

Though few realised it at the the time, Ratana victories in 1935 marked the beginning of a fundamental realignment in Maori politics from the old tribally-based alliances, astutely managed by a prestigious parliamentary leader like Carroll and later Ngata, to a class-based grass roots movement, organised by a network of Ratana branches and in due course firmly aligned to the Labour Party.[106] The influence of the Ratana/Labour alliance will be discussed in the next chapter, but it is worthwhile in concluding this chapter to make further reference to the continuing influence of traditional tribal factors in Maori politics, so far mentioned only in passing. In Parliament the Maori members had to behave according to the long established British traditions—and there is no doubting the ability of Carroll and the Young Maori party representatives to do that—but out in the electorates they had to practise their Maoritanga. That term was invented by Carroll at a hui at Te Kuiti in 1920. But he refused to define it and, in his usual enigmatic way, said it was up to others "to give it hands and feet".[107] The others most certainly included Ngata who eventually did define it as including emphasis on Maori culture, "pride in Maori history and traditions...retention of old-time ceremonial, the continuous attempt to interpret the Maori point of view to the pakeha in power".[108]

All of those things needed to be cultivated by Maori aspirants for Parliament. Buck was unusual amongst candidates of the period in that he was not a "native speaker" of Maori. In his youth he lost the Maori he had picked up as a small child and, after graduation from Otago, had to learn again the language of his Maori kin. Although he was well known in

[104]Ngata to Buck, 17 December 1928, Ramsden Papers, 196/310.
[105]Love, pp.289-91.
[106]R.M.Chapman, quoted by David Tabacoff, "The Role of the Maori M.P. in Contemporary New Zealand Politics", in S.Levine, ed., *New Zealand Politics: a Reader*, Melbourne, 1975, p.376.
[107]Quoted by Joan Metge, *The Maoris of New Zealand*, London, 1967, p.59.
[108]Ibid.

the North from his work there as a Medical Officer, Buck had no lineal connections with the northern tribes and owed his selection as a candidate for the electorate in 1909 to Carroll. When the previous member, Hone Heke, died in Wellington Carroll and Buck accompanied the funeral cortege to Kaikohe for the tangi. At the ceremony Carroll announced that Heke's mother wanted to repay the debt for bringing her son's body back from Wellington by "marrying their son's widow to a chief from the south". He asked the assembly to accept a somewhat startled Buck as the "husband" for the widow.[109] Buck was duly elected despite competition from several disgruntled local candidates. And he was by no means the last to be launched into a political career during a tangi for a deceased member.

Pomare's successor for Western Maori, Taite Te Tomo, was selected on the marae at Waitara in 1930 in the same way. He got the backing of Pomare's tribal supporters ahead of the Young Maori party candidate, Pei Te Hurinui Jones, a young man very much in the mould of Ngata. Though Jones had the support of important Kingite leaders like Te Puea and some of his own Ngatimaniapoto tribe, he failed to get the backing of the King, Te Rata, and the bulk of the Kingites. They had given their support to Pomare in 1928 and preferred to back his chosen successor, Te Tomo, who had been Pomare's secretary and electorate organiser. But Jones, with the politician's habitual optimism, thought that he could win.

His letters to Ngata during the campaign provide a rare and revealing insight into the conduct of a Maori election at this time. On the eve of his campaign he wrote: "I have seen all my kaumatuas and I leave knowing their hearts are with me....as far as the younger people are concerned they should come with me....Summed up, Api, I think my chances are not too bad".[110] He took up the slogan of the Young Maori party—"Ka pu te ruha, ka hao te rangatahi" (when the old net is cast aside, the new net is used for fishing) and issued a printed party manifesto. Five days later he wrote

> the slogan "Te Ao Hou" has caught on. Yesterday was a very strenuous day. We addressed meetings at Meremere, Waiokura, Manaia and finished up at Parihaka. Our intention was to return to Hawera late last night, but the response to our appeal was so exuberant that we stayed up all last night. We had three Taite supporters...to contend with. We disposed of all their points and questions to the entire satisfaction of our audience with the result that they retired in dismay shortly after mid-night and left us to enjoy the rest of the night with pois and paos....So far I have been doing extremely well.[111]

And so the campaign continued, with Jones forever hopeful, apparently getting a warm response in south Taranaki—"the more

[109]Quoted in J.B.Condliffe, *Te Rangi Hiroa: the Life of Sir Peter Buck*, Christchurch, 1971, pp.111-12.
[110]Jones to Ngata, 15 September 1930, MA 31/56, National Archives.
[111]Jones to Ngata, 20 September 1930, MA 31/56.

progressive they were, the surer we were of getting...support".[112] He was even allowed to address a meeting at Ratana Pa, despite the fact that Tokouru Ratana was standing—and got a solitary vote for his pains. Jones was enthusiatically supported by the local pakeha press. As the *Hawera Star* put it, Jones was "the outstanding candidate" because of his "training and experience and progressive outlook".[113] But he did not win. Indeed he came a poor third to Taite Te Tomo and Tokouru Ratana. Taite's tribal alliance of the Waikato Kingites and Pomare's north Taranaki tribes had prevailed by some 800 votes over Tokouru's burgeoning support from the morehu of the Ratana movement. Although Taite retained his seat in the 1931 general election, Tokouru narrowly ousted him in 1935. The politics of tribe were giving way to those of class.

[112]Mick Jones to Ngata, 24 September 1930, MA 31/56.
[113]23 September 1930.

CHAPTER VIII

MAORI REPRESENTATION IN PARLIAMENT: THE THIRD PHASE, 1935-1985

Ratana cemented the alliance with the Labour Party by leading a deputation to the Prime Minister, M.J. Savage, at Parliament House in April 1936, leaving with him various gifts "as a mark of unity in politics".[114] In the same year Ratana's cousin Rangi Mawhete, who had done much to forge the Ratana/Labour alliance, was nominated to the Legislative Council. Ratana's quest for the Four Quarters was soon to be achieved. In the 1938 election the Ratana/Labour candidate, T.P. Paikea, won Northern Maori but Ngata retained Eastern Maori, though on a minority vote. The opposition vote was divided between the Labour-endorsed candidate, R.T. Kohere, and the Ratana candidate, Tiaki Omana. Labour did not make the same mistake in 1943 and endorsed Omana who just beat Ngata for the seat he had held for 38 years.

In view of their growing influence in the Labour Government, the Ratana members were well placed to achieve their original objectives. They had entered Parliament on a platform of ratification of the Treaty of Waitangi, the resolution of long-standing land grievances, the equalisation of welfare benefits, and electoral reform, including an increase in the number of Maori seats to 6 to compensate for growth in Maori population. They attempted to promote this policy through the Maori Organising Committee (later the Maori Advisory Council) of the Labour Party, in caucus, and on the floor of the House. But neither of the Maori members was admitted to Cabinet—the Prime Minister, M.J. Savage, took on the portfolio of Native Affairs—and they had only limited success in other respects. In the matter of electoral reform, their main demand for increased representation was ignored, although in 1937 the Government applied the secret ballot, which Europeans had had since 1870, to the Maori electorates, by allowing Maori voters to mark their ballot papers in the normal way without the advice of Maori associates. But, despite a promise from Walter Nash to Tirikatene that electoral rolls would be prepared for Maori seats for the 1938 election, they were not in fact ready until the 1949 election.[115] The Electoral Office had continued to exaggerate the difficulties of compiling a roll until Fraser decided to use the Welfare Officers of the Maori Affairs Department to flush out Maori enrolments in time for the 1949 election.[116]

But in the welfare field the Labour Government was quicker to attend to Maori needs. Maori were placed on an equal footing with Europeans for unemployment pay in 1936, though it was some time before they were brought onto the same rates as Europeans for old age and

[114]Love, p.295.
[115]Jackson and Wood, p.393.
[116]A.G.Harper to Fraser, 13 November 1944, 10 June 1949, and Harper to T.T.Ropiha, 9 November 1949, EL 19/15/3, National Archives.

widows' pensions.[117] With the passage of the Social Security Act in 1938 Maori were eligible for the child benefit on the same basis as Europeans. But Labour was slow to act on long-standing Maori land grievances; for instance the Waikato and Ngaitahu compensation claims, in abeyance since Commissions of Inquiry in the 1920s, were not finally resolved until the late 1940s. And Tirikatene's frequently reiterated demand for ratification of the Treaty of Waitangi was ignored. Altogether Labour's record in Maori affairs prior to the war was decidedly uneven; as Claudia Orange put it, the Government "just muddled along".[118] There was little leadership from the top with the portfolio of Native Affairs nominally in the hands of the ailing Savage but most of the responsibilty devolving to the insensitive Acting Minister, F. Langstone, who formally took over the post on Savage's death in 1940. Moreover the Ratana movement became divided with the death of T.W. Ratana in 1939 when the presidency of the Church was conferred on his son, Tokouru, but leadership of the movement in Parliament remained for the time being with Tirikatene. The Ratana members "seem to have remained peripheral to policy decisions on Maori matters".[119] Nevertheless the Ratana/Labour alliance remained firm since Labour's social welfare and economic policies were bringing many benefits to Maori—as well as to pakeha.

The outbreak of war in Europe and later the Pacific was to divert attention from domestic concerns. A Maori Battalion was recruited and sent overseas in May 1940. At home a Maori War Effort Organisation was formed under the chairmanship of Paikea who had been appointed to the Executive Council as Representative of the Native Race.[120] The Organisation was primarily concerned with recruitment and support for the Maori Battalion, but it also began planning for rehabilitation of returned servicemen after the war.[121] The Organisation worked through a network of tribal committees, was outside the control of the Native Department, and soon began to develop larger ambitions; indeed some of those involved saw it as a way of reviving that long-unachieved will-o'-the-wisp, Maori autonomy. Paikea once described it as fulfilling a recommendation made by Sir George Grey 80 years before that Maori could best be governed through their tribal leaders.[122] But the Organisation did not survive the war, although the tribal committees were kept in existence under the Maori Social and Economic Advancement Act of 1945. As Love puts it, "the government effectively destroyed the incentive and initiative of a large measure of self-determination which had been the motivating factor behind the Tribal Committees during the time of the Maori War Effort Organisation".[123] But, much to the dismay of the Maori members, the committees were no

[117]C.J.Orange, *A Kind of Equality: Labour and the Maori People*, M.A. thesis, University of Auckland, 1977, pp.63-4, 105-110.
[118]Ibid., p.116.
[119]Ibid., p.118.
[120]On Paikea's death in 1943, Tirikatene took over both responsibilities.
[121]Orange, p.135.
[122]Quoted by Love, p.361.
[123]Ibid., p.400.

longer part of an independent structure; they were made responsible to a newly constituted welfare section of the Native Department.[124] Later, however, two important Maori organisations grew out of the remains of the War Effort Organisation: first the Maori Women's Welfare League, formed in 1951, and then the New Zealand Maori Council, a male-dominated confederation of tribal committees, formed in 1962. But neither of these gender-oriented organisations possessed great independence; they could attend to purely Maori social and cultural matters within their particular spheres, but otherwise their powers were only advisory.

The 1946 election was a close-fought contest. There was some dissatisfaction with the Ratana/Labour members and in the Northern and Eastern electorates there were unsuccessful attempts to field other candidates bearing the Labour banner. The National Party, under the vigorous leadership of S.G. Holland, ran Ngata again in Eastern Maori and made much use of officers from the Maori Battalion, including J.C. Henare, son of the former member, who stood for Northern Maori. But in a high poll in which more than 85% of Maori adults cast their vote,[125] the 4 Ratana/Labour candidates came home with increased majorities—and with 63.9% of the total valid votes.[126] In Eastern Maori, where 2521 more votes were recorded than in 1943, there were allegations of plural voting, but they were not sustained.[127] Since the Maori election was held a day before the general election, Fraser was able to capitalise on Labour's victory in the Maori seats. But when the general election was held, Labour and National won 38 seats each and Labour clung to office by virtue of the Maori seats.

The Maori members had a golden opportunity to extract the maximum advantage. Unwilling to hand over the portfolio of Native Affairs to one of the Maori members, Peter Fraser reluctantly took it on himself—and became the most successful pakeha holder of the office since Coates. Tirikatene was eventually given a minor portfolio: Minister in Charge of the Government Printing Works and Stationery Supplies. But he had little influence in Government since Fraser could not "swallow him".[128] The other Maori members were even less influential. Matiu Ratana, who had succeeded his brother in a 1945 by-election, was not fluent in English; and neither Omana in Eastern Maori nor T.P. Paikea, who had succeeded his father in Northern Maori, was at all forceful.[129] So the initiative remained with Fraser, a shrewd and astute politician, and his Ministerial Secretary, M.R. (Mick) Jones. It was he who persuaded Fraser to have the term "Native" replaced by "Maori" in all official documents and communications. Commissions were set up to examine outstanding land grievances in Taranaki, Northland and elsewhere. Fraser personally settled the Waikato, Whakatohea and Ngaitahu

[124]Ibid., p.396.
[125]A.J.McCracken, *Maori Voting and Non-Voting: 1928 to 1969*, M.A. thesis, University of Auckland, 1971, pp.235-7.
[126]See Chapman Annex, Graph 1.
[127]Love, pp.407-8.
[128]Ngata to Ramsden, 12 October 1947, quoted by Orange, p.167.
[129]Ibid.

claims. When G.P. Shepherd retired Fraser appointed Tipi Ropiha as Under-Secretary to the Maori Affairs Department, the first Maori to hold the position, thus out-flanking Ratana critics who complained that the Department was run by pakeha. But despite further initiatives from Fraser in housing and welfare, little else was achieved. The undeveloped state of some Maori land, exacerbated by rapid urbanisation, provided the Opposition with an opportunity to attack the Government.

As the 1949 election loomed, it became increasingly risky for the Maori members to exploit their mandate. This was ceaselessly panned in the pro-National press, as, for instance, in Minhinnick's cartoons in the *New Zealand Herald* which showed Fraser for ever pandering to a grass skirted Maori "mandate".[130] It seems likely that Labour's dependence on the so-called Maori "mandate" was a significant factor in their defeat in the 1949 election.[131] After the election Nash ruefully admitted that "Fraser laid too much stress on the Maori side of his campaign to the detriment of his pakeha voters. The Tory press...played it up for all it was worth and with the winning of the four Maori seats in the first day of the election, I think a lot of pakeha voters changed over night".[132] Separate representation did guarantee the Labour Party 4 seats, thanks to the strength of the Ratana movement and the increasing proletarianisation of the Maori population. But there was no effective way those Maori Labour members could demand of their Government the affirmative action that was needed to lift their people in the social and economic scale to the level of the pakeha population, without causing a pakeha backlash at the polls. Nor was anything to be gained by crossing the floor and bringing down the Labour Government since National offered a worse alternative. The 4 Maori members considered but rejected this strategy.[133]

Without any Maori in his Party, Holland appointed E.B. Corbett, a Taranaki farmer, as Minister for Maori Affairs. Ngata feared that the National Government, drawing much of its support from pakeha farmers, would make a last raid on Maori land, "at what remains of Naboth's vineyard".[134] But the elder statesman was able to give Corbett some salutary advice and the land development schemes which Ngata himself had initiated were continued under the National Government, as were the urban housing and trade training schemes initiated by Labour. Yet, although National won the snap 1951 election with ease, and the 1954 election, it could not capture any of the Maori seats, despite Holland's advice to the Maori voters to back the winning horse.[135] In fact the National percentage of Maori votes in this period steadily declined and, as a consequence, the 4 Ratana/Labour members, despite

[130]See Orange, pp.160-2, for samples.
[131]Ibid., p.209.
[132]Quoted from the Nash papers by Augie Fleras, "From Social Control towards Political Self-Determination? Maori Seats and the Politics of Separate Maori Representation in New Zealand", *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 18 (1985), p.562.
[133]Love, p.433.
[134]Ngata to Ramsden, 1 January 1950, Ramsden Papers, 196/377.
[135]*New Zealand Herald*, 27 August 1951.

lacklustre performances in the House, continued to increase their majorities.[136]

Though National was philosophically inclined towards assimilation, it did nothing to abolish the Maori seats. Just before his death in 1950, Ngata told Corbett that "the Maoris themselves will demand the abolition in the course of a few years".[137] But Maori leaders made no such demand. National, unwilling to eliminate the Maori voice from Parliament, continued to hope that it would win back at least one of the Maori seats. In the meantime, it was content to tinker with the existing system. Thus in 1950 and 1951 legislation was passed to schedule Maori elections on the same day and same hours as the general election; and in 1954 there were changes to the electoral boundaries, mainly to increase the Southern Maori electorate by bringing it into the southern North Island. There was some concern over the state of the Maori rolls, but Corbett adamantly refused requests from the Electoral Office to use Maori Welfare Officers to recruit Maori voters. In September 1954 he told the Minister of Justice, J.R. Marshall, that "it would be unwise to have officers of my department engaged in matters related to .the enrolment on the Electoral Roll....It was previously reported to me that when Welfare Officers were engaged in this work that their enthusiasm went further than the business of enrolling electors and took the form of political propoganda [sic]".[138] Evidently Corbett regarded the Welfare Officers as recruiting agents for the Labour Party. To get round the problem Maori enrolment was made compulsory in 1956, in line with European enrolment which had been compulsory since 1927. But now a new problem arose because the old rolls were destroyed and all Maori voters were required to re-enrol. Though the Electoral Office sent out re-enrolment cards to all Maori on the previous roll, only about half replied within 2 months and the Office once more requested the aid of the Welfare Officers, only to be turned down again by Corbett.[139]

In the longer term, Corbett was looking for a way of eliminating the Maori seats. He told Marshall in July 1957 that "the time has arrived when consideration should be given to amendments being made to the Electoral Act whereby Maori electors are given the option of enrolling on European Rolls if they so desire". He claimed that there was a feeling among Maori "that their interests could be best served by local European members of Parliament, and that the time has arrived when the Maori electorates should be abolished". But "rather than place the responsibility on the Government to arbitrarily abolish the electorates, it would be better for the Maori people themselves to decide the issue by going on the European Rolls if they so desire and if the numbers on the Maori Electoral Rolls fall below a fixed minimum, then the time will have arrived for doing away with the electorates".[140] But the Government did

[136]See Chapman Annex, Graphs 1 & 7.
[137]Quoted in Corbett to J.R. Marshall, 29 July 1957, EL 19/15/3.
[138]Corbett to Marshall, 7 September 1954, EL 19/15/3.
[139]L. Irwin to Corbett, 13 June 1957, and Corbett to Marshall, 26 June 1957, EL 19/15/3.
[140]Corbett to Marshall, 29 July 1957, EL 19/15/3.

not introduce amending legislation before the November election. Ironically, there was also talk among pakeha members of the Labour caucus of abolishing the Maori seats—in the hope that Labour would pick up more than 4 urban seats—but the Maori Advisory Council of the Party, headed by Tirikatene, came out firmly against the idea. Instead, the Council demanded that Maori representation be increased in line with the increase in population. It was now evident that in terms of total population, if not registered electors or valid votes, Maori were considerably under-represented in comparison with Europeans.[141] This was to be a constant refrain of Labour's Maori members for 30 years.

In the 1957 election Labour was narrowly returned to office—with 41 seats to National's 39—and was once more dependent on the 4 Maori seats. The 4 Ratana/Labour members had been returned, though 2 with decreased majorities as a result of the intervention of Social Credit candidates. Nevertheless Labour's share of the qualified Maori vote increased to 56.4% while that of National decreased to a mere 14.4%.[142] But once again high hopes of the Maori members were soon dashed. Walter Nash took the Maori Affairs portfolio, though Tirikatene was named as the Associate Minister and was also given the comparatively minor portfolio of Minister of Forests. Moreover Nash refused to allow Tirikatene to play any effective role in the formulation of Maori Affairs policies, keeping these, as indeed many other aspects of government, under his sole control. The Maori Policy Committee of the Party was also ignored. Though Tirikatene frequently represented Nash at Maori gatherings, he was unable to give firm answers on problems that were raised; everything had to be referred back to Nash in Wellington, and Government became paralysed by the bottleneck in the Prime Minister's office.[143]

Unable to take decisions himself, Nash brought in J.K. Hunn from the Justice Department, made him Acting Head of Maori Affairs, and instructed him to carry out an "accounting of Maori assets to find a way of using them for the good of the Maori people as a whole".[144] Although the Report was ready by June of 1960, Nash refused to consider it before the November election. Nash and Tirikatene were also publicly at loggerheads over the 1960 All Black tour of South Africa. Tirikatene had forthrightly condemned the decision of the Rugby Union to send a team without Maori, but Nash refused to intervene, carefully avoiding a commitment for or against the tour.[145] There was continued criticism of the Government by the Maori Policy Committee, but, as the election approached, the Maori members decided that loyalty to the party was more important than threatening its defeat. Once again, the Maori "mandate" had proved of little value, though a more skilled and energetic leader than Tirikatene might have gained more in Cabinet. Even Love, who is very sympathetic to Tirikatene, admits that he was

[141]Love, pp.440-2; and Appendices 1 & 2.
[142]See Chapman Annex, Graph 1.
[143]Keith Sinclair, *Walter Nash*, Auckland, 1976. p. 340.
[144]J.K.Hunn, *Report on Department of Maori Affairs*, Wellington, 1960, p.13.
[145]Love, pp.477-8.

not popular in Cabinet, over-stressed his points, and built up resistance from colleagues to Maori issues.[146] He concludes that, "as in the 1947-1949 period, the Ratana members lost their chance to take a more forceful role in securing their objectives".[147]

National, now led by K.J. Holyoake, won the 1960 election with a majority of 12 seats. But Labour retained the 4 Maori seats though with diminished majorities in all except Tirikatene's seat. There was some recovery of the National vote and a strong challenge from Social Credit, whose candidate for Eastern Maori beat the National candidate into second place.[148] The portfolio of Maori Affairs was handed to J.A. Hanan, a Southland lawyer on the liberal wing of the Party. One of Hanan's first tasks was to consider the Hunn Report. Hunn had not been content with the simple "accounting" of Maori assets but had spoken out boldly on broad matters of policy. He recommended that the policy of assimilation, promoted by New Zealand Governments for more than a century, should be replaced by integration. This he defined as an attempt to "combine (not fuse) the Maori and pakeha elements to form one nation wherein Maori culture remains distinct".[149] Hanan and the National Government accepted integration as the basic objective of their Maori policy, but it was regarded with great suspicion by Maori leaders, many of whom saw it as a new euphemism for the old assimilation policy.[150] The rest of Hunn's Report was concerned with land, housing, education, employment, health, crime, and legal differentiation. It provided the National Government with clear guidelines for future action. To their credit, Hanan and the Holyoake Government accepted many of the recommendations. Some, like the proposal to set up a Maori Education Foundation, met with Maori approval; others, such as the attempt to eliminate uneconomic fragments of land (later reiterated by the Pritchard-Waetford Report and incorporated in the 1967 Maori Affairs Amendment Act), provoked bitter Maori resistance.

The Hunn Report made only brief passing reference to Maori representation in Parliament—under the heading "Legal Differentiation". Hunn's research team had compiled a list of 264 instances of differentiation in New Zealand legislation. Of these, 58 were said to have conferred a Maori privilege, 35 a Maori disability, 69 a Maori protection, and 102 merely set out a different procedure. The electoral provisions were described as conferring a Maori privilege, a disability, and a different procedure. Hunn did not make recommendations on the items of differentiation, but merely suggested that they should not "endure indefinitely by default".[151] But he did go on to include the electoral provisions as one of 9 items meriting "sceptical scrutiny".[152]

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[146]p.478.
[147]p.488.
[148]See Appendix 4.
[149]Hunn, p.15.
[150]See, for instance, *A Maori View of the Hunn Report*, published for the Maori synod of the Presbyterian Church, Christchurch, 1961.
[151]Hunn, p.77.
[152]Ibid., p.78.

Since the National Government was without Maori representation in Parliament, and now committed itself to the integration of the races, it is surprising that it did not take advantage of Hunn's recommendation for a "sceptical scrutiny" of separate Maori representation. Hanan himself was against separate representation, saying on one occasion that he did not think that in the electoral field there should be special privileges for anyone.[153] But he was unwilling even to take up Corbett's plan to allow Maori voters to register on the European rolls.[154] However from time to time National members spoke mildly in favour of integration of the seats. In 1965, during a debate on an Electoral Amendment Bill to peg the General seats in the South Island at 25 and increase those in the North Island, Tirikatene made yet another plea for an increase in the number of Maori seats in line with increased Maori population. But Holyoake replied that "Maori representation had never been regarded as being on a population basis....Over the years, whether the population justified it or not—and mostly it did not—the Maoris have been represented by four members in this House, and in all the years I have been here the general understanding in the House has been that the next step in Maori representation should be complete integration; that we should join together and be on the same roll".[155] The Labour Opposition defended separate Maori representation but as the debate became increasingly acrimonious Holyoake charged that such representation was "a form of apartheid".[156]

Nevertheless Holyoake did not take the next step to integration. However in 1967 an Electoral Amendment Act was passed which removed the disqualification preventing Maori, other than half-castes, from standing for European electorates, and allowed Europeans to stand for Maori seats. The act did not confer the same rights on voters, although this had been recommended by Corbett in 1957. But, in an odd reversal of party attitudes, the new Leader of the Labour Opposition, Norman Kirk, said, "it might have been a much wiser step to have moved towards integration by leaving the Maori an area of choice to enrol either as a European or as a Maori elector, thus automatically giving him the right to contest a seat either as a European or as a Maori".[157] The amendment, and Labour's new stance, were to be significant in the future. In the meantime, however, National had to soldier on without Maori representatives in Parliament. In the 1969 election, which National won with a slightly reduced majority, the Party failed to put up Maori candidates for winnable General seats and the 4 Maori seats, now all fielding Ratana-aligned candidates, were won by Labour, all with enhanced majorities.[158] The Maori Affairs portfolio was now in the hands of Duncan McIntyre, a Hawke's Bay farmer who developed a warm rapport with Maori in some rural areas. He began to

[153] *Thursday Magazine*, 24 July 1969, p.36.
[154] NZPD, Vol.328, 1961, p.2199.
[155] NZPD, Vol.344, 1965, p.2708.
[156] ibid.
[157] NZPD, Vol.353, 1967, p.3264.
[158] Appendix 4.

shift policy pronouncements from integration towards bi-culturalism, or rather, in recognition of the growing number of island Polynesians residing in New Zealand, towards multi-culturalism.[159]

Although such statements were usually politely received by Maori gatherings, important new divisions were appearing in Maori society that were not fully reflected in Maori representation in Parliament. National Governments did have a measure of Maori support—albeit not nearly enough to win Maori seats—which was expressed through the tribally-organised and rurally-oriented New Zealand Maori Council. The three chairmen of the Council—Sir Turi Carroll, Pei Te Hurinui Jones and Sir Graham Latimer—were at one time or another unsuccessful National candidates for Maori seats. While such leaders controlled the Council there was little danger that it would claim more than advisory powers and set out for the long-lost goal of autonomy, as some of the urban radicals who had captured the Auckland District Council would have wished. The Maori Women's Welfare League represented yet another but more progressive strand of Maori opinion, although the women confined their attention largely to social issues. The Ratana/Labour alliance held the middle ground, with Maori trade unionists like Matiu Rata (who won Northern Maori in 1963), Steve Watene (a Mormon who won Eastern Maori in 1963) and Paroane Reweti (who replaced Watene in 1967) beginning to occupy prominent positions, thus reflecting the massive shift since the war of the Maori population into urban areas and unskilled occupations. Then, on the left, there appeared from the late sixties several radical groups, coming partly from the trade unions, partly from the universities, including Nga Tamatoa (a student group at Auckland University) and the Wellington-based Maori Organisation for Human Rights. Inspired by the Civil Rights movement in the United States and the nationalist movements which had secured independence from European colonial rule in tropical Africa, the Carribean, and the Pacific, these Maori movements attacked expressions of racism they detected at home, and the "internal colonialism" which they saw as suppressing Maori rights, aspirations and culture.

In 1968 there was an attempt to revive the Kotahitanga movement, some 80 years after the movement was founded, this time at a meeting on Otiria marae at Kawakawa. Proposals were advanced for Maori self-determination, the ratification of the Treaty of Waitangi, and a symbolic unity under the Maori Queen. Matiu Rata, the Member for Northern Maori, attended the meeting and reported that the Kotahitanga movement was a "long-standing one and occasionally comes to the fore at apparent dissatisfaction", as in this case over the recent Maori Affairs Amendment Act. Rata admitted that many people expressed concern at Maori demands for self-rule, but he thought, from his discussions with them, that they were more interested in getting recognition of the right of Maori to have a greater say in their affairs. He saw the demand for the ratification of the Treaty in the same light: "as a symbolic recognition of

[159]See, for instance, his statement reported in *Te Maori*, June-July 1970, pp.53-4.

Maoris within New Zealand society in a broad context, although they do not seem to realise that the ratification does not or cannot bestow on individual Maoris what they want from life".[160] Rata's comments here are a useful demonstration of the role of Maori MPs in Maori community affairs at this time. They tended to follow and even to moderate the demands coming from Maori organisations. But they had also to lend their weight to the growing cultural renaissance and more particulaly the revival of Maori language that Nga Tamatoa had called for. It was no longer sufficient for Maori members to be competent in English; they had to embody and promote Maoritanga in their constituencies.

The radicals also became involved in the campaign against sporting contacts with South Africa which raged unabated from 1960, and divided Maori as much as it divided pakeha. Inevitably the Maori members of Parliament and the political parties were dragged into these controversies. Tirikatene had opposed the visit of the All Blacks to South Africa without Maori; Rata was one of the first to say that it was no better for Maori to go to South Africa as "honorary whites", as happened in 1970.[161] The National Governments under Holyoake and Marshall were content to "build bridges" with South Africa, once Maori could be included; Labour, pressed by radical and trade union groups, was forced to oppose any further sporting contacts.

In 1972 a reinvigorated Labour Party, led by Norman Kirk, had a landslide victory with a majority of 23 seats. Labour's Maori members again came home with increased majorities and accumulated 82.4% of the valid votes in the 4 constituencies, compared with a mere 12.8% for National.[162] Kirk, having failed to persuade, then told the Rugby Union not to proceed with the planned Springbok tour of New Zealand for the winter of 1973. The following summer Christchurch triumphantly hosted the Commonwealth games, attended by athletes from black African Commonwealth nations. Later in the year Tanzania's president, Julius Nyerere, made a state visit to New Zealand. Kirk was a dominant figure at the Montreal Commonwealth conference.

He also quickly developed considerable empathy with Maori and made Waitangi Day a national holiday—the closest a Labour Government came to the long-espoused Ratana demand for the ratification of the Treaty—taking full advantage of the Waitangi ceremonies to bring the races together. This third Labour government gave its Maori members a full part in Cabinet. Rata and Whetu Tirikatene-Sullivan were elected to Cabinet, and Rata was given Maori Affairs, the first Maori to hold the portfolio since Ngata. There was also an important electoral change, already foreshadowed by Kirk in 1967. In the Maori Affairs Amendment Act of 1974 the definition of a Maori had been broadened to include any person descended from a Maori, and in the 1975 Electoral Amendment Act Maori as so defined were given the option of registering on the Maori or the General roll. Hitherto this option

[160]Rata to Mira Szaszy, 7 November 1968, Rata Papers, 2/23, National Archives.
[161]Tom Newnham, *Apartheid Is Not A Game*, Auckland, 1975, p.36.
[162]Chapman Annex, Graph 1.

had been confined to half-castes. The option was to be exercised at the next census. Then the number of Maori seats was to be calculated on the same basis as General seats.[163] The Maori electoral population was to be made up of all Maori who opted for the Maori roll, plus their children under 18, and each Maori electorate was to have a similar electoral population to General electorates. This left open the possibility of an increase—or a decrease—in the number of Maori seats.

In 1974 the Labour Government began to founder. Kirk's deterioration in health and death left it rudderless; his successor, W.L. Rowling, lacking Kirk's charisma, was unable to establish himself before the election. The economy was hit by a rapid escalation in oil prices and ensuing inflation. Some of the Cabinet, including the 2 Maori Ministers, were not on top of their portfolios, and were ruthlessly targeted by an invigorated National Opposition, led by R.D. Muldoon. There was racial tension in the suburbs where many new immigrants resented being unable to obtain houses. There were smouldering resentments over the cancelled Springbok tour. All of these opportunites were exploited by Muldoon during the 1975 election campaign and this time National won handsomely, exactly reversing Labour's majority. But once more the 4 Maori electorates remained faithful to Labour, withstanding the landslide in the General seats, though it was notable that the 2 Maori Ministers had diminished majorities while the 2 non-Ministers increased their majorities.[164]

Yet National also got some Maori representation for the first time since 1943. Two candidates of Maori descent won General seats: Ben Couch in Wairarapa and Rex Austin in Awarua. As new members of Parliament they could not expect immediate promotion to Cabinet and McIntyre was again made Minister for Maori Affairs. Having got some Maori members, the National Government was content to retain the existing system and those members began to defend it. In 1976 Couch said that it was National Party policy to retain the 4 Maori seats, and Austin added that the seats would not be abolished until the Maori people said that they did not want them.[165] Minor changes were introduced by the Electoral Amendment Act of 1976. Although Maori electors retained their right to choose between the Maori and the General rolls, the number of Maori seats was pegged to 4, irrespective of the results of the Maori exercise of their option during the 1976 census. According to Elizabeth McLeay, the result was not made public, and Muldoon simply announced that the 4 Maori seats would remain "until such time as the Maori people indicate their desire to be on a common roll with no special Maori seats".[166] But the result was eventually published in *The New Zealand Census of Population and Dwellings*, showing that 145,087 Maori electors and their children had opted for the Maori roll, just over 40% of the total Maori population.

[163]W.L.Rowling, NZPD, Vol.401, 1975, p.4547.
[164]Appendix 4.
[165]NZPD, Vol.406, 1976, pp.2848-9.
[166]Quoted in E.M. McLeay, "Political Argument about Representation: the Case of the Maori Seats", *Political Studies*, XXVIII (1980), p.48.

There was much bickering over the state of the rolls for the 1978 election which National won comfortably, though losing some seats. Couch was made Minister for Maori Affairs. He lacked the guile of more sophisticated politicians, and was much criticised for supporting sporting contacts with South Africa, but was well regarded by some rural Maori. In 1979 National gained a third member of Maori descent when Winston Peters was awarded the Hunua seat after a judicial recount and inquiry. In 1980 there was a split in Labour's Maori ranks when Matiu Rata, complaining that the Party machine was giving insufficient attention to Maori matters, resigned his seat, formed the Mana Motuhake Party, and contested the ensuing by-election for Northern Maori. He lost by less than a thousand votes to Labour's official candidate, Dr Bruce Gregory.

The 1981 election was one of the most bitterly fought in New Zealand's recent political history. Held in the wake of the 1981 Springbok tour, which had torn the country into warring camps, it was much influenced by that traumatic event. Muldoon, who tacitly encouraged the tour and used the full force of the state to enable it to proceed, held on to the rural seats, where support for the tour had been strongest, but he lost seats in the cities and in the end scraped home by a single seat. The Maori were equally divided over the tour but their decisions at the hustings were probably influenced more by the vigorous intervention of Mana Motuhake in all 4 seats. The new Party plugged a more nationalist line than any before it—more so than even the Ratana candidates in their heyday—but it failed to win any of the seats from Labour. However the Mana Motuhake candidates did come second in all 4 electorates.[167]

In the 1984 election Mana Motuhake made a bigger effort, fielding 4 candidates in General seats as well as 4 in the Maori seats. This time they conceded second place to National in 2 of the Maori seats and their total vote was considerably lower than in 1981.[168] Once more the 4 Labour candidates won handsomely—as did the new-look Labour Party under the leadership of David Lange. Labour's Maori candidates had obtained 77.6% of the total valid vote, compared with 9.6% for Mana Motuhake and 7.1% for National candidates.[169] Now membership of Ratana church was only incidental—only 2 of the 4 Maori members were of the Ratana faith. Labour's Maori support was based on class—working class—rather than religious lines, even if most of its Maori representatives, like most of its other members, were now from the professional midddle class. Once more 2 of the 4 Maori were elected to Cabinet: Koro Wetere, who was given the Maori Affairs and Lands portfolios, and Peter Tapsell who became Minister for Internal Affairs.

The 1984 election result was but another phase in the remorseless accumulation of Maori support for the Labour Party which has characterised the whole of the period considered in this chapter. This is

[167]Appendix 4.
[168]Chapman Annex, Graph 1, & Appendix 4.
[169]Chapman Annex, Graph 1.

more fully explained and clearly depicted in Professor Chapman's commentary and graphs which are printed as an Annex. The loss of Maori support by National has been even more dramatic, since National has not been picking up Maori voters occasionally disillusioned with Labour. They have voted for minor parties like Social Credit and, more recently, Mana Motuhake. A good many have not voted at all. National hopes that Maori voters would eventually support candidates for the party in Government, as usually happened (with the notable exception of Ngata) before 1935, were dashed. The growing Maori support for Labour since 1935 exactly parallels the shift in their socio-economic position from a rurally-based people, with sadly depleted and under-developed land resources in the inter-war period, to a largely urban proletariat after the Second World War. Ngata's land development schemes, continued by the first Labour Government and by National, could not arrest that process. The great bulk of a now rapidly increasing Maori workforce had to turn to unskilled jobs on the wharves, in the freezing works, on public works projects, and in the factories. They became unionised and supported Labour, the party of the unions. In Government that party first gave Maori full unemployment benefits—in due course full employment—child benefits, and a full range of other welfare benefits and services. As Ngata ruefully put it in 1940, "the Labour policy of increased social benefits, higher wages for less work, and equality of pakeha and Maori was striking a severe blow at the things I had come to regard as fundamental to the maintenance of the individuality of the Maori people".[170] But Maori voters knew where their material interests lay and have remained loyal to Labour ever since.

That loyalty is an expression of the growing significance of class in Maori politics. As Paul Potiki put it in 1971: "I see most of our problems as being identical with the mass of the working class—made a little more difficult and intensified perhaps by the fact that our skin pigmentation is different".[171] There was an accompanying diminution of tribal if not yet of family considerations. Candidates were still selected on a marae, with the tangata whenua having an advantage over carpet-bagging manuhiri, but traditional tribal factors were now usually outweighed by family or party considerations. The former were particularly important when a sitting member retired or died in office. In Southern Maori Whetu Tirikatene-Sullivan succeeded her late father, Sir Eruera, in 1967. In Western Maori Matiu Ratana succeeded his late brother, Tokouru, in 1945 and on his death in 1949 was replaced by his wife, Iriaka. In Northern Maori, Tipi Paikea succeeded his father in 1943. But it is notable that Steve Watene's son, Apanui, failed in a bid to secure the Eastern Maori nomination on his father's death in 1967. It went instead to the Ratana nominee, Paraone Reweti, a Tauranga waterside worker. The Arawa hosts, who had never had a member of their tribe in the seat, failed to get their candidate nominated, although they eventually succeeded when Reweti retired in 1981 and Dr Peter

[170]Ngata to Buck, 15 July 1940, Ramsden Papers, 196/310.
[171]Quoted by Bernard Kernot, "Maori Strategies: Ethnic Politics in New Zealand", in Levine, ed., *New Zealand Politics: A Reader*, op. cit., p.233.

Tapsell was selected.[172] It should also be noted that National could not work miracles with prestigious family candidates. Neither Turi Carroll, nephew of Sir James, nor Henare Ngata, the distinguished youngest son of Sir Apirana, could win back Eastern Maori. Nor could J.C. Henare, whose father Tau held Northern Maori from 1914 until 1938, win it back for National. Yet they were opposing sitting Ratana/Labour members whose parliamentary performances had been undistinguished.

Nevertheless it would be unreasonable to measure the worth of Maori members since 1935 purely on the basis of performance in debate, and even on the rare occasions that some of them held ministerial office, though even in these respects they were probably on a par with the average pakeha MP or Minister. Like other members, the Maori MPs had the usual array of duties to constituents—somewhat exacerbated in their case by numerous social problems facing a rapidly growing and urbanising Maori population. According to David Tabacoff's sampling of Matiu Rata's correspondence from constituents from 1968 to 1972, 149 out of 221 letters were concerned with housing, land, education and social services.[173] But Maori members had a number of additional problems which did not affect pakeha members. Maori constituencies, especially Southern Maori, were very much larger than any of the European electorates, and impossible to service properly. Maori members were expected to attend numerous important, though time consuming, Maori functions, like annual hui of the Ratana and King movements, or tangihanga, and when there to perform political functions. It is notable that all of the Maori MPs whose constituent activities were surveyed by Tabacoff in 1972, except Mrs Tirikatene-Sullivan, regarded attendance at tangi as a necessary obligation.[174] Popular members like Matiu Rata were in much demand as speakers who would provide a Maori viewpoint at student or civil rights meetings. He seldom turned down invitations.[175]

Although the concerns of Maori politics were responding to changes in the socio-economic condition of the Maori people and the internationalisation of race issues, the practice of Maori politics did not change very much after 1935. Having followed Pei Jones on the campaign trail in the 1930 by-election, it is worth accompanying another Maori MP at a later date—this time Paraone Reweti for Eastern Maori in 1967. Thanks to S.K. Jackson's M.A. thesis on the Eastern Maori electorate, it is possible to present an intimate, though necessarily much abridged, account of that campaign.[176] Reweti set himself a punishing schedule of 46 meetings—in fact he held several more—with 2 or 3 per day in different settlements of his wide-flung electorate. Most of the meetings were held on marae; and even when they were not the protocol was distinctly Maori. Reweti's political speeches were always

[172]S.K. Jackson, *Politics in the Eastern Maori Electorate, 1928-69*, M.A. thesis, University of Auckland, 1977, pp.132-150.
[173]Tabacoff, p.377.
[174]Ibid.
[175]Rata Papers, Series 1, Boxes 1-5, National Archives.
[176]op.cit., pp.185-212.

preceded by a ceremonial welcome in which he was aided by several of his kaumatua who travelled with him. The length of these ceremonies meant that Reweti could be late for his next scheduled meeting, but he accepted the fact that he could not abide by "pakeha time". Meetings were also prolonged by religious services and, although Reweti was a member of the Ratana church, he readily accepted services by spokesmen for other denominations as part of the kawa of different marae. This illustrates how a candidate had to know the customs, traditions, psychology, and religious affiliations of his hosts; or, if not, to take some kaumatua who could act correctly for him. Reweti's National opponent, Henare Ngata, did this too, as his famous father had done before him—a reminder that no matter what mana a Maori MP might gain from his membership of Parliament, he must always accede to the greater mana and wisdom of local elders on a particular marae. For the most part Reweti's meetings were conducted in Maori, with Reweti only using English when a questioner had done so. By contrast Rata, who accompanied Reweti at several of the meetings, preferred to speak in English to get across the finer points of Labour policy. On the marae Maori voters were quite open about their party allegiance. Even when they opposed Reweti, as was usually the case in the Ngatiporou territory of the East Coast, they politely told him: "We vote for Henare because he is ours....we like your policies but Henare is our man".[177] This was a quaint reminder of tribal loyalty to the Ngata family, but of course it was no longer sufficient to put a Ngata back into Parliament, given the support for Labour elsewhere in the electorate. It is also a reminder of the gentlemanly conduct of Maori elections. There was no heckling of candidates—at least in rural areas and small towns not yet touched by the rise of urban Maori radicalism. There was not a great deal of detailed discussion of policy, though Reweti carried with him a Maori version of the Party manifesto, and took the opportunity to conjure up memories of the first Labour Government's efforts for Maori welfare. There was much more concern in the electorate about the intentions of the current National Government, especially in view of its recently passed Maori Affairs Amendment Act, with its powers of compulsory purchase of uneconomic fragments of land; and National's apparent intention to abolish the Maori seats. On this last point Reweti promised that Labour would give electors a choice of registering on the Maori or the European rolls and would, if necessary, increase the number of Maori seats. After 2 years in Parliament, in which he had maintained a fairly low profile, Rewiti was no longer a novice, but he was generally held by his electors to have acquitted himself well. He had a decisive victory, increasing his vote by just over 12% to 60%.

So far as Maori constituents were concerned, performances in Parliament had still to be accounted for and matched by performance on the marae. To pakeha separate Maori representation was a constitutional oddity, a hangover from the nineteenth century, but Maori had made it something of their own. It had been indigenised.

[177]Quoted ibid., p.196.

CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSION

Separate Maori representation in Parliament, introduced in 1867 as a temporary expedient for a 5-year period, has endured in the New Zealand constitution for 119 years. It is not an entrenched clause and could be abolished by legislation passed by a simple majority in the House. Yet, although European opinion in the country has been solidly in favour of abolition[178] and politicians of various hues have often spoken of it, no one has attempted to abolish the seats. And the political parties—other than the New Zealand Party during the last election—have been remarkably coy in committing themselves to abolition. This does not mean that the parties have become philosophically committed to the idea of separate racial representation, but merely that they have seen no sufficient political advantage in abolishing the seats in the face of what was bound to be considerable Maori opposition. That opposition has effectively stopped the abolition of the seats.

In the early decades of Maori representation it seemed more important to bring Maori fully into the political process, especially those tribes still disaffected by the wars, than to attempt to abolish the seats. That process was complete by the 1890s when Maori in the remote King Country and Urewera were recording votes and the franchise was granted to Maori women. Thereafter aspiring Maori politicians competed vigorously for representation in Parliament. Indeed since 1890 there have been only 2 uncontested elections: in 1911 and 1919 when Ngata was re-elected unopposed for Eastern Maori. Very often there were numerous candidates, most of whom lost their deposits.[179] During the long reign of the Liberal Party, the first modern party in New Zealand political history, Maori representation was securely established under the aegis of Carroll—though he personally favoured abolition—and the leaders of the Young Maori party. Even though Reform was inclined towards abolition, it failed to take up the idea and during Coates's premiership relied considerably on the co-operation of the Maori members—even of Ngata who remained in the Opposition. And United could not move on abolition at all since Ngata was a powerful force in their Cabinet.

With the advent of the first Labour Government an enduring alliance was forged between the Ratana movement, which had captured 2 of the seats by 1935, and Labour. By 1946 Labour was beholden to its Maori "mandate" and there was little chance that it could abolish the seats without endangering its hold on office—or at least of losing 4 safe seats. Hitherto the Maori members, with one or two notable exceptions, had supported the party in power. But after 1949 they stuck with Labour through long periods in Opposition—a recognition of the proletarian status of the bulk of the Maori electorate. For more than 40 years

[178]Fleras, p.26.
[179]See Appendix 4.

Labour's Maori members have pleaded for the retention of the seats, and frequently requested more on the ground of increasing Maori population. They won the battle for retention and gained at least the possibility of an increase in seats with the Electoral Amendment Act of 1975. But that possibility was negated when National pegged the seats at 4 in 1976. The position remains unchanged, though Labour is currently committed to a return to the 1975 situation. The Party believes that "Maori people are entitled, as of right, to representation in Parliament in proportion to the number of people who elect to put themselves on the Maori roll", and that the number of Maori seats should be determined on the same basis as General seats. In this way Maori representation would be retained "as long as the Maori people so wish because as the original tangata whenua they have a special place in the New Zealand political system". Since Maori people comprised a disproportionate number of the unemployed, the prison population, under-achievers in education and of those with health problems, separate representation allowed such matters to be more effectively represented and articulated.[180]

In contrast to Labour, National has not been beholden to Maori members: it has been without a Maori seat since 1943. Moreover it has been in office most of the time since 1949 and has thus had ample opportunity to abolish the seats. But National Governments have been extremely cautious in moving towards abolition. In the 1950s Corbett was thinking of a gradual erosion of the Maori electorate through allowing Maori to register on the European rolls and the eventual abolition of the Maori seats. But that policy was not followed through by National Governments in the 1960s, since National still hoped to win at least one Maori seat, but possibly also because the Party hierarchy deferred to the plea of its Maori Advisory Committee, led by Mat Te Hau, not to abolish the seats.[181] But in 1967, in a final admission of its inability to win back even one of the Maori seats, National altered the electoral law to allow Maori to stand for European seats. Little advantage was taken of this opportunity[182] and it was not until 1975 that National put up Maori candidates in winnable General seats. Couch and Austin were elected. With this National decided to peg the Maori seats at 4, hoping that in due course the seats would be whittled away by transfer of Maori voters to the General rolls. Currently the party is in favour of a "phased abolition" to be carried out over the next two or three elections.[183]

Critics have charged that separate representation amounts to apartheid. This is a considerable distortion since in South Africa blacks have never been allowed parliamentary representation, whereas in New Zealand Maori have been represented in the national Parliament on conditions similar to those applying to Europeans. On the other hand, supporters of separate representation for Maori say that it has been the only guarantee that Maori would be represented in Parliament at all. This

[180]Labour Party submissions to the Royal Commission on the Electoral System.
[181]Personal communication, R.M.Chapman, 28 March 1986.
[182]See Appendix 6.
[183]Final submissions of the National Party to the Royal Commission on the Electoral System.

was largely true for the 1870s and 1880s, but less so afterwards, as Carroll and much later Couch, Austin and Peters demonstrated. Had the Maori seats been abolished, then it would have been necessary for Maori candidates to secure the nomination of one or other of the main parties. In this century independents and representatives of small parties have found it well nigh impossible to get elected, given the first past the post electoral system. However it is likely that the main parties would have felt morally obliged to put up more Maori candidates for winnable seats, as National, unable to win Maori seats, ultimately decided to do. But whether Maori would have got more than 4 seats, as they deserved to get on the basis of their total population, remains a moot point; probably not, since pakeha New Zealanders have never been able to take their tokenism very far, as can be seen from their apprehension whenever the Maori representatives in Parliament have held the balance of power, the disparaged "Maori mandate".

In fact the advantages to Maori of occasionally holding the balance of power in Parliament have been more apparent than real, since taking too much advantage would have brought a pakeha backlash, and the Opposition to power. There was more to be gained by getting powerful positions in Cabinet, especially the portfolio of Maori Affairs, as Ngata above all demonstrated. But, as his fall showed, a vigorous Maori Minister could go too far for the pakeha bureaucracy and electorate to stomach. There were some signs of a similar reaction to the Maori Ministers and policies of the third Labour Government. In short, Maori representation in Parliament and in Cabinet has been acceptable to pakeha New Zealand so long as it has not gone too far. It has remained a comfortable form of tokenism to be tolerated until the Maori became assimilated or integrated into the dominant community. This was long assumed to be the inevitable destiny of the Maori people, but it has not come about. They have retained a distinct identity, if not a political autonomy, and jealously guard separate representation as an expression of that identity. But separate representation has never really been seen by pakeha New Zealanders as a proper expression of bi-culturalism. If it were to be so recognised, there could be a demand from other ethnic communities, like the various Island Polynesian groups, now integrated into the General seats, for their own representatives in Parliament.

But, so far as Maori are concerned, the 4 seats have become a last guarantee of their tangata whenua status and their rights as a minority in their own country. Progressively, since the Treaty of Waitangi was signed and New Zealand was annexed as a British colony, Maori autonomy has been whittled away. Once the colonists got self-government under the 1852 Constitution Act and subsequently gained responsibility for domestic, including native, affairs they gradually asserted their control over the Maori population and brought them within the realm of law and order, much of it locally made by the settler-controlled Parliament. Maori resisted the complete fulfilment of this process for many years, particularly by creating extra-parliamentary

organisations of their own, like the King movement and later the Kotahitanga Parliament. These were condoned by Europeans so long as they remained innocuous, but were never officially recognised, let alone permitted to exercise legal powers. At best the European Governments were prepared to recognise lower level tribal committees with strictly confined powers of local government, as happened with Carroll's Maori Councils Act of 1900. Every Maori effort to create a national organisation with effective and autonomous powers was fenced off, as happened with the Maori War Effort Organisation which Tirikatene wanted to vest with real and enduring power. Instead, the New Zealand Maori Council was created in 1962, but it was no more than an advisory body whose advice could be and was ignored.

So, in the last resort, Maori organisations have had to come back to Maori representation in Parliament as their last vestige of a lost autonomy. The King movement, hitherto ostentatiously aloof and haplessly trying to erect their own Parliament, did so when they backed Major Te Wheoro, a former Kupapa, for the Western Maori seat in 1886. The Kotahitanga leaders, fruitlessly manœvering between their own Parliament and the real Parliament in Wellington, ultimately had to come behind Carroll and the Young Maori party. Ratana was shrewd enough not to go his own political way, but merely sought to capture the Four Quarters; so too the latest to attempt to construct a new nationalist party by Matiu Rata, though his Mana Motuhake has failed to capture any of the Maori seats.

In the meantime some Maori radicals, frustrated at the powerlessness of Maori in the parliamentary machine, have been trying to reclaim their lost autonomy, or" Maori sovereignty" as they now call it. According to Dr Ranginui Walker, Maori sovereignty has been perpetuated all along in the "rangatiratanga (chieftainships) over their lands, homes and treasured possessions" guaranteed to the Maori in the second article of the Treaty of Waitangi. If only 3 million acres of that Maori land remain today, the "turangawaewae (nurturing ground) of Maori sovereignty consists of the 600-700 marae reserves throughout New Zealand, and the hearts and minds of the people who know that they are the tangata whenua".[184] An English constitutional lawyer would hardly agree, and would point to article 1 of the Treaty whereby Maori sovereignty, equated with kawanatanga (governorship), was transferred to the British Queen. The differences are irreconcilable, with each side interpreting the different articles of the Treaty according to different linguistic and cultural traditions, but they are an earnest of the gulf which still divides the races in New Zealand. That gulf has not been bridged constitutionally—except by that long-standing "temporary" expedient, the 4 Maori seats.

However the Maori dilemma remains: the 4 seats have so far proved to be the maximum concession they can extract from the pakeha parties; frequent Maori requests for additional seats, on the strength of

[184]See "Korero", *New Zealand Listener*, 1 February 1986; see also Donna Awatere, *Maori Sovereignty*, Auckland, 1985.

the increasing Maori population, have always been turned down, often on the ground that in terms of votes cast Maori have been considerably over-represented by 4 seats.[185] By operating within the system Maori leaders have not been able to gain very great benefits, even when they have been in Government, without attracting a pakeha backlash. All that can be said is that they have done considerably better in this century than in the last, thanks to a fall-off in the European demand for Maori land and a willingness of twentieth century Governments to allow Maori a share of development and welfare expenditures. But such Governments have seldom gone far in providing the affirmative action that would be necessary to lift the Maori population in the socio-economic scale to the level of the European population.

Although most articulate Maori opinion favours the retention, indeed the increase, of the Maori seats, a few prominent Maori have recently spoken out in favour of abolition. Robert Mahuta, Director of Waikato University's Centre for Maori Studies, has supported abolition on the ground that an influx of Maori voters onto the General rolls would force members for those constituencies to "become more knowledgeable about, and pay more attention to, Maori voters and interests".[186] Hiwi Tauroa, then Race Relations Conciliator, wrote a series of pamphlets under the general title of *Let's Work Together*, taking a similar approach. But neither has attracted much support. The attitude of the rank and file is harder to estimate, although a poll conducted in 1976 showed that 56% of Maori respondents favoured the continuation of the separate seats.[187]

Yet despite the continuing Maori plea for separate representation, there has not been a corresponding grassroots support for the Maori seats in terms of registration and voting on the Maori roll. Since the introduction of a Maori roll in 1949 there has been a persistent, if sometimes slightly fluctuating, fall-off in the percentage of eligible Maori registering on the Maori roll, despite the introduction of compulsory registration in 1956. In 1949 77.7% of the eligible Maori population were registered, but by 1975, when the basis of registration was changed from half or more to anyone descended from a Maori, the percentage had fallen to 58.3. There has been an even larger fall-off in valid votes as a percentage of the total eligible population—from 84.8% in 1949 to 27.7% in 1975. Though the change in 1975 increased the potential Maori electorate very considerably—from some 118,180 persons of half or more Maori descent in 1975 to some 154,400 who were descended from a Maori—there was no corresponding increase in the number of registrations on the Maori rolls.[188] The increases in total enrolments since 1975 have been more or less in line with the natural increase in population, plus the additional numbers resulting from the lowering of the voting age from 20 to 18 in that year. At the time of the July 1984

[185]In fact both arguments can be supported by statistics. See Appendices 1 & 2.
[186]"Maori Political Representation: a case for change", in Evelyn Stokes, ed., *Maori Representation in Parliament*, Hamilton, 1981, p.25.
[187]Fleras,p.26.
[188]See Appendix 7.

election only 77,564 Maori, out of an estimated 209,600 who were eligible, were registered on the Maori electoral rolls. Some 132,000 were registered on the General rolls or not registered at all.[189] This suggests that nearly two-thirds of Maori voters do not care about maintaining the Maori seats—or that they have chosen to vote in marginal General electorates where their vote can be more useful, something that party organisers have been only too willing to encourage. There is probably an advantage for the Labour Party here: with 4 safe seats from the Maori electorates, there is much to be gained by getting as many "Maori" voters as possible onto the rolls in marginal General electorates.[190] According to one recent analysis, there would have been a slight gain for National in the 1981 election if the 4 Maori seats had been abolished and the votes redistributed among the existing General seats.[191] However any future abolition and redistribution would also require a re-drawing of electoral boundaries and that would not necessarily confer advantage on one party or the other.

Another feature of Maori electoral behaviour over recent years has been the high and increasing percentage of Maori who do not vote or who cast invalid votes. Maori voting has always been hampered by insufficent polling booths over their wide-flung electorates, although this has been less so in recent years when improved transport and urbanisation have meant that it has been easier for the bulk of Maori voters to reach polling booths. Yet, as Professor Chapman's graphs clearly indicate, there has been a steady rise in non-voting from the 1950s. Since 1966 Non-Vote has been the second largest "party" after Labour.[192] "Special Votes Disallowed" have also risen alarmingly, especially in the 1981 and 1984 elections, due to largely to failure to register or to technical errors in the exercise of the Maori option.[193] Here is yet another indication that separate Maori representation, though desperately defended on principle by most articulate Maori, has now become so complicated in electoral terms that it is increasingly failing to involve the rank and file of the Maori population. And for a long time both major parties have tended to accept the status quo while awaiting a clear statement from the Maori people for abolition. That has not been forthcoming.[194]

Nevertheless the present system does provide those persons descended from a Maori with a free choice to vote on the Maori or the General roll; and an opportunity to change from one roll to another after each census. The Maori option exercised in 1982 resulted in a net loss of 4,544 voters from the Maori roll, although there was a net gain to the Maori roll of 973 from the 1986 Maori option. The total Maori electoral population in 1984—made up of those Maori opting for the Maori roll, plus their children—was 140,421, giving an average electoral population

[189]Ibid.
[190]Fleras, p.34.
[191]A.C.Simpson, "Redistributing the Maori Vote: 1972-1984", University of Waikato, 1985.
[192]See Chapman Annex, Graph 7.
[193]See Appendix 4.
[194]Fleras, p.36.

of 35,105 per Maori seat, some 2,500 more than the average for the 91 General seats. This is not enough to justify the creation of another Maori seat. On the other hand the average valid votes per seat in the Maori electorates in 1984 was 14,783, compared with an average of 20,550 for the General seats; as ever, the Maori members have been elected by fewer voters than the pakeha representatives.[195]

Such cold statistics mask a more complex human situation, including the fact that the Maori people, depressed economically, frequently changing addresses, and not yet fully literate in an alien European culture, are notoriously reluctant to fill in and return registration forms. Many eligible Maori voters—the precise number is unkown, though it could be as high as one-third—are unregistered on either roll, and thus take no part in the political process. Many are young Maori who are unschooled in their rights as citizens, let alone in the niceties of the constitution. They have not been politicised by the Maori members of Parliament, or by the political parties. Nor have they been recruited to the slim ranks of the urban radicals. Politics, particularly that distinctly Maori variety waged mainly on the marae, is very much an activity of the middle-aged and the elderly. For them separate Maori representation remains as the best that they could secure: the crumbs that have fallen from the pakeha table.

[195]See Appendices 1 & 2.

APPENDIX 1

NON-MAORI REPRESENTATION IN PARLIAMENT: SEATS AND VOTES PER CAPITA

Election Year	Non-Maori Population*	No. of Non-Maori Seats	Average Population Per Seat	Total Valid Votes	Average Valid Votes Per Seat
1890	626,658	70	8,952	150,025	2,143
1893	672,265	70	9,603	303,076	4,329
1896	698,706	70	9,981	258,254	3,689
1902	807,929	76	10,630	416,962	5,486
1905	882,462	76	11,611	390,189	5,134
1908	960,642	76	12,640	428,648	5,640
1911	1,008,468	76	13,269	488,769	6,431
1914	1,095,994	76	14,420	515,907	6,788
1919	1,177,405	76	15,492	535,153	7,041
1922	1,218,913	76	16,038	614,070	8,079
1925	1,325,037	76	17,434	671,971	8,841
1928	1,388,700	76	18,272	735,391	9,676
1931	1,442,746	76	18,983	693,072	9,119
1935	1,485,046	76	19,540	827,795	10,892
1938	1,517,712	76	19,969	917,684	12,074
1943	1,537,637	76	20,232	911,370	11,991
1946	1,656,706	76	21,799	1,011,087	13,303
1949	1,780,228	76	23,424	1,035,520	13,625
1951	1,823,796	76	23,997	1,032,507	13,856
1954	1,973,042	76	25,961	1,059,251	13,937
1957	2,086,097	76	27,448	1,120,557	14,744
1960	2,212,051	76	29,106	1,133,483	14,914
1963	2,306,903	76	30,353	1,157,176	15,226
1966	2,676,919	76	35,222	1,167,691	15,364
1969	2,583,155	80	32,289	1,299,039	16,237
1972	2,720,320	83	32,774	1,359,204	16,375
1975	2,893,100	83	34,856	1,560,932	18,806
1978	2,867,600	88	32,586	1,663,431	18,902
1981	2,916,694	88	33,144	1,746,062	19,841
1984	2,956,735	91	32,491	1,870,069	20,550

*Numbers for non-census years are official estimates.

Sources: This table has been compiled from population statistics in *The New Zealand Official Handbook*, 1892, *The New Zealand Official Yearbooks*, at 3-yearly intervals from 1894 to 1984, and from electoral returns in AJHR from 1890.

APPENDIX 2

MAORI REPRESENTATION IN PARLIAMENT: SEATS AND VOTES PER CAPITA

Election Year	Maori Population*	No. of Maori Seats	Average Population Per Seat	Total Valid Votes	Average Valid Votes Per Seat
1890	41,873	4	10,468	6,611	1,652
1893	41,017	4	10,254	11,269	2,817
1896	39,854	4	9,963	13,008	3,252
1899	41,827	4	10,457	13,625	3,406
1902	44,061	4	11,015	14,271	3,567
1905	46,813	4	11,703	16,038	4,009
1908	48,576	4	12,144	16,365	4,091
1911	49,844	4	12,461	11,768†	3,923
1914	51,416	4	12,854	18,550	4,637
1919	52,636	4	13,159	10,231†	3,410
1922	54,934	4	13,733	20,658	5,164
1925	61,486	4	15,731	15,314	3,828
1928	67,401	4	16,850	20,940	5,235
1931	72,998	4	18,249	21,439	5,359
1935	80,455	4	20,113	24,842	6,210
1938	85,974	4	21,493	28,709	7,177
1943	95,095	4	23,774	30,458	7,614
1946	101,566	4	25,391	36,118	9,029
1949	110,032	4	27,508	38,084	9,521
1951	114,676	4	28,669	37,284	9,321
1954	128,561	4	32,140	37,642	9,365
1957	143,138	4	35,784	36,808	9,202
1960	161,099	4	40,275	37,020	9,255
1963	180,715	4	45,178	40,869	10,217
1966	210,159	4	50,289	37,404	9,351
1969	216,912	4	54,228	41,129	10,282
1972	235,938	4	58,985	41,948	10,487
1975	261,510	4	65,378	42,801	10,700
1978	273,723	4	68,430	46,742	11,685
1981	279,255	4	69,813	55,241	13,810
1984	289,900	4	72,475	59,132	14,783

*From 1890–1926 Maori population includes half-castes living as Maori; from 1926 to 1976 includes all persons of half or more Maori descent; after 1976 persons describing themselves as half or more Maori. Figures for non-census years based on average decrease or increase between censuses.

†Only 3 seats contested.

Sources: This table has been compiled from Maori population statistics in *The New Zealand Official Yearbooks* from 1893. The total valid votes are from MA 23/15, National Archives for 1890, and AJHR for subsequent elections.

APPENDIX 3

MAORI CANDIDATES ELECTED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 1868–1887

Northern	*Eastern*	*Western*	*Southern*
1868			
Russell, F.	Te Moananui, T.	Paetahi, N. K.	Patterson, J.
1871			
Katene, W.	Takamoana, K.	Parata, W.	Taiaroa, H. K.
1876			
Tawhiti, H. K.	Takamoana, K.	Nahe, H.	Taiaroa, H. K.
1879			
Tawhai, H.	Tomoana, H.	Te Wheoro, W.	Tainui, I.
1881			
Tawhai, H.	Tomoana, H.	Te Wheoro, W.	Taiaroa, H. K.
1884			
Hakuene, I.	Pere, W.	Te Ao, Te P.	Taiaroa, H. K.
*1885**			Parata, Tame
*1886**		Taipua, H.	
*1887**			
Katene, W.			
1887			
Taiwhanga, H.	Carroll, J.	Taipua, H.	Parata, Tame

*By-elections

Source: J.O. Wilson, *New Zealand Parliamentary Record, 1840–1984*, Wellington, 1985.

APPENDIX 4

MAORI ELECTION RESULTS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 1890–1984

(See page 79 for party abbreviations)

	Northern		*Eastern*		*Western*		*Southern*	
1890	Kapa, E.Te M.	623	Carroll, J. (Lib)	1,596	Taipua, H.	971	Parata, Tame	153
	Puhipi, T.	515	Pere, W.	1,406	Eketone, P.	467	Maaku, H.	108
	Katene, W.	300			Whakatauri, K Te	70	Taiaroa, R.M.	78
	Rewiti, H.	194			Karape, T.	58	Ellison, R.	51
	Kawitupu, R.	7			Whakapoko T te	13		
	Whatanui, K Te	1						
	Totals	1,640		3,002		1,579		390
1893	Heke, H. (Lib)	952	Pere, W.	2,645	Te Ao, R.	817	Parata, Tame	367
	Kapa, E.Te M.	445	Tumuirangi, H.	1,246	Eketone, P.	727	Mutu, T.	182
	Uruama, P.	277	Ngata, P.	1,015	Hunia, W.	365		
			Tomoana, H.	663	Kaititia, N.	334		
			Tukino, Te H.	542	Aperahama, R.	274		
			Mangakahia, H.	194	Whakaahu, E.	224		
	Totals	1,674		6,305		2,741		549
1896[1]	Heke, H.		Pere, W.		Kaihau, H.		Parata, Tame	
1899	Heke, H. (Lib)	1,453	Pere, W. (Lib)	2,294	Kaihau, H.	2,685	Parata, Tame (Lib)	387
	Kapa, E.Te M.	367	Te Atakikoia, M.	1,387	Tukino, Te H.	873	Hape, T.	219
	Ururoa, H.	225	Apanui, H.	1,316	Nikitini, Te Ao	581		
	Te Ahu, K.	126	Numia, K.	331	Hipango, W.	440		
	Uruamo, P.	94	Mete, T.	207	Patene, H.	199		
			Haweti, T.	126	Kingi, T.	173		
					Ngapaki, W.	145		
	Totals	2,265		5,661		5,096		606

[1]Successful candidates only, voting figures not available.

	Northern		*Eastern*		*Western*		*Southern*	
1902	Heke, H. (Lib) ..	1,665	Pere, W. (Lib) ..	2,182	Kaihau, H.	3,324	Parata, Tame (Lib) ..	343
	Mangakahia, H. ..	268	Mataiawhea, P. ..	1,568	Katitia, N.	954	Tikao, T.H.	263
	Te Whatanui, K. ..	119	Te Atahikoia, M. ..	1,515	Tukino, Te H. ..	840		
	Henare, H.	74			Te Kahu, E.	673		
	Ihaka, E.	8			Teehi, Te O.	399		
					Kingi, Te W.	76		
	Totals	2,134		5,265		6,266		606
1905	Heke, H. (Lib) ..	1,158	Ngata, A.T. (Lib) ..	2,447	Kaihau, H. (R) ..	3,026	Parata, T. (Lib) ..	287
	Rewiti, R.	541	Pere, W. (Lib) ..	1,690	Tukino, Te H. (I) ..	1,338	Uru, J.H.W. (R) ..	127
	Tukariri, H.	238	Mohi	1,594	Takahu, E. (Lib) ..	991	Taiaroa, W. (R) ..	123
	Ururoa, P.	218	Paaka, T.	785	Taipua, P. (I) ..	397	Makitanara, T. ..	118
	Rotoroa, R.	186	Ihaia	305	Kingi, W.	162	Hoani, M.	94
			Kohere, R. (R) ..	92	Teimana, H.	124		
	Totals	2,341		6,913		6,035		749
1908	Heke, H. (Lib) ..	1,468	Ngata, A. T. (Lib) ..	4,740	Kaihau, H. (R) ..	2,375	Parata, T. (Lib) ..	358
	Rangi, H.	423	Paaka, T. (R) ..	1,730	Eketone, P. (Lib) ..	1,618	Uru, J.H.W. (I) ..	351
					Tukino, Te H. ..	1,375	West, C.	21
					Te Ao, H.	1,178		
					Kahu, E.	728		
	Totals	1,891		6,470		7,274		730

	Northern		*Eastern*		*Western*		*Southern*	
1911	Te Rangihiroa, P. (Lib)	1,032	Ngata, A.T. (Lib)		Pomare, M. (I)	2,464	Parata, Taare (Lib)	264
	Puhipi, R. (I)	627			Kaihau, H. (I)	1,899	Uru, J.H.W (I)	233
	Maetara, J. (R)	500	NO CONTEST		Eketone, P. (Lib)	1,470	Watson, T. (I)	131
	Nehua, W.	455			Taingakawa, T.	581	Erihana, T.	84
	Te Paa, H. (I)	414			Katitia, N.	560	Apes, J.	80
	Rapihana, H.	295			Hetaraka, P.	19	Patete, H.	18
	Ihaka, E.	287						
	Porowini, K.	261						
	Kawhai, W.	43						
	Netana, R.	26						
	Tito, H.	25						
	Totals	3,965				6,993		810
1914	Henare, T. (R)	885	Ngata, A.T. (Lib)	4,934	Pomare, M. (R)	3,416	Parata, Taare (Lib)	434
	Te Paa, H. (Lib)	709	Pere, H. (R)	2,109	Te Ao, H. (I)	1,309	Erihana, T. (R)	196
	Puhipi, R. (R)	696	Votes disallowed	71	Eketone, P. (Lib)	1,074	Rore, H. (I)	162
	Kawiti, N. (I)	662			Mawhete, R. (Lib)	703		
	Papakakura, N.	382			Paora, H.T. (I)	166		
	Te Whaka, H. (I)	218			Patena, T. (I)	125		
	Hoori, P. (I)	187						
	Ngawaka, A. (Lib)	183						
	Totals	3,922		7,114		6,793		792

	Northern		*Eastern*		*Western*		*Southern*	
1919	Henare, I (R)	2,665	Ngata, A.T. (Lib)		Pomare, M. (R)	2,669	Uru, J.H.W. (I)	376
	Kawiti, N. (I)	1,036			Katitia, N. (I)	1,245	Tairaroa, R. (Lib)	169
	Ngawaka, A. (I)	135	NO CONTEST		Short, T. (I)	567	Erihana, T. (I)	97
	Tuoro, A.	71			Patena, T. (I)	536	Matiu, H. (I)	46
	Henare, W. (I)	32			Taniwha, T. (I)	212		
	Votes disallowed	44			Kaihau, H. (I)	215		
					Keawene, T. (I)	45		
					Te Ahu, K. (I)	44		
					Paora, O. (I)	35		
					Chase, E. (I)	24		
					Whatanui, K. (I)	12		
					Votes disallowed	71		
	Totals	3,983				5,675		688
1922	Henare, T. (R)	2,432	Ngata, A. T. (Lib)	4,559	Pomare, M. (R)	3,835	Uru, H.W. (R)	287
	Kawiti, N. (I)	991	Uamairangi, T. (I)	3,058	Ratana, T. (I)	3,037	McDonald, P. (I)	200
	Heke, H. (I)	379			Mawhete, R. (I)	827	Erihana, T. (I)	153
	Ngawaka, A. (R)	332			Patena, T.	113	Barrett, W. (I)	136
	Tai, I Te (I)	303					Waitiri, R. (I)	16
	Totals	4,437		7,617		7,812		792
1925	Henare, T. (R)	2,434	Ngata, A. T. (Lib)	4,468	Pomare, M. (R)	4,010	Uru, H.W. (R)	211
	Kaitaia, H. (I)	825	Makena, H. (I)	864	Mawhete, R. (Lib)	1,287	Makitanara, T. (R)	195
	Wihongi, P. (I)	611			Patena, T. (I)	110	Erihana, T. (I)	157
							Pitama, W. (I)	114
							Patuki, J. (R)	28
	Totals	3,870		5,332		5,407		705

	Northern		*Eastern*		*Western*		*Southern*	
1928	Henare, T. (R)	2,531	Ngata, A. T. (U)	4,950	Pomare, M. (R)	4,674	Makitanara, T. (U)	199
	Paikea, P.K. (Ra)	1,651	Moko. P. (I)	1,846	Ratana, H.T. (Ra)	3,075	Tirikatene, E.T. (Ra)	198
	Waiaua, H. (I)	467	Stewart, T. (Lib)	254			Tikao, J. (R)	167
	Waika, T. (U)	245					Uru, H. (R)	163
	Heke, H. (IR)	225					Macdonald, P.H. (Lib)	79
	Wihongi, P. (I)	192					Pitama, W. (I)	42
	Parore, L. (I)	9					Erihana, T. (I)	33
	Totals	5,320		7,050		7,749		821
1931	Henare, T. (CR)	3,297	Ngata, A. T. (CR)	5,105	Te Tomo, T. (CR)	4,172	Makitanara, T. (CU)	334
	Paikea, P.K. (Ra)	2,109	Moko, P. (I)	1,994	Ratana, H.T. (Ra)	2,736	Tirikatene, E.T. (Ra)	315
	Witehira, H. (I)	224			Wakarua, R. (I)	394	Katene, H.W. (I)	268
					Eketone, P. (I)	293		
					Piahana, H. (I)	103		
					Takiruhi, T. (I)	95		
	Totals	5,630		7,099		7,793		917
1935	Henare, T. (N)	3,303	Ngata, A. T. (N)	5,678	Ratana, H.T. (Ra)	3,433	Tirikatene, E.T. (Ra)	362
	Maihi, R. (I)	162	Omana, T. (Ra)	2,454	Te Tomo, T. (N)	3,395	Bragg, T. (N)	319
	Otene, M. (I)	90	Kohere, R. (I)	406	Asher, J. (D)	996	Rio-Love, E. (I)	217
	Paikea, P.K. (Ra)	2,320			Hawera, H. (L)	644	Makitanara, T. (D)	68
	Parore, L. (D)	414			Patena, T. (L)	165		
	Taylor, D. (I)	202						
	Witehira, H. (I)	214						
	Totals	6,705		8,538		8,633		966
1938	Paikea, P.K. (L)	4,669	Ngata, A. T. (N)	4,113	Ratana, H.T. (L)	6,460	Tirikatene, E.T. (L)	715
	Henare, T. (N)	2,658	Kohere, R. (L)	3,049	Jones, P. Te H. (I)	2,193	Bragg, T. (N)	230
	Taretana, H. (I)	115	Omana, T. (Ra)	2,126	Te Tomo, T. (N)	1,369	Macdonald, P. (I)	87
	Tawhai, M. (I)	79	Dansey, H. (I)	343	Hopa, Te (I)	169	Informal	8
	Informal	62	Rangi, M. (I)	334	Informal	241		
			Informal	359				
	Totals	7,583		10,324		10,432		1,040

	Northern		*Eastern*		*Western*		*Southern*	
1943	Paikea, T.P. (L) ..	4,398	Omana, T. (L) ..	5,462	Ratana, H.T. (L) ..	6,351	Tirikatene, E.T. (L) ..	741
	Pou, E. (N)	1,960	Ngata, A. T. (N) ..	5,222	Jones, P. Te H. (I) ..	3,042	Tikao-Barrett, J. (I) ..	183
	Poata, W. (I)	580	Informal	261	Pomare, Te R (N) ..	976	Thomas, V. (N) ..	135
	Toka, P. (I)	278			Rangitaura (I) ..	136	Pitama, Te (I) ..	50
	Harawira, K. (I) ..	259			Rewiti, T. (I)	78	Informal	11
	Taylor, D. (I)	234			Peka, M. (I)	73		
	Witehira, P. (I) ..	143			Informal	212		
	Maioha, S.W. (I) ..	141						
	Tawhare, P. (I) ..	16						
	Informal	403						
	Totals	8,412		10,945		10,868		1,120
1946	Paikea, T.P. (L) ..	5,580	Omana, T. (L) ..	7,321	Ratana, M. (L) ..	9,300	Tirikatene, E.T. (L) ..	861
	Henare, J.C.T. (N) ..	3,025	Ngata, A. T. (N) ..	5,804	Marumaru, H. (N) ..	2,809	Thomas, V. (N) ..	280
	Poka, L. (I)	764	Informal	439	Amohanga, P. (I) ..	217	Informal	14
	Informal	132			Kauhau, R. (I) ..	157		
					Informal	188		
	Totals	9,501		13,564		12,671		1,155
1949	Paikea, T.P. (L) ..	5,841	Omana, T. (L) ..	8,487	Ratana, I. (L) ..	9,069	Tirikatene, E.T. (L) ..	970
	Henare, J.C.T. (N) ..	3,812	Carroll, A.T. (N) ..	5,276	Marumaru, H. (N) ..	2,752	Bates, H.N. (N) ..	283
	Otene, M. (I) ..	93	Informal	252	Mathews, G. (I) ..	326	Informal	19
	Tuwhare, M. (I) ..	30			Wirihana, T. (I) ..	302		
	Informal	127			Nutana, K. (I) ..	219		
					Wakarua, W. (I) ..	154		
					Taua, T. (I)	122		
					Hovell, H. (I)	120		
					Rangitaura, R. (I) ..	115		
					Amohanga, R. (I) ..	113		
					Informal	267		
	Totals	9,903		14,015		13,559		1,272

	Northern		*Eastern*		*Western*		*Southern*	
1951	Paikea, T.P. (L)	5,812	Omana, T. (L)	8,905	Ratana, I. (L)	9,589	Tirikatene, E.T. (L)	979
	Henare, J.C.T. (N)	3,680	Carroll, A.T. (N)	5,199	Marumaru, H. (N)	2,237	Beaton, W. (N)	320
	Informal	141	Informal	245	Mathews, G. (I)	352	Informal	13
					Kauhau, R. (I)	211		
					Informal	250		
	Totals	9,633		14,349		12,639		1,312
1954	Paikea, T.P. (L)	6,154	Omana, T. (L)	7,015	Ratana, I. (L)	7,784	Tirikatene, E.T. (L)	4,452
	Waetford, H. (N)	1,719	Anaru, K. (N)	3,921	Bennett, W. (N)	1,147	Carroll, A.T. (N)	1,588
	Otene, M. (I)	1,314	Paku, W. (I)	614	Butler, T. (I)	505	Logan, F. (I)	477
	Maihi, T. (I)	240	Informal	391	Kaihau, S. (I)	283	Baker, M. (I)	261
	Informal	304			Informal	317	Huata, A. (I)	168
							Informal	145
	Totals	9,731		11,941		10,036		7,091
1957	Paikea, H.T. (L)	5,774	Omana, T. (L)	6,569	Ratana, I. (L)	7,076	Tirikatene, E.T. (L)	5,335
	Davis (N)	1,464	Maxwell (N)	2,372	Jones, P. Te H. (N)	1,523	Straton (N)	952
	Maihi, T. (SC)	773	Reedy, H. (SC)	2,021	Awatere, P. (SC)	1,171	Ropiha (SC)	394
	Sutherland (LU)	529	Informal	235	Kaihau, S. (ML)	154	Makitarana (K)	113
	Te Pania (ISC)	319			Te Hira (K)	119	Informal	102
	Witehira (K)	39			Patara (IR)	111		
	Informal	144			Informal	250		
	Totals	9,042		11,197		10,404		6,896
1960	Paikea, H.T. (L)	5,454	Omana, T. (L)	5,809	Ratana, I. (L)	6,695	Tirikatene, E.T. (L)	5,132
	Harrison (N)	2,082	Reedy, H. (SC)	2,784	Jones, P. Te H. (N)	2,029	Tutaki, R. (N)	1,185
	Clarke, W. (SC)	1,437	Vercoe (N)	2,496	Tuwhangai (SC)	874	NiaNia, M. (SC)	474
	Informal	165	Carter (I)	191	Rakena (K)	378	Informal	135
			Informal	360	Informal	193		
	Totals	9,138		11,640		10,169		6,926

	Northern		*Eastern*		*Western*		*Southern*	
1963	Rata, M. (L)	5,965	Watene, P. (L)	6,775	Ratana, I. (L)	7,795	Tirikatene, E.T. (L)	6,065
	Henare, J.C.T. (N)	3,842	Reedy, H. (N)	4,209	Jones, P. Te H. (N)	2,699	Couch, M.B.W. (N)	1,087
	Clarke, W. (SC)	374	Smith, R. (YM)	741	Informal	440	Bristow, R. (YM)	387
	Birch, B. (I)	40	Raukopa, B. (SC)	230			NiaNia, M. (SC)	299
	Informal	138	Baker, P. (IM)	157			Informal	177
			Rangi, R. (Lib)	112				
			Sadler, (ISC)	92				
			Informal	281				
	Totals	10,359		12,597		10,934		8,015
1966	Rata, M. (L)	5,926	Watene, P. (L)	6,537	Ratana, I. (L)	7,304	Tirikatene, E.T. (L)	5,474
	Wilcox, F. (N)	1,629	Reedy, H. (N)	3,416	Te Heu Heu, T. (N)	1,724	Pere, M. (N)	1,642
	Wairua, P. (SC)	1,212	Paul, C. (SC)	1,158	Sadler, W. (SC)	925	MacDonald, J. (SC)	457
	Informal	127	Informal	218	Informal	333	Informal	226
	Totals	8,894		11,329		10,286		7,799
1969	Rata, M. (L)	6,157	Reweti, P.B. (L)	7,247	Wetere, K. (L)	9,146	Tirikatene-	
	Latimer, G. (N)	1,399	Ngata, H. (N)	3,760	Hura, P. (N)	1,616	Sullivan, T.W.M. (L)	7,802
	Wairua, P. (SC)	688	Paul, C. (SC)	679	Te Hira, T. (SC)	1,032	Pomare, N. (N)	1,172
	Informal	2,682	Informal	284	Informal	442	Makitanara, T. (SC)	290
							Rangi, K. (SI)	141
							Informal	246
	Totals	10,926		11,970		12,236		9,651
1972	Rata, M. (L)	6,276	Reweti, P.B. (L)	8,831	Wetere, K. (L)	9,555	Tirikatene-	
	Latimer, G. (N)	1,016	Dewes, K. (N)	2,641	Rawiri, R. (N)	869	Sullivan, T.W.M. (L)	9,078
	Toia, H. (SC)	551	Rangi, R. (SC)	505	Te Hira, T. (SC)	706	Parahi, K. (N)	827
	Samuels, D. (ND)	147	Clarke, T. (ND)	177	Amohia, H. (ND)	234	Ngakuru, G. (SC)	450
	Sadler, M. (ISC)	86	Informal	200	Informal	298	Informal	162
	Informal	86						
	Totals	8,162		12,354		11,662		10,517

	Northern		*Eastern*		*Western*		*Southern*	
1975	Rata, M. (L)	5,988	Reweti, P. B. (L)	8,491	Wetere, K. (L)	10,145	Tirikatene-Sullivan, T.W.M. (L)	7,708
	Peters, W. (N)	1,837	Searancke, M. (N)	2,230	Rangi, E. (N)	1,220	Amaru, N. (N)	1,256
	Toia, H. (SC)	500	Te Pere, M. (SC)	548	Te Hira, T. (SC)	821	Kamau, L. (SC)	598
	Marriner-Grub, C. (V)	231	Stevens, D.	208	Houston, M. (V)	250	Mahi, W. (IL)	358
	Informal	210	Informal	344	Informal	203	Currie, Y. (V)	246
							Te Puke-Watson, T. (ISM)	166
							Informal	1,281
	Totals	8,766		11,821		12,639		11,613
1978	Rata, M. (L)	6,071	Reweti, P.B. (L)	9,085	Wetere, K. (L)	11,176	Tirikatene-Sullivan, T.W.M. (L)	10,250
	Pirihi, N. (N)	1,049	Searancke, M. (N)	1,685	Pihema, G. (SC)	1,457	Maitai, C. (N)	1,070
	Toia, H. (SC)	1,227	Te Hira, T. (SC)	1,195	Te HeuHeu, T. (N)	893	Gregory, W. (SC)	1,013
	Marriner-Grubb, C. (V)	148	Kaa, H. (V)	182	Fromm, D. (V)	124	Burdan, M. (V)	117
	Informal	1,413	Informal	231	Informal	289	Informal	169
	Totals	9,908		12,378		13,939		12,619
1981	Gregory, B. (L)	6,368	Tapsell, P. (L)	8,222	Wetere, K. (L)	10,523	Tirikatene-Sullivan, T.W.M. (L)	10,685
	Rata, M. (MM)	2,703	Tahana, A. (MM)	1,990	Rickard, T. (MM)	1,899	Reedy, N. (MM)	1,740
	Campbell, P. (SC)	1,573	Little, C. (N)	1,505	Te Hira, T. (SC)	1,697	Aramakutu, R. (SC)	1,149
	Tautari, M. (N)	1,004	Tibble, R. (SC)	1,172	Katene, W. (N)	1,547	Kiwara, B. (N)	1,060
	Birch, H. (I)	124	Informal	164	Informal	201	Mihaka, Te R. (I)	280
	Informal	98	Special Votes Disallowed	1,555	Special Votes Disallowed	1,896	Informal	157
	Special Votes Disallowed	1,767					Special Votes Disallowed	1,420
	Totals	13,637		14,608		17,763		16,491

	Northern		*Eastern*		*Western*		*Southern*	
1984	Gregory, B. (L)	10,471	Tapsell, P. (L)	12,285	Wetere, K. (L)	11,325	Tirikatene-Sullivan, T.W.M. (L)	11,792
	Rata, M. (MM)	2,783	Kiwara, B. (N)	1,055	Katene, W. (N)	1,215	Reedy, N. (MM)	1,297
	Henskes, W. (N)	949	Heremaia, R. (NZ)	400	Rickard, T. (MM)	1,049	Mei Te A. (N)	982
	Brown, F. (NZ)	492	McLean, B. (MM)	575	Te Hira, T. (SC)	523	Amaru, W. (NZ)	427
	Joyce, I. (SC)	373	Te AweAwe (SC)	277	Rameka, T. (NZ)	298	Aramakutu, R. (SC)	226
	Informal	168	Informal	124	Informal	154	Mihaka, Te R. (I)	177
	Special Votes		Special Votes		Special Votes		Watene, H.	161
	Disallowed	1,224	Disallowed	1,694	Disallowed	1,517	Informal	148
							Special Votes	
							Disallowed	1,107
	Totals	16,460		16,410		16,081		16,317

BY-ELECTIONS

1909

Northern Maori

Te Rangihiroa, P. (Lib)	1,725
Porowini, K. (I)	318
Rapihana (I)	290
Hapa (I)	190
Kaitaia (I)	175
Hare (I)	124
Kawiti (I)	85
Ururoa (I)	51
Netana, R. (I)	25
Total	2,983

1918

Southern Maori

Uru, J.H.W. (I)	237
Parata (NG)	223
Eirhana, T. (I)	158
Total	618

1922

Southern Maori

Uru, H.W. (R)	364
Erihana, T. (R)	250
Pitama, W. (I)	108
Barrett, W. (I)	90
Total	812

1930

Western Maori

Te Tomo, T. (R)	3,970
Ratana, H.T. (Ra)	3,150
Jones, P. Te H. (YM)	902
Total	8,022

1932

Southern Maori

Tirikatene, E.T. (Ra)	425
Parata, W. (U)	184
MacDonald, P. (I)	132
Beaton, J. (I)	113
Bragg, T. (I)	94
Mihaka, W. (I)	3
Total	951

1945

Western Maori

Ratana, M. (L)	4,687
Jones, P. Te H. (I)	2,960
Piahana (I)	450
Tupaea (I)	378
Amohangu (I)	113
Rewiti (I)	108
Erueti (I)	78
Hau (I)	42
Total	8,756

1963

Northern Maori

Rata, M. (L)	3,090
Henare, J.C.T. (N)	2,643
Pou, E. (LU)	562
Clarke, W. (SC)	340
Hui, T.K. (IL)	268
Cooper, W. (I)	257
Toka, P. (LU)	143
Mokaraka, H. (I)	25
Peita, H.K. (K)	22
Informal	67
Total	7,417

1967						*1980*		
Southern Maori			*Eastern Maori*			*Northern Maori*		
Tirikatene-Sullivan, T.W.M. (L)	..	4,968	Reweti, P.B. (L)	..	4,460	Gregory, B. (L)	..	3,580
Pere, M. (N)	..	1,371	Reedy, H. (N)	..	2,416	Rata, M. (MM)	..	2,589
MacDonald, J. (SC)	..	347	Paul, C. (SC)	..	1,219	Toia, H. (SC)	..	560
Informal	..	58	Bennett, D. (IM)	..	671	Hetaraka, W. (Ch.U)	..	80
			Huata, Te O. (I)	..	246	Weal, T.K. (CDU)	..	13
			Informal	..	81	Warner, P. (R)	..	9
						Informal	..	53
						Special Votes Disallowed	..	2,439
Total	..	6,744	Total	..	9,093	Total	..	9,323

Sources: Compiled from MA 23/15, National Archives for 1890; and from AJHR for subsequent elections.

PARTY ABBREVIATIONS

C.D.U.	Christian Democratic Union
Ch.U.	Cheer Up
C.R.	Coalition Reform
C.U.	Coalition United
D.	Democrat
I.	Independent
I.K.	Independent Kotahitanga
I.L.	Independent Labour
I.M.	Independent Maori
I.R.	Independent Ratana
I.S.C.	Independent Social Credit
I.S.M.	Independent Southern Maori
K.	Kauhanganui
L.	Labour
Lib.	Liberal
L.U.	Labour Unofficial
M.L.	Maoritanga Labour
M.M.	Mana Motuhake
N.	National
N.D.	New Democratic
N.G.	National Government
N.Z.	New Zealand Party
R.	Reform
Ra	Ratana
S.C.	Social Credit
S.I.	Straight Independent
U.	United
V.	Values
Y.M.	Young Maori Party

APPENDIX 5

MAORI MEMBERS OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL

Mokena Kohere	11/10/1872–25/4/1887
Wiremu Ngatata	11/10/1872–8/11/1887
Hori Kerei Taiaroa	17/2/1879–25/8/1880 15/5/1885–4/8/1905
Ropata Wahawaha	10/5/1887–1/7/1897
Henare Tomoana	24/6/1898–20/2/1904
Mahuta Tawhiao Potatau Te Wherowhero	22/5/1903–21/5/1910
Wiremu Pere	21/1/1907–27/6/1912
Tame Parata	13/6/1912–6/3/1917
Wiremu Kerei Nikora	26/6/1913–15/7/1915
Te Heu Heu Tukino	7/5/1918–1/6/1921
John Topi Patuki	7/5/1918–6/5/1925
Sir James Carroll	2/9/1921–18/10/1926
Wiremu Rikihana	1/6/1923–31/5/1930
Rangi Mawhete	9/3/1936–8/3/1950
Sir Apirana Ngata	22/6/1950–14/7/1950
Hoeroa Taraua Utiku Marumaru	27/7/1950–31/12/1950

Source: J.O. Wilson, *New Zealand Parliamentary Record, 1840–1984.*

APPENDIX 6

KNOWN MAORI CANDIDATES FOR GENERAL SEATS, 1967-1984*

C.M. Bennett (L) Rotorua 1969
D.I. Sinclair (L) Raglan 1969
T. Tuhimate (L) Franklin 1969
T.S. Mihaere (L) Ruahine 1972
W.R. Austin (N) Awarua 1975, 1978, 1981, 1984
R.R.R. Te Rite Pahi (Lib) Manukau 1975
P.W. Tapsell (L) Rotorua 1975, 1978
M.B.W. Couch (N) Wairarapa 1975, 1978, 1981, 1984
W.R. Peters (N) Hunua 1978, 1981, Tauranga 1984
H. Te H. Ruru (SC) Central Otago 1978
T. Gemmell (L) Wairarapa 1981
P. Tahere (L) King Country 1981
H. Te M. Kaa (V) Palmerston North 1981
W.K. Amaru (N) Pencarrow 1981
M.T. Metekingi (I) Porirua 1981, (MM) Porirua 1984
P.P. Tairua (SC) East Cape 1984
D.M. Terei (SC) Onehunga 1984
B.T. Hoera (NZ) Otara 1984
R.B. Tamihere (MM) Otara 1984
N.F. Rangi (N) Tongariro 1984
N. Te Hira (MM) West Auckland 1984
H.H.E. Maxwell (MM) Whangarei 1984
B. Matthews (NZ) Mt Roskill 1984

*This list could be incomplete since candidates with Maori ancestry did not always identify themselves as Maori.

Only one European is known to have stood for a Maori seat since 1967: T.K. Weal (C.D.U.) who stood for Northern Maori in the 1980 by-election and got 13 votes.

APPENDIX 7

REGISTERED ELECTORS AND VALID VOTES ON THE MAORI ROLL, 1949–1984

Year	1949	1951	1954	1957	1960	1963	1966	1969[1]	1972	1975[2]	1978	1981	1984
Estimated Maori population (half or more)	..	110,032	114,676	128,561	143,138	161,099	180,715	210,159	216,912	235,938	261,510	273,723	279,225	289,900
Est. Maori voting age population (half or more)	44,930	47,360	52,020	57,770	57,450	71,540	77,200	86,660	96,340	118,180	132,990	147,130	161,560
No. registered on Maori roll	34,896	39,387	38,799	42,731	48,647	49,197	52,547	51,624	54,473	68,983	109,598[3]	75,704	77,564
Percent of Maori (half or more) registered on Maori roll	77.7	83.2	74.6	74.0	84.7	68.8	68.1	59.6	56.5	58.3	82.4	51.5	48.0
Maori descent 18 and over	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	154,400	173,100	191,649	209,600
Valid votes on Maori roll	38,084	37,284	37,642	36,808	37,020	40,869	37,404	41,129	41,948	42,801	46,742	55,241	59,132
Valid votes as percent of total eligible population	..	84.8	76.7	72.4	63.7	64.4	57.1	48.5	47.5	43.5	27.7	27.0	28.8	28.2

1. Voting age lowered to 20 years
2. Voting age lowered to 18 years and option introduced whereby all persons who are Maori or descendants of a Maori can choose whether to enrol on a General or a Maori roll.
3. Difficulties with compilation of 1978 electoral rolls mean this figure must be treated with caution.

Source: Appendix 2 and figures supplied by the Royal Commission on the Electoral System, Febuary 1986.

Annex

Voting in the Maori Political Sub-System, 1935-1984

Robert Chapman[1]

This Annex is offered with the twin purposes of adding recent voting details to Professor Sorrenson's historical account, and of helping to clarify the operations and outcomes of the parallel Maori electoral system over the last 50 years. The essence of the evolution to be examined can be read from the graphs included, but perhaps a commentary on the indicative trends they display, some of the factors behind the trends, and the methodology and limitations of the graphs may be of assistance.

Graph 1 shows the party outcomes of the last 17 general elections in the 4 Maori seats taken as a whole and percentaged on the conventional basis of 100.0% equalling all valid votes cast. Insofar as MPs, the press and the public have moved on from attending to the relative size of majorities in numbers of votes from one election to the next, it is to valid vote percentages and comparisons they have gone. The advantage of basing percentaging on valid votes is that the figures are carefully scrutinised and compiled and widely published. They cover all the votes which "count" in deciding seats and therefore appear to cover all the trends which affect the final result.

The main features of the last 50 years of Maori voting shown by Graph 1 are first, the rise of the Ratana-then-Labour vote from a shade above one-third of the combined electorate to the current level of nearly three-quarters of the vote over the last 6 elections. The rise was rapid, very much so between 1935 and 1938, then strongly so until 1946 and was still lifting until 1951. Between 1951 and 1957 Labour support formed a plateau somewhat above two-thirds of all valid votes. Then, at the end of the second Labour Government, there was a minor to middling reverse (down 4.9 points). The climb was thereupon resumed both in 1963 and 1966 and more strongly again in 1969 and 1972 until it reached an absolute peak of 80.4 per cent or four-fifths of all Maori valid votes.

Once more a 3-year Labour period in office was followed by a minor to middling reverse (again down 4.9 points). In 1978 the regaining of ground began as it had in 1963. Only this time the process was suddenly interrupted by a heavy fall. This Labour fall seemingly reflected the appearance of Mana Motuhake alone, for all other competitors were simultaneously declining (down 2.3 points in sum) save Independent (up 0.7 points). In 1981 Labour continued to draw nearly two-thirds of the vote, but such a result raised the question of whether this new party of the articulate and those alienated from parties as they had been would manage to reduce Labour to its plateau of the fifties and keep it there. That question was answered for the time being in 1984 when Labour support made its largest single leap since the

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Ratana-to-Labour surge between 1935 and 1938. The three-quarters level had again been overtopped.

The second major feature of the developments set out in Graph 1 is the unsteady but continuing decline in support for the National candidates. The unsteadiness of the decline and at times the decline itself are linked to the third feature on the graph, the proneness of Labour's opposition to divide and even, as in the earliest and latest periods covered, to fracture into competing fragments.

Why the opposition to National was so divided in 1935 and why it continued divided against Labour for a time, why National descended so decisively and, reciprocally, why Labour rose, paused and rose again are all highly complex questions. The answers are intermingled with a change in the Maori political system which sprang from politically induced changes in the social and economic situation of Maori voters. There were changes in the way parties were organised, in candidature and in basic loyalties. In turn the altered system was tested by a profound social transformation in the shape of the accelerating urbanisation and industrialisation of the Maori people. It is true there were changes in the formal electoral system: the secret ballot for the 1938 election; general elections held on the same day as the pakeha voted from 1951; a new and more equal boundary distribution for 1954; and workable rolls for 1957. The effects of these alterations were, however, minor by comparison with the effects of refocused loyalties which followed a Government acting upon matters of general Maori concern.

The situation as it had been still dominated the general election of 1935. Graph 1 begins with National possessed of a clear majority over Ratana at a time when the "European" electorates were returning a large Labour preponderance. As Graphs 2 to 5 showing the individual Maori seats bring out, Sir Apirana Ngata with his great mana, personal achievements and long tenure as a Liberal since 1905 had no trouble holding Eastern Maori by 37.8 points. Likewise the Reform MP, Tau Henare, who had sat for Northern Maori since 1914, was able to gather an ample majority of 14.7 points. In Western Maori, by contrast, Sir Maui Pomare, the Reform stalwart, had died some years before in 1930. His successor, Taite Te Tomo, had proved unable to equal Sir Maui's attractive powers and in 1935 a full fifth of the vote was split away by Democrat and Independent Labour candidates. Even so, Te Tomo barely lost the seat by half a point to Haami Tokouru Ratana. He was the Prophet's eldest son who had contested the electorate 4 times before and was widely known and respected.

Only in Southern Maori was the prestige of occupancy working for rather than against the Ratana candidate. Eruera Tirikatene had fought the pocket borough electorate—it had just 966 valid voters in 1935—twice before finally becoming the first of Wiremu Ratana's "Four Quarters" to become an MP. Tirikatene had lost by 1 vote in 1928 and 19 in 1931. Then death removed the Coalition United MP in June 1932 and at the ensuing by-election on 3 August the way was further opened by a 6-candidate struggle which Tirikatene won easily. The general

election narrowed his lead to one-fifth of what it had been but the main challenger proved to be an Independent while the National aspirant worsted only the Democrat.

In 1935 the name "National" was new and did not yet represent a fresh organisation or a different reality. Beneath the label the faces were the same and the tradition was still of candidates lining up loosely tagged as one or other of the 2 old former parties, Liberal and Reform, or parading their hopes and independence usually in vain. There was still little or no organisation and few benefits for Maori from the old parties to point to. Belonging to the party of Government was of value and, because Maori since 1919 had to vote the day before Europeans, they had less chance to pick up the tremors and excitement of impending change in Government from the rest of the voters on the day. So the mana of notable men, their efforts to ventilate land and fishing grievances, the cumulative prestige of occupancy and links with tribes, federations and churches all mattered the more when there was no history of effective political change to the status quo.

The "party of the morehu", Ratana, was different in manner, basis and objectives. Prophetic in leadership and inspiration, supra-tribal in aim, it was congregational and sectarian in fundamental organisation and this made it unusually strong in experienced speakers, ministry and committee work. Moreover Ratana was an entirely Maori party with easily-grasped objectives flowing out of Maori concerns and ideals for the land, health, education, their economic needs and opportunities and, above all, the proper place of the people under the Treaty of Waitangi. Yet the party stood checked at general and by-elections between 1922 and 1935. Its church adherents, supporters and political sympathisers could muster between one-quarter and two-fifths of the voters. Such limits on support, apart from the quirks of one by-election, had proved too narrow to win seats until 1935.

Had there been a system of strict proportional representation in a 4-MP Maori electorate there might well have been a Ratana MP in 1931 and perhaps 2 in 1935. As it was, there was 1 by 1932 and 2 in 1935. Given that proportional representation would also have yielded a new and Labour-led Government in 1935, albeit probably dependent for a slim margin on Country and Independent allies, then the adherence of the 2 Ratana members to that governing coalition or alliance would also have resulted then as it did in fact. PR would have made the conjunction far, far more of a critical matter even while PR at the same time rendered the new Government so shaky that it would not have risked the active programme which in reality it could and did safely undertake. As it was, Eruera Tirikatene had voted with Labour through the depths of the Great Depression so, after the Prophet and the new Prime Minister had formalised the Ratana-Labour alliance early in 1936, both Tirikatene and H.T. Ratana voted with Labour and joined the Labour caucus.

The major changes after 1935 to the shape and outcome of the Maori political system were neither the result of having 2 Ratana members in Parliament nor simply the consequence of their joining Labour in alliance and caucus. It was not until 1946, long after Labour's principal

innovative legislation was passed and after the "post-war" initiatives like the Maori Social and Economic Advancement Act of 1945 were in place, that Labour found its majority down to 4 and every last MP in caucus needed for defence.

What profoundly altered the Maori relationship to Government was the presence of a party in power which was prepared to make successive changes in the legal and administrative status of Maori, to include them as citizens in the structure of welfare and social security it was building, and ready to spend disproportionately on the health, education and housing of individual Maori in the name of more equal opportunity for all. This was not done on an ideological basis nor done in the name of "affirmative action", "positive discrimination" or "cultural identity" for those concepts and terms were two decades off in the future. Nor was it done in a coherent, consistently executed fashion. On the basis of a philosophy of the value of the common man, the new Government felt its way forward and found its way, for example, to the structure of tribal executives and committees which was later crowned by National with the New Zealand Maori Council. Before 1935 there had been leading politicians such as Sir Apirana Ngata and Gordon Coates who individually achieved much for Maori causes. After 1935, however, a party in Government began to achieve what only Governments can carry into effect.

Certainly the major change came after and not at the 1935 election which was in most respects, as has been indicated, in the style of the first 3 decades of the century as modified but not transformed by the advent of the Ratana candidates and the deprivations of the Depression. Graph 1 shows the change came in 1938 following the torrent of legislative and administrative activity which characterised the intervening years. In 1938, Sir Apirana Ngata and Tau Henare stood again, still with their mana, still sitting members but, as Graphs 4 and 5 demonstrate, with very different results from those of 1935. Tau Henare lost Northern Maori after 24 years to Paraire K. Paikea who had tried 3 times before and not once reached two-fifths of the valid vote. Sir Apirana's reputation, deeds and connections had not altered but his margin shrank from 37.8 to 10.7 points in the face of a divided candidacy which set an endorsed Labour candidate—Reweti Kohere, 30.6%—against the regular Ratana standard-bearer, Tiaki Omana, who took 21.3%. As for the 2 sitting Ratana and Labour MPs, Tirikatene's lead of 4.5 became 47.0 points while Tokouru Ratana's climbed from 0.5 to 20.6 points.

One is always wary of the fallacy in *post hoc, ergo propter hoc* ("after this, therefore on account of this"). Nevertheless only a sweeping and powerful set of factors could have moved so many voters so far and simultaneously in the same party direction. Voters changed to Labour despite opposition candidates' occupancy, mana or connections, more easily in their absence, but whether the opposition possessed them or not. Plainly, the motivation was Maori approval of Labour's political upheaval of the status quo. That had the strength and comprehensiveness in its emotional and practical effects to produce

such a widespread result especially when action contrasted so positively with the dull endurance demanded by the Depression. The consequence was a climb in Labour support which outlasted the Labour Government and only paused in 1954 and 1957.

There was no sign of the new Maori loyalties being shaken at or after the first Labour loss of office in the way Liberal and then Reform had seen their vote eroded and some of their MPs displaced. By the time the Labour setbacks of 1960 and 1975 arrived it would be more reasonable to ascribe Labour's sags in Maori support to great expectations disappointed by the party's performance in office than to reverse the sequence and view the diminished vote as the product of losing the prestige engendered by governing. Moreover the reversion of some Maori seats to National as the new party of Government did not occur as it had when Reform succeeded Liberal. Instead the process had yet to begin although National had been the party in office for more than three-quarters of the time since 1949.

What this long succession of Labour members in Maori seats suggests, like the exceptionally high percentages of the valid votes cast in their favour, is that the separate Maori seats permitted their voters to choose and maintain a different course of political action from their fellow New Zealanders, one to which they have shown remarkable fidelity for over 4 decades. The Maori political system is part of and contributes to the general party system in that Labour continues to be one of New Zealand's two major parties from which Governments come. But the Maori course is removed from pakeha practice in that a very small portion indeed of Maori voters shift back and forth from one to the other major party. Furthermore the origins of earlier Labour candidacy in the Ratana movement gave an independent and Maori style as well as a Maori organisation to this distinct and only partially parallel Maori political system.

At first the Labour leadership did not fully grasp the advantages the Ratana alliance had conferred on them. A small group of Maori Labour activists believed, in the face of failures in 1925 and 1928, that the general pattern of Labour organisation and selection could be applied within the Maori context. Kohere's endorsed Labour candidacy for Eastern Maori in 1938 was a challenge to Ratana selection and to the 4 men chosen by the Prophet and, in particular, to Tiaki Omana, the Eastern Maori "koata". Both candidates and both movements lost by this test of whether either could do without the other. Looking at earlier and later results on Graph 4, it is debatable but unlikely that Sir Apirana Ngata would have lost in 1938 even if the test had not been permitted and if the alliance had been upheld in all 4 seats instead of in 3. Just the same the sudden, sharp dip in the trend line for Ngata—followed by a subsequent rise in 1943—shows that the combined extra pull exercised by running a pure Labour candidate plus a pure Ratana candidate could drag National's result down by 8 to 10 points. Both the Labour and Ratana men did well but neither, thanks to the other, did well enough to win or come close to winning the seat. Having learned the consequences of unfaithfulness to the alliance and rediscovered the

penalties of disunity, Labour endorsed Omana in 1943 and Sir Apirana's long and distinguished tenure ceased.

By the point at which National's last MP in a Maori seat was defeated, National as a whole had descended from 50.7% in 1935 to 27.2% in 1943 partly as the converse of the secular shift towards Labour which has been examined. There was a recovery (+4.8 points) for National in 1946 when the men of the Maori Battalion were home from the War. But it did not represent a National success in relation to Labour for at the same election Labour had grown nearly twice as fast (+8.2 points). In search of an explanation for both major parties rising simultaneously, one has only to look down at the base of Graph 1 to see that the succession of Democrat, Independent and Independent Labour candidacies had at last subsided in 1946, pulled down eventually by their persistent and complete lack of success for individuals. Adding all the Independent and mini-party candidates together, they had in 3 elections successively preoccupied 14.8%, 19.0% and 17.1% of the voters. Released at the coming of peace, and with 5,660 additional valid votes in the 1946 total, the result was a rise for both major parties in the ratio of roughly 2 Labour to 1 National.

The years from 1946 to 1951 saw National climb to its zenith in General voting, followed by the Korean War boom, soaring prices, industrial battle on the waterfront and Sidney Holland's successful snap election of 1951. Despite all these stirring developments on the general political stage, those same years were, by contrast, stable years in Maori politics. This would have been paradoxical if Maori politics had been simply a subdivision of pakeha politics. As a Maori political sub-system taking its own course, however, its independent results were clear enough. Labour moved up very faintly (+0.1) as it sank from power among other voters, then went up definitely (+3.8) during the "Strike Election". Independency rose slightly and fell again. National sank in the Maori seats (−1.2) as it came to power elsewhere and sank again (−1.1) as it acquired a massive majority of 24 in the other 76 seats.

This was the era of the Hon. E.B. Corbett as Minister of Lands and Maori Affairs in both the first and second Holland Ministries and the first Holyoake Ministry of 1957. The new Government might have been able to strike out with fresh policies and to a degree overlay with National's activity the deep impression Labour's changes had made. For the need to go on adapting to and providing for the consequences of the spreading urbanisation and industrialisation of the Maori people was increasing with the acceleration of the transformation itself. The first Labour Government's thinking in relation to Maori apprenticeships, job training and professional opportunities had moved on from the once universal conception of rural solutions, but not so fast towards an evolving mixture of urban and rural answers as the facts now required. It was an opportunity which the conventional Corbett administration chose not to seize even though the Minister's regular and friendly presence on marae was welcomed.

Without initiatives to counteract Maori loyalty to Labour, National's descent became steeper in 1954 and reached a nadir of 17.1% at the 1957 election which returned Labour to power in the country at large. Among Maori voters there was no build-up to this event nor any visible addition from National's exodus. Labour's vote stayed above two-thirds of the valid vote for 3 elections while declining gently in 1954 (−0.3) and more gently (−0.2) in 1957. Little was happening in Labour's Maori ranks with the party out of power and a stable set of MPs. Eruera Tirikatene had been there since 1932, Tiaki Omana and T.P. Paikea since the general election of 1943, while Mrs Iriaka Ratana had succeeded her deceased husband, Matiu, at the general election of 1949.

If they were not going to Labour, where then were National's departed supporters going to and why? Here again we encounter the phenomenon of splits in the anti-Labour opposition such as could be found in 1935, 1938 and 1943. Among Maori voters in 1954 the 3 Social Credit candidates took 5.8% while Independency went from 1.5% to 4.5%. In net terms National's outflow contributed 8.5 points and Labour's trickle 0.3 points. The 1954 rejection of National and the consequent filling up of the ranks voting for an alternative conservative or at least non-Labour party was by no means a peculiarly Maori phenomenon. Among General voters the economic strains and discontents of the early fifties drove National down even further (−9.8 points) and that pushed the newcomers in the Social Credit Political League up far further to 11.3%.

Maori and General voters alike felt the pressure of credit squeezes, import cuts and exchange allocations as participants in a common economy. Resentment at this pressure had conjured forth within the General system a hastily-assembled party to express this indignation without having to vote Labour and, in that, it was successful. The enthusiasts for Douglas Credit and the League leadership no doubt hoped for power or, at a minimum, a change to National's economic policy. In those aims the League's activists failed and, instead, prolonged the Holland Government's life for 3 years in a way that a traditional transfer of support between alternative governing parties would not have done.

The Maori sub-system's variations displayed in 1954 were, however, to prove indicative. Independency in General seats went from an insignificant 0.1% in 1951 to an insignificant 0.3% in 1954 while Independency showed a clear secondary response in Maori electorates by lifting 3.0 points. Social Credit found 76 candidates for 76 seats in the General system but could fill only 3 out of 4 Maori slots. Most important for the long term was the disparity between the 11.3% accorded by General voters and the 5.8% from Maori electors. After 2 further elections which embodied a noteworthy Maori departure to which we shall return, the generally lesser but parallel Maori share for Social Credit was to reassert itself and continue through to 1984. The following table illustrates this. The bracketed figures indicate fewer than the optimum number of candidacies.

Table 1

Election	1954	1963	1966	1969	1972	1975	1978	1981	1984
"European" SC%	11.3	8.1(73)	14.6	9.2	6.7	7.5	16.2	21.0	7.8
Maori SC% ..	5.8(3)	3.4(3)	10.0	6.5	5.3	5.8	10.5	10.1	2.4

Seemingly, the conclusions are obvious. The Social Credit Political League was utilised as a fluctuating opposition within the opposition to Labour both by General and by Maori electors, although to a diminished extent by the latter. Social Credit's best years were those elections reflecting a degree of rejection for both major parties, in 1954, 1966, 1978 and 1981. The appropriate rises and falls show up in Table 1 along both the "European" and Maori lines, so that conclusion stands and represents a common response to political and socio-economic circumstances among both General and sub-system voters. But is the other conclusion that there was a "lesser" or "diminished" Maori tendency to split the opposition to Labour correct?

To doubt it one has only to recall the major difference between the Maori sub-system with its decisively declining line of support for National and contrast it with the situation obtaining in the General system where the battle lines of National and Labour intertwine around the 50% down to 40% parallels. In the General system, opposition to Labour—in the sense of voters for all other parties or Independents—will normally constitute over 50% and even 60% of the entire valid vote. A look at the height of Labour in Maori voting emphasises the contrasting fact that the anti-Labour opposition there may run from a third to a quarter and as low on occasion as one-fifth. For Social Credit to have picked up, say, 10% of an opposition amounting in all to one-third of the Maori voters could be to display a greater propensity for third party splitting than for Social Credit to capture, say, 15% of an anti-Labour sector of 60% of the whole General vote.

Table 2 tests the proposition by expressing the points scored by Social Credit as a percentage of all points won by non-Labour candidates at each election among, first, Maori voters and, second, General voters.

Table 2

	1954	1957	1960	1963	1966	1969	1972	1975	1978	1981	1984
Maori Election											
A. Total non-Labour.	32.5	32.7	37.6	34.9	32.5	26.2	19.6	24.5	21.7	35.2	22.4
B. Social Credit share	5.8	11.8	15.0	3.4	10.0	6.5	5.3	5.8	10.5	10.1	2.4
B/A as %	17.8	36.1	39.9	9.7	30.8	24.8	27.0	23.7	48.4	28.7	10.7
"European"/"General" Election											
A. Total non-Labour.	56.7	52.3	57.2	52.3	59.4	56.8	52.6	61.4	60.6	61.8	58.1
B. Social Credit share	11.3	7.1	8.4	7.1	14.6	9.2	6.7	7.5	16.2	21.0	7.8
B/A as %	19.9	13.6	14.7	13.6	24.6	16.2	12.7	12.2	26.7	34.0	13.4

By comparing the last lines for Maori and for "European" it can be seen that Social Credit's share in each non-Labour sector was close in 1954. It then shot up in the Maori case in 1957 and 1960 when Social Credit's share among Maori was greater than among General voters

regardless of the size of the non-Labour sector. In 1963 the Maori figure fell sharply back but rose again to be greater than Social Credit's share in the General sector for the next 5 elections, far greater indeed. The last 2 comparisons reverse, though not very markedly when it is remembered that the appearance of Mana Motuhake in 1981 and 1984 threw the Maori non-Labour sector into an unprecedented realignment when the new party at once became the principal non-Labour party at both elections. Furthermore, the irruption of the New Zealand Party in 1984 upset the General side of the comparison when Mr Jones's creation notably out-polled Social Credit.

Seven cases of larger Social Credit proportions in the Maori sector, 5 of them much larger, weigh heavily against 4 reverse instances, 2 of them confused by extraneous developments, 1 clear case and 1 reasonably close to even. It is to reiterate this same point about the greater Maori propensity for splitting its opposition to Labour to emphasise that Mana Motuhake's share of the Maori non-Labour sector was as high as 42.9% both in 1981 and 1984 whereas the New Zealand Party's proportion of the General non-Labour sector in 1984 was 21.7%.

It would seem safe enough to say that, if cumulative National weakness was one peculiar feature of the Maori sub-system, so was the linked phenomenon of a greater Maori tendency to divide its opposition to Labour. It was not a new feature which arrived with Social Credit for it can be seen in 1935, 1938 and 1943 when Independency was far better supported among Maori than among General voters. It reaches back to the twenties and earlier when there were other dominant parties. It was a particular feature of Maori by-elections when, in the absence of a sitting member and his mana, candidates positively flocked in to try their fortunes. And now this fractionalisation of the opposition to the dominant party can be seen stronger than ever in the eighties.

How, then, did Maori Social Credit's contrary performance in continuing to rise both in 1957 and 1960 fit in with National plumbing a new low point in 1957, then shooting up again by 1963 to its best result in a dozen years? Partly it was a matter of overall political developments but the prestige of the candidates played an increasing role, especially in 1963. National's inactivity in Maori affairs and its tightening of the economy continued to drive its results down whether its team of candidates were widely-known or not. In 1954 such distinguished names as Carroll, Bennett and Waetford all lost points and when they retired from the fray in 1957, their replacements—with the exception of Pei Te Hurunui Jones in Western Maori—fared worse again.

On the other hand, in 1957 the now familiar Social Credit League was reinforced by 2 outstanding candidates. Instead of finding no candidate in Western Maori, this time Colonel Awatere appeared and captured 11.5%. At the same time in Eastern Maori, H.T. Reedy's manifold connections on the East Coast raised Social Credit's level from 5.3% to 18.4% (Graphs 3 and 4). Elsewhere results were mixed with −5.2 points in the North and +2.1 points in the South. Nevertheless, overall Social Credit rose 6 points in Maori voting while it was falling (−4.2) in General electorates.

Now the record of a one-term Labour Government came into play. Great expectations were disappointed particularly by the Prime Minister being both Minister of Maori Affairs and a supporter of the Rugby Tour of South Africa despite the "No Maoris, No Tour" movement. There were other factors which I examined in *New Zealand Politics in Action*[2], but suffice it to say that they all produced a strong reaction which appears as the loss of 4.9 points. That and a minor decline of 2.3 in Independency made possible the simultaneous rise of both opposition parties, National gaining 4.0 points and Social Credit 3.2.

For Social Credit H.T. Reedy continued to gain (+6.3) in the East, W. Clarke succeeded T. Maihi in the North and rose (+7.3), while Southern crept up (+1.2) and Western descended (−2.7) when H. Tuwhangai replaced Colonel Awatere (Graphs 4, 5, 2, 3 respectively). Only Pei Jones was a notable candidate for National and all the others were new since the last election, yet just the same they went up in percentage terms in 1960. The lesson of 1960 was that a strong tide carries candidates up or down almost regardless of quality or mana. The same lesson appeared to have been taught in 1954 but then was partially contradicted in 1957. Now 1963 was to reinforce the 1957 demonstration of the importance on occasion of the Maori candidate's heritage, reputation, achievements and tribal and confederal connections.

Meantime National was back in power and the Rt. Hon. Keith Holyoake calmly disposed of a similar but smaller foreign exchange crisis than the one Nordmeyer had dealt with by taking the opposite tack. The Prime Minister had his Minister of Finance borrow and wait for export prices to rise—as they did. His Government was rewarded by the General electorate with a fall in support of only 0.8 points in the "No Change Election". The Hon. E.B. Corbett had retired in 1957 and this time Keith Holyoake chose the third-ranking man in his Cabinet, Josiah Ralph Hanan, to be Minister of Maori Affairs as well as Attorney-General, Minister of Justice and Minister of Island Territories. A lawyer from Invercargill, Hanan claimed no experience or expertise on Maori Affairs but he had strong opinions about equality before the law in all matters and a growing suspicion of institutions like the Maori seats which might recognise and actively express cultural differences.

Above all Ralph Hanan was a contrast to Ernest Corbett in being a widely influential and indefatigable legislator. By 1961 the Maori Education Foundation was established because education was the key to integration as set forth in the Hunn Report which, ironically, was a deferred and interpretative summation of much data-gathering under Walter Nash's regime. From 1961 separate registration of Maori births and deaths was abolished and Maori became eligible for jury service. The following year came the New Zealand Maori Council which federated the district and tribal committees, thus producing an alternative leadership system at the centre with which the Government could have more sympathy than with the 4 Labour Maori MPs. From this

[2]R.M. Chapman, W.K. Jackson A.V. Mitchell, *New Zealand Politics in Action. The 1960 General Election*, London, 1962, pp. 71-2, 283-4.

period also there was an acceleration in the phasing-out of the traditional and valued system of Maori schools with their dedicated corps of teachers and emphasis on Maori "language, history, arts and crafts". By 1963 they accounted for only 20% of Maori pupils at primary and 6% at secondary schools. Such changes and innovations received a mixed reception because they at first appeared to point in different directions and their full effects were hard to anticipate. The Education Foundation seemed to many, however, to promise particularly well.

It was plainly time for a special effort on the National Party's part to break Labour's hold on all 4 Maori seats. Before this could be attempted at a general election, there was occasion for a trial run at the Northern Maori by-election which followed on the death of Tapihana Paikea in January 1963. Nine candidates contested the by-election on 16 March including 2 unofficial Labour and 1 Independent Labour candidates, 2 Independents and 1 Kauhanganui. National secured J.C.T. Henare, a former Colonel of the Maori Battalion, son of the Reform member for the seat, and himself National's contestant in 1946, 1949 and 1951. Social Credit continued with J. Clarke, their representative in 1960.

Labour with Ratana advice selected a surprise candidate in Matiu Rata, a registered minister of the Ratana Church, a youth worker and unionist aged 28, who was well-known in Auckland but less so in country districts despite coming from Te Hapua in the far North. The result startled Labour when the majority dropped from 3,372 to 447 votes and their percentage from 60.8 to 42.0. Social Credit was disappointed to see Clarke go from 16.0% to 4.6% while National was much encouraged by James Henare lifting their results from 23.2% to 36.0%, the kind of level he had maintained in the late forties. Incidentally, the 6 unofficial and Independent candidates collectively drew 17.4% with E.M. Pou, a former National candidate now running as "unofficial Labour", taking 7.7%.

When the general election arrived, National had gathered its strongest team in many years. James Henare stood for the fifth time in Northern Maori and Pei Te Hurunui Jones represented National for the third successive time in Western Maori. There was a fresh candidate in Southern Maori, an ex-All Black and future MP for Wairarapa, M.B.R. Couch. National's unexpected acquisition in Eastern Maori, however, was the Social Credit League's leading vote-gatherer, H.T. Reedy, who changed party banners presumably in the hope of combining his own following with National's steady 22%.

The results only partially justified the hopes that were held for them. Reedy raised National from 22.1% to 34.2% which was still 12.6 points short of a total combination of the 2 parties' forces in 1960. James Henare improved his by-election result by adding 1.6 points but had to watch Matiu Rata rise from 42.0% to 58.4% which was within 3 points of the last Paikea victory. Pei Jones added another 5.4 points to reach 25.7% but that was less than the 33.6% he had garnered as Independent in the February 1945 by-election or his 28.5% as Independent Labour in 1943, although rather better than his 21.5% as Independent in 1938 or his 11.5% as Young Maori Party in the October

1930 by-election. Only Couch's vote was less than his predecessor's, by 3.5 points. As for the Social Credit team, it was symptomatically back to 3 people again with nobody once more in Western Maori. As the by-election had foretold, all those who stood lost heavily; Smith in Eastern down to 6.0% from Reedy's 24.7%, Clarke in Northern down from his own 16.0% to 3.6%, and Nia Nia in Southern reduced from 7.0% to 3.8%.

Can one conclude that this was a limited victory for National personalities and personal connections? In part no doubt it was. But what contribution was made by Ralph Hanan's active role, probably perceived on balance at the time as beneficial? And what share in it all should be attributed to the disappointment and disenchantment of Social Credit's ex-supporters who for 3 elections past had been investing votes, each time in increasing numbers, in the hope ultimately of dislodging a Labour MP or 2, or at least surpassing National, but had succeeded in doing neither? Moreover what part was played by the fortuitous occurrence of the by-election? It came at such a point that its results could well have roused more National voters, who duly turned out; discouraged Social Creditors, who in fact did not; and stirred Labour voters to take corrective action at the following general election, which they did do with enthusiasm.

No precise allocation of weights or percentages to these 4 considerable factors can be made. We cannot take the results of the 1963 general election as demonstrating the predominance in Maori voting of personal attributes like achievements, mana, and tribal and confederal connection because the 3 other factors were not personal but impersonal political sequences which, taken apart or together, may well have been far more important to the outcome within the sub-system. The 1957 result may assist an argument for the importance of the personal factor in 1963, but then 1954 and 1960 show that personal factors can be quite swept aside.

What can be said is that, by comparison with General New Zealand politics, the factors we have reviewed take on rather different proportions in Maori politics. Whakapapa, mana, achievements and connections can combine to work individual variations in results that are on occasion noticeably greater than those seen in General voting. However, they remain within limits set by the characteristics of the sub-system itself. Moreover, because in 1963 there were no parallel pakeha factors nor in the outcome any National rise or sudden fall for Social Credit such as Maori voting produced, we have been confined in explaining these Maori results to examining factors working on or arising from the sub-system alone. This powerfully underlines the fact that Maori politics do define and constitute a sub-system.

At this point we can also sum up or point to the continuation of other characteristics of the sub-system that have appeared before or confirmed themselves by their works or have begun to do so. First, in 1963 Maori Labour sailed up 2.7 points in the Maori seats as a whole, apparently little affected (Graphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5) by the hubbub within the opposition below. Maori Labour was on its way up to a higher peak than ever from which only discontent among its own supporters with the

performance in Government of the Party itself could dislodge it—as it had done in 1960 and would do again in 1975.

Second, the battle within the opposition between National, Social Credit and Independency was once again confined there in 1954, 1957 and 1963. National's "ups" again corresponded with third party and Independent "downs" and, as in many earlier and later elections, vice versa. Third, the amplitude of the waves of opposition within the opposition in 1957 and 1960 had again proved far greater proportionately among Maori voters, given the size of their opposition sector compared to Maori Labour, than did the General surge to Social Credit in 1954 or in 1966 given the size of the General non-Labour sector. Indeed, that was shown over the whole range of elections to have been normally the case.

Fourth, despite hope springing up with National's two rises in Maori voting in 1960 and 1963, analysis showed the underpinnings to be transitory, unrepeatable and as fragile as baulked political ambitions. Moreover the high point of this second National recovery in 1963 was distinctly lower than the first in 1946. The third "rise" rather than "recovery" in 1975 was to prove no more than a slight elevation lasting for one election only. In truth, notwithstanding the second recovery, the National Party had been and remained in decline.

If one sets aside the 1935 election result as the last of the previous era of Maori politics, and disregards National's disastrous fall of 21.6 points in 1938 as the equivalent of what happened to National in the General seats in 1935, then the whole span of 46 years from 1938 to 1984 may be seen as the single, latest era in Maori politics that it is, an era with common characteristics. If one of those characteristics is a prolonged National decline, then a straight trend line should economically describe the general run of results and evenly divide all the variations. Just such a trend line starts at 34% in 1938 and runs down to 7% in 1984. There are 8 elections above the trend line and 7 below it while the last result is, naturally, almost on trend.

The actual results begin below the trend line in 1938 and 1943 for these are the years—like 1935—of lingering Independency. The results are above trend in 1946, 1949 and 1951, the years of 2-party contests which followed the subsidence of Independency and preceded the appearance of Social Credit. Actuality for National then drops sharply beneath trend for 1954, 1957 and even 1960, the elections of Social Credit's cumulative growth. At last in 1963 National's result climbs out to an inspiriting peak for reasons already pondered and in the election year which marked Social Credit's first Maori disaster. So far, then, all the variations above and below the trend line have to do with the presence or absence of Independent or third-party competition.

Results for 1966 and 1969 are in quickly descending order but do not fall below National's overall trend until 1972. Social Credit did rise much faster than Labour in 1966 and can take most of the credit for pulling National back in that year. But in the next 2 elections in 1969 and 1972 the Social Credit League's results themselves declined. Therefore it was the net effect of National's own policies and of Labour's pull in those

boom years for the Party which brought National back under trend by 1972.

In the most recent Muldoon phase National was almost 3 points above trend in 1975, the year when Maori confidence in Labour was deeply shaken and a reduced Maori National contingent could still overcome the appearance of a little Values vote (+2.2) and a faint upturn (+0.5) by Social Credit. In 1978, however, Social Credit doubled its share and for the first time surpassed National in Maori politics. The National trend line was now so far down that the actual National result was only driven a half point below that line. Mana Motuhake's advent in 1981 was so successful that it soared (+15.1) into the opposition lead. Social Credit fell slightly (−0.4) but still managed to come second, which left National in third place in an opposition sector which had grown by 13.5 points thanks to Labour's apparent collapse. Paradoxically that put National, which had fallen further (−0.7) and lay third, nevertheless a half point above trend. At the terminal election in 1984 National sat one-tenth of one percent above its trend line.

It was a trend which had carried National from dominating the opposition to Labour down to the position of having to concede that opposition leadership to others for the final 3 elections. Overall National's actual results had come closer and closer to the trend, particularly as they reached the bottom of the line. It was a case of increasing congruence between projection and reality. The party was losing support at an average rate of six-tenths of 1 percent every year for 46 years so that prolonged National decline did indeed characterise this era and lay at the heart of the overall decline of the opposition which was the converse of Labour's rise.

In a way National seems to have concluded that its recapture of Maori seats was out of the question after the 1966 result and recognised that the trend was what it was so long as the sub-system was permitted to continue. For 1966 did come as a blow. Matiu Te Hau, who became Maori Vice-President of the National Party, told me before the 1966 election that he believed they would take a seat, probably the Northern electorate because of James Henare's fine showing there in the 1963 by- and General elections. Alas for such hopes, F.R. Wilcox contested Northern and his result halved National's percentage (−19.0). In Western, M. Te Heu Heu succeeded Pei Jones and the new man dropped 8.4 points. H.T. Reedy fought again but saw his score diminish by 3.4 points. Only in Southern Maori where Baden Pere replaced Ben Couch was there a gain of 7.8 points. What had happened was that both in General and Maori seats Social Credit bounced back at remarkably similar rates (+6.5 and +6.6 respectively). National's second term was seen as lacklustre with farm protests, Vietnam debates and economic difficulties. National fell (−3.4) in General seats and faster (−6.5) in Maori electorates, the difference being that Labour rose (+2.4) among Maori but among pakeha it just as definitely descended (−2.4), new leader, Norman Kirk, notwithstanding.

Ralph Hanan's conclusions as Minister of Maori Affairs can be judged from his words and his acts. He spoke with approval of the eventual

removal of separate Maori representation and thought the right time would come in about 10 years. In Parliament he introduced the Maori Affairs Amendment Bill in 1967 and, despite widespread and bitter opposition to major and minor aspects of the Bill from all over Maoridom, even including objections on several points from the New Zealand Maori Council, the Bill with minor alterations became an Act. At the next 2 general elections National lost 3.2 points then 6.5 points to reach the hitherto unprecedented level of 12.8%. Not that some notable names did not appear to struggle for National in 1969. H.K. Ngata in the East, G.S. Latimer in the North and N.W. Pomare in the South tried for the last time, but the die was cast. The gains Labour made in these elections were made primarily at the expense of National and secondarily from Social Credit which was also sinking modestly.

Labour also successfully negotiated the risks of changing the guard among its MPs during these years. The first challenge was met and overcome when Matiu Rata won his by-election entry and proceeded to gain back most of the support formerly accorded the Paikeas at the general election of 1963. At that same point Tiaki Omana retired after 20 years as MP for Eastern Maori. His selected successor was P.T. ("Steve") Watene, a Mormon of 53 who had made his name as a chairman and initiator of Maori and social policy within the Labour Party organisation. The relationship between the Ratana Church and the Labour Party was altering publicly when a non-Ratana candidate could be accepted, albeit in the least Ratana of the 4 seats. The Ratana Church remained a very significant force, but it tended increasingly henceforth to concentrate on religious and welfare concerns.

Two deaths and a retirement then widened the break in generation. Sir Eruera Tirikatene died in January 1967 after 34½ years of service in the House as Member for Southern Maori. The first and last of the original 4 of the Prophet's "koatas" to be an MP, he died aged 71 and his daughter, Mrs T.W.M. (Whetu) Tirikatene-Sullivan, at the by-election triumphantly improved on her father's high standing by lifting Labour from 72.3% to 74.3%. Unexpectedly Steve Watene died in June of the same year. Labour made a more conventional selection in choosing P.B. Reweti who was a well-liked trade unionist and watersider and a most effective speaker on the marae. Brown Reweti was 51 when he won Eastern Maori against H.T. Reedy for National, C.M. Paul for Social Credit and two Independents including D.M. Bennett. Labour's vote dropped from 58.8% in 1966 to 49.5% but it rose above Watene's 1966 level to reach 62.0% by the next general election in 1969. That election also marked the retirement of Mrs Iriaka Ratana at the age of 64 after 20 years as MP for Western Maori. Koro T. Wetere who was selected to succeed Mrs Ratana was 30 years her junior, a farmer, and worker for church and party who formed close links with the King movement and the Maori Queen. In his first election Wetere managed the feat of improving on Mrs Ratana's 1966 vote of 73.4% by contriving to capture 77.5%.

Thus between 1963 and 1969 all the electorates had acquired new members, 3 of them born within 3 years of one another: Mrs Tirikatene-

Sullivan, Matiu Rata and Koro Wetere. The first 2 were to become Ministers of the Crown in 1972 at the ages of 40 and 38 respectively. The third had to wait for the fourth Labour Government to become a Minister in 1984 at 49. Their thinking was of an utterly different era from that, say, of Paraire Paikea who was a Member of the Executive Council from January 1941 until his death in April 1943. Eruera Tirikatene was in a way an important bridging figure. He was in the Executive Council from May 1943 to the end of the Fraser Cabinet in 1949 and Minister of Forests in the Nash Cabinet between 1957 and 1960. Tirikatene urged Fraser to go further and faster towards Maori institutions and self-administration by extending the advances in the Maori Social and Economic Advancement Act of 1945. In the second Labour Government he broke away from Nash and his Cabinet colleagues to publicly oppose the Rugby tour—both of them issues that lasted and grew in importance.

Nevertheless the way that Matiu Rata's views on the land issue developed, for example, was keyed not to the past but to his own leading role in the parliamentary struggle against the Maori Affairs Amendment Act of 1967 and his determination to undo the policies and attitudes it represented. Likewise, as Maori Studies developed in the universities and teachers' training colleges, new or revived views on the value of Maori culture and language were aired by Maori lecturers, students and graduates. In parallel the spread of television documentaries, debates and news film of protest marches and occasions provided popular extra-parliamentary arenas for political activity. So much visible exhortation doubtless promoted some broader changes in attitude but it conjured up resistance to them at the same time.

The scene was being set for a new Labour Government to produce the most active legislative programme on Maori affairs that Cabinet support and 3 crowded years would permit. Such were the expectations, however, and such the interested public's swirling, altering conceptions of what was possible, which directions the Government had pursued and which in the critics' view it should, that the result was bound to be confusion and disappointment. Years of effort concluded with a Maori Minister of Maori Affairs looking out on a Land March which, for example, loosely united the protests of a National stalwart in her seventies with those of hundreds of all ages, most of them young people from all 3 parties and from none except the activism of the streets.

However busily these events filled the television screens they were marginal to the life and work of most pakeha New Zealanders and most Maori. They provided emotional colour and stereotypes for political argument but the structures of politics generally and of Maori politics did not alter. The 1975 election brought big swings in General voting to the National Party and a sharp drop to Labour in Maori voting. These were traditional forms of rejection with normality in control and in demand. Yet the taste of change mixed with the fear of too much change left the electorate uneasy and half expectant.

The verdict in 1978, bringing the sudden rise of the Social Credit alternative to both the major parties, suggested that the third National Government had not been able to deliver a reality which matched the vague and multiple promise of "New Zealand the way you want it" any more than the third Labour Government had been able to answer "Time for a Change" with the correct amount of it. We earlier noted that pakeha and Maori ran roughly parallel in the rise of Social Credit with the Maori line lower and slower to rise. National lost 7.8 points among General voters and 5.3 points among Maori voters while Labour rose 0.8 points and 2.8 points respectively.

This was in fact the commencement of a minor change in the structure of Maori politics. Social Credit had briefly become the first party of opposition and fragmentation was on its way—but within the opposition, not the system as a whole. The precondition of this alteration was the already-examined cumulative decline of National going back in its latter phases to the sixties rather than to the swings and arrows of the early seventies. The emotional force behind the searching expressed in fragmented opposition arose from the dragging economic pressures of "stagflation" and rising unemployment, a dreary cramping of opportunity and continued strain and stress which, from 1974 onwards, fluctuated but did not cease whatever the policies of the Government of the day. Proportionately far more of the Maori than of the General population suffered it and sought relief. Yet most Maori voters continued to rest their hopes with Labour.

A minority did not. For them the personal wrangling between the leader of the Labour Party and his front-bench Maori spokesman which led to temporary demotion, indignant independence and resignation for Matiu Rata were the occasion for action. The process of creating Mana Motuhake brought the ex-Minister and his personal assistant from that period of legislative effort together with critics of party and pakeha institutions, theorists of autonomy and self-direction, believers in Maori resources for independent economic and social ventures. The Treaty of Waitangi was to be given its full meaning in Maori culture and applied to redress the past and the present. Above all, the language was to be saved by recognition as an official language and every educational measure available.

No-one could be sure of how far the appeal of such ideas might stretch. Matiu Rata chose the by-election in an electorate he had represented for 17 years as the most favourable testing ground and medium for advertising the ideas and policies of the new party. Labour responded by selecting a 43-year-old, Anglican, medical practitioner. He was well-known in the North, a former chairman of the Tai Tokerau District Maori Council, on the Kaitaia College Board of Governors and with an active interest in social services. Incumbency, mana, achievements and the fact of the ministry in the Ratana Church were all with Rata. The Labour Party's standing was Dr Gregory's principal asset. Instead of the 71.5% Rata had secured in 1978, at the by-election on 7 June 1980 Dr Gregory took 52.4%. Dr Gregory dropped 19.1 points. Matiu Rata 17 years before had dropped 18.8% from the 1960 results.

J.C.T. Henare had achieved 36.0% against Rata. Rata managed 37.9% against Gregory. It was a tribute to continuity in Maori politics, while the fact that Social Credit took 8.2% and that National did not run a candidate was a sign that the opposition to Labour was in flux.

In the months before the oncoming 1981 general election, health problems and his 65 years brought the particularly popular member for Eastern Maori, Brown Reweti, to announce his forthcoming retirement. The Labour selection was a critical one in that the party organisation was vividly aware that a challenge of unknown size and from a new direction awaited them at the general election. Their choice fell on a second medical practitioner, Peter Tapsell, 51 years old at selection as Brown Reweti had been when selected, a University Rugby Blue and former Maori All Black, and a prominent orthopaedic surgeon in Rotorua. He had served on a Tribal Lands Incorporation Board, been on the Maori Health Advisory Committee, and was chairperson of the Maori Arts and Crafts Institute in Rotorua. His most unusual recommendation was that he had already twice stood for a General electorate, Rotorua, in 1975 and 1978. It recalled the figures of Carroll and Buck who had stood for both Maori and "European" electorates. At the election of 1981 Peter Tapsell easily withstood the challenge of A. Tahana for Mana Motuhake who drew 15.0%. But Tapsell's result at 64.1% was 10.7 points down on Reweti in 1978, a fall Tapsell recovered amply when Labour went up by 20.1 points in 1984.

These 2 changes of MP in the early eighties were little affected by questions of denomination. One was a committed Anglican, the other a churchgoer but eclectic. The important alteration to the Maori Labour team was the fact that in 2 further steps it had become heavily professional in background: a graduate social worker, a general practitioner and a surgeon in Mrs Tirikatene-Sullivan, Dr Gregory and Dr Tapsell. The changes in the sixties had been generational, with consequences for ideas as the seedbed of policy. The replacements of the early eighties, because they had entered politics later than the two who came on from the sixties, brought all 4 Labour MPs into a cluster aged between 44 and 51 at the 1981 election—a cluster into which Matiu Rata would have fitted neatly at 47.

The ideological and attitudinal fit would naturally have been less happy. Matiu Rata was out of the party and Parliament which formed him politically and into a vigorous exchange with other groups. Labour's 4 MPs were by now less crusading, more interested in the detailed workings of institutions and measures, more moderate and pragmatic than their predecessor appeared, and certainly more suited to the Government that was to come. Given that the conceptual challenge of Mana Motuhake had proceeded primarily from tertiary institutions and those professionally concerned with teaching about Maori language and society, this re-balancing of the Labour team towards professionalism could be seen as a parallel but different outcome of the same process of change in Maori political and social leadership, or as a riposte to the graduate middle-class element in Mana Motuhake, or as both.

One question the nature of the new party and the balance of the new Labour team both raised was which would attract the urbanised, unionised, lower to middle income workers—and unemployed—of the cities and provincial towns? And what of the people still on the land, the older more traditional folk? The Northern Maori by-election had given a strong hint. Indeed the same thoughts could well have moved the 1984 Labour caucus when it chose Koro Wetere, the experienced politician with a country base, and Peter Tapsell, the oldest of the quartet and from a provincial town, to be the fourth Labour Government's two Maori Cabinet Ministers.

That was in the future, however. After the Northern Maori by-election and the Tapsell selection, the question in November 1981 was how well would a Maori party, running on a platform of Maori issues as conceived by the policy-makers of Mana Motuhake and running in all 4 seats, compete against the party which had been chosen by an increasing majority of Maori voters for more than four decades? Those seeking guidance on how Mana Motuhake would fare in the 4-electorate total now had the warrant of the by-election result to look to the past for precedents. They could have taken the height reached by all the Independent Labour and Democratic Labour candidates in 1943 which was 14.8% (Graph 1): or picked Social Credit's zenith in 1960 which was 15.0%. Of course National had been much stronger in those days, so in 1981 one might expect there to be less National opposition within the opposition sector. Or would it mean that there would just be fewer opposition voters to persuade into the new party? It might have cut either way.

The actual result was that Mana Motuhake took 15.1% of the whole Maori valid vote, which was remarkably close to the 2 likeliest precedents of well-prepared and widely-known opposition within the opposition. Had this support indeed come over from other opposition parties? On the face of the net trends in the results, apparently very little. Values was down (−1.2 points), National down slightly (−0.7), Social Credit faintly (−0.4), and Independency was actually up a touch (+0.7). By contrast it was Labour which had shed 13.5 points. The conclusion seemed plain that in the main it was Labour loss which had fuelled Mana Motuhake's rise and that in turn might possibly indicate that Labour's long-term increases, only dented sharply in 1975, were at last to be eaten into seriously, if not this time, then next.

There was another and firmer conclusion to be drawn. Looking at Graph 6, which aggregates all non-National, non-Labour support into one category of "Other" valid votes, makes the matter very visible. This opposition to both major parties comes at the beginning, the middle and the end of the latest era. Comparing the 3 with each other shows that they have not greatly altered in magnitude over the whole era which otherwise was characterised by a long-running Labour climb and a long-running National decline. Periodically, then, there have been waves of opposition amongst Maori voters against the 2 parties of Government in the overall party and electoral system. These have risen to successive crests of 19.0% in 1938, 16.5% in 1960 and 25.9% in 1981, or between

one-sixth and one-quarter of the whole, then subside over a total cycle of 3 or 4 elections.

The breaking of the 2 previous waves could have brought reassurance to Labour's 4 Maori MPs after 1981, even though Mana Motuhake came second in all 4 seats. What did reassure Labour's MPs was that the new party was not a credible threat to them anywhere, not even in Northern Maori where Matiu Rata had lost 16.6 points of his by-election percentage and was now down to 21.3%. Mana Motuhake persisted to fight again in 1984 only to find it was facing a Labour Party invigorated by a change of leadership, major improvements in organisation and the circumstances of the snap election.

In 1984 Labour picked up once more by 12.8 points which was only 0.7 points less than all it had lost in 1981. With so much of substance removed by Labour, Mana Motuhake sank by more than one-third of its previous strength (−5.5) and lodged at 9.6%. That the fall stopped there must be attributed principally to the net effect of Social Credit's major collapse of 7.7 points, National's descent of 2.2 points and to the New Zealand Party in Maori seats being held down to a gain of only 2.7 points. There were therefore enough voters departing from Social Credit and National to compensate in net terms for between one-half and two-thirds of Labour's retrievals.

In earlier describing the 1981 election the words claimed only that the "conclusion seemed plain that in the main it was Labour loss which had fuelled Mana Motuhake's rise". The caution indicated that we had arrived at a classic instance of the limitations of analysis based on valid vote percentages. There was in fact a force in the vicinity of that 1981 struggle other than Labour's regiments and the battalions of National and Independency. This was the leaderless and fluctuating force it has been my habit since 1960 to refer to as the "non-vote", the thousands of non-participants, abstainers or protesters who are entitled and qualified to vote and registered yet who, with reason or without, choose not or neglect to do so.

When the non-vote shrinks then one party, some parties or all parties may gain. When discontent or disillusion grows and the non-vote swells then its expansion may take from one, some or all but there are no party gains, simply losses. A change of party adds to the new and takes from the old, a double effect. When the non-vote enlarges, a particular party may lose much more than the others or be more prone to desertion yet, equally, it may be more likely to receive back its losses when the mood of protest fades. This is not only associated with other characteristics of the party, it is also normally the case that parties are differentially open to losses into non-vote and to recoveries from non-voting. This is especially significant in the Maori sub-system where the non-vote is normally at least double the non-vote percentage in the "European" or "General" electorate.

Much research overseas has established that in Western countries there is an association between poor voting participation and lesser or low levels of information on and interest in the political scene, weak identification with parties, reduced feelings of personal efficacy, and

lesser educational attainments and economic resources. There are a multitude of further factors at work such as societal change breaking up the formation of voting habits or, on the grand scale, the size, party history and federal constitution of a country which can complicate and obscure from the voter the lines of political responsibility so that a fringe or even a major sector of voters may retreat into apathy interspersed with sallies out to support colourful personalities. Suffice it to say that, in the huge, federal entity that is the United States, the general rate of voter participation is low and, within it, the participation rate of black voters is lower again. The University of Michigan vote validation study reported white voter participation in the 1984 Presidential election as 70.2% and the parallel figure for black voters as 52.0%[3]. In New Zealand in 1984 the General rate was 92.3% and the Maori rate 77.0%. Neither in General nor Maori seats do New Zealanders approach either of the American levels. Yet the choice of not voting is always an exercised and often significant option in New Zealand elections both General and Maori in differing proportions.

Graph 8 on its left half makes 100.0% equal the whole valid vote and on its right half makes 100.0% equal all those qualified to vote. Looking at Graph 8 one can compare the pictures of the Maori voting record in 2 different mirrors, one reflecting all the qualified potential participants including those who do not vote or vote informally, and in the other, only those who do vote and formally so. In the qualified vote half, the inclusion of more potential voters has lowered National's silhouette while making no major change to its shape. Something the same can be said for "All Other Valid" down to 1960 although thenceforth there are certainly changes especially in the period since 1972. Labour's climb is reduced then flattens out sooner and after 1957 the shape is quite different and altered in significant ways.

Lastly we come to the other force on the outskirts of electoral battles, those temporarily or normally withdrawn, together with the platoon of informal voters. First they decline somewhat in proportion and are then recruited so fast that they surpass National in 1954 and then rise from 1957 onwards in 3 successive surges to reach a peak only 6.6 points below Labour in 1975, only thereafter to fall away to the 23.8 level by 1984. Undoubtedly one's understanding of the record of Labour, Independency and National in that order is increased to greater or lesser degree by using an analysis which comprehends all the factors available.

In order to see what the comprehensive analysis tells us which the partial valid vote analysis did not, let us take the latest phase from 1972 to the present when the greatest differences appear by comparing Graphs 6 and 9. According to the valid vote Graph 6, Labour fell by 4.9 points between 1972 and 1975, a middling response to the Muldoon onslaught. Graph 9 reveals a devastating desertion of 14.9 points from the Labour regiments. Who benefitted in net terms? According to the valid vote trends the middling loss from Labour was picked up almost

[3]P.R. Abramson, and W. Claggett, "Race-Related Differences in Self-Reported and Validated Turnout in 1984", *The Journal of Politics*, 48 (1986), pp. 416-418.

evenly by National (+2.5) and "All Other" (+2.4). On the qualified vote trends National lost a shade (−0.4), "All Other" picked up very little (+0.3), while Non-Vote and Informal made a huge leap of 15.0 points upwards. The comprehensive record shows the net movement. The essence of the result was an alarming desertion from Labour and a formidable fresh contingent of non-voters off the battlefield. The switch had left the other battalions much where they were.

The exchanges between 1975 and 1978 are altered only mildly by comparison. Labour now recovers faster on qualified vote figures (+4.2 not +2.8), National loses less (−2.9 not −5.3) because the largest net source is now some former non-voters (−3.3) returning to the struggle. "All Others" are +2.0 points instead of +2.5. The lesson from this is that where non-voting does not alter greatly, the valid vote picture of what was happening corresponds much better to its reflection in the qualified vote. Of course it can be and has been objected that this picture of net movement itself does not represent all the cross-cancelling exchanges between the various forces which also take place. That is obviously so. But as I found in designing and analysing a large questionnaire survey of the 1975 election which did pick up these cross-cancelling exchanges, it is still the net movement which carries the message and measures the operative trends of the election.

Now we come to the altered picture of the 1981 election and what really happened when Mana Motuhake appeared on the field. In order to pick out Mana Motuhake and other battalions and companies from "All Other", it would be clearest if the comparison were now made between Graphs 1 and 7. The valid vote version on Graph 1 shows Mana Motuhake shooting up (+15.1 points) and Labour tumbling (−13.5), the one seeming to draw upon the other. Graph 7 reduces Mana Motuhake's leap to 11.0 points but at the same time dramatically arrests Labour's tumble and turns it into a modest descent of 2.8.

The cause of the contrast is easily detected. The qualified vote record attends to non-voting and reveals that its huge increase and the corresponding desertion from Labour occurred back in 1975. Non-vote's battalions shrank in 1978—while Informal rose, equally unnoticed—and this shrinkage helped to recruit not only Informal but Labour and Social Credit as well, but not National or Values. Then in 1981 a much larger detachment came back out of non-voting (−6.9). The Labour loss in 1981 was as mentioned 2.8 points. Informal dropped 2.1 while Values disappeared with a loss of 0.8. Adding the 3 together, they do not equal the detachment from non-voting. Add the 4 together and they indicate the net sources for Mana Motuhake's leap, with enough left over for slight gains of 0.7 points for Social Credit and 0.4 for National.

Finally between 1981 and 1984 both kinds of calculation—on a valid vote and a qualified vote basis—agree that it was, within the Maori sub-system, a case of Labour up drastically and the New Zealand Party a little, with every other party or group down. Table 3 sets out the 2 versions of the changes.

Table 3

Voting Changes between 1981 and 1984

In % of Valid Vote				In % of Qualified Vote			
LAB	+12.8	SC	−7.7	LAB	+11.8	SC	−5.6
NZP	+2.7	MM	−5.5	NZP	+2.1	MM	−3.6
		NAT	−2.2			N−V	−3.2
		IND	−0.1			NAT	−1.4
						IND	−0.1
						INF	−
Total	+15.5	Total	−15.5	Total	+13.9	Total	−13.9

It can be seen that the qualified vote measurement reduces every component because of the larger numbers in its base of 100.0%. Nevertheless it keeps the same order and roughly the same proportions although its additional elements—the non-vote, and Informal which in this instance did not change—can alter those proportions radically if movement into or out of non-vote is a major trend. This was so in 1960 (+8.5 points), 1966 (+10.6), 1969 (−5.6), 1975 (+14.8) and in 1981 (−6.9). By following through changes in the non-vote and interconnected changes in other parties and especially in the Labour vote, one can see why on Graph 7 the "w" formation appears in Labour's silhouette between 1957 and 1972 and again between 1972 and 1984. On valid vote's Graph 1 the shape is a steepening climb from 1960 to 1972 followed by a small "v" from 1972 to 1978 and a much deeper "v" between 1978 and 1984.

The characteristics of the Maori sub-system of electoral voting which remain much as before in this deeper qualified vote analysis are:

1. The continuing decline of National with limited recoveries in 1946 and 1963 and the reduction of this party of Government to second or third place even within the opposition to Labour in the last 3 elections.

2. The greater tendency of the opposition to Labour within the Maori sub-system to sustain an opposition within itself; and the larger proportion that internal opposition constitutes relative to the size of the opposition sector as a whole when compared with similar elements in the General system.

The characteristics of the sub-system which are shown by the qualified vote analysis to have altered, or to be additional, are:

3. Labour's climb to dominance flattens out one election sooner, while the plateau now stretches from 1946 to 1957. Labour thereafter plunges in 1960 twice, and in 1975 three times as far as the valid vote calculations revealed. Consequently, after 1957 instead of 6 buoyant elections on or above the plateau line, there are only 3. Nevertheless, the Labour Party continues to dominate this latest era of the sub-system with an average support of 50.3% of all those qualified to vote as compared to 65.8% of all valid voters.

4. A fourth force in non-voting and Informal is thereby added to Labour, National and Independency with third-party voting included. This fourth force shows up on the graph in third place, its 2 elements together pass National in 1954 while the non-vote alone does so in 1960.

With a 1-election exception this continues to be so. The real contest for dominance after 1963 is between a surging non-vote and the Labour Party, an unequal contest in which non-vote falls away after 1975.

The 2 analyses employed have, to change the metaphor, introduced different sets of actors in the amphitheatre of Maori politics. First the adolescent Labour giant soon grown to full stature, the mature National figure bending with increasing years and ever less with time, and a tribe of changing, cartwheeling patch-coated Independents thrust aside by the privates and sergeants of Social Credit until, as a finale, a second adolescent warrior climbs to the top of the giant's boots. Next the qualified vote analysis introduced a chorus of non-voters—and the Informal dwarf—who commented on the economic fates and the success of the play and often took off their masks and walked on as bit-players as it pleased them.

Now there is a last and numerous group who remain in the shadowy audience, the unregistered potential voters who therefore are not even qualified to vote. Their thousands among the rapidly growing Maori population impressed me a quarter century ago when doing research for an article.[4] It was the increasing disparity between the estimated population and the first "hard" reliable roll numbers in 1957 which alerted me, while the trends backwards and forwards showed the problem to be growing as rapidly as the urbanisation which helped cause it by interrupting or suspending the teaching by family example and small community interaction of those political attitudes and habits like voting which have to be learned.

Anthony McCracken explored the problem and expanded on and reached beyond my answers in a fine MA thesis.[5] The problem grew and the necessary research on the underlying figures which could only have been done officially was never undertaken. Instead there were *ex-cathedra* pronouncements by Ministers that ever larger numbers of Maori were "going over to" or, from journalists and fearful candidates, "being put onto" the "European" or later the General rolls. So one can only introduce the subject and hope that, before any conclusions are drawn, resources and officially-conducted research will clarify the numbers and the motives involved, and discover also whether the neglect of the recent past may not have left tens of thousands quite outside the patterns of participation as well as the records of our electoral system.

For if there is, particularly after the reforms of 1975, a permeable boundary between the Maori political sub-system and the General electoral system, then is not that a further creditable adaptation by Maori of a special representation system they have made their own and use for their own purposes? If National declines in the sub-system, it usually governs in the General system. Indeed, as Maori candidates

[4]R.M. Chapman, "The response to Labour and the question of parallelism of opinion, 1928-1960", in Robert Chapman and Keith Sinclair (eds.), *Studies of a Small Democracy,* Auckland, 1963, pp. 247-52, 279-80.

[5]A.J. McCracken, *Maori Voting and Non-Voting: 1928-1969. A Study of Change in Voting Patterns Preceding and Accompanying Urban Migration,* Unpublished MA thesis, University of Auckland, 1971.

have come onto the General roll and been selected for National, and subsequently won, they have reflected a transition by individual Maori before them in time and who shared their values. Nor is the choice of voting on the General roll confined to National voters. Labour and Social Credit organisers have sought and enrolled those available in marginal General electorates. For it is now an entirely free choice and, despite the accusation in the 1960s that it smacked of apartheid, it has been largely choice for decades.

Those who chose to stay on the rolls of the Maori seats are participating in a unique and valuable sub-system. Here electors can choose representatives of their own culture who can express their constituents' attitudes, views and responses, articulate their needs, and attend to their contacts with Departments and officialdom and mediate one to the other. No MP in a General electorate could consistently perform such a task, for he or she is tied in terms of time and is responsible for expressing the interests and considering the views of constituents predominantly or overwhelmingly of another culture. Reading Hansard or the newspapers with an attentive eye will reveal the force of this fact.

This Annex has been devoted to showing how the sub-system differs from the General system with which it interacts in many vital ways. The sub-system is distinct and different because it is supposed to do the different job of representing the other culture in our country in its Parliament. Maori electors and MPs see to it that it does.

Maori voters have invented their own parties, adapted other people's parties, and coalesced where it suited them. Maori voters display different policy priorities, values and party choices from those of the system in general. Ironically, by their consistent choice of 4 Labour MPs, the voters have made the sub-system work to balance the tilt in favour of National as against Labour displayed by the "European" or General system over more than 3 decades. The great merits of the present sub-system, however, lie in the uses to which it has been put. Maori have thus made it their creation. They have endowed it with functions they need to have performed and which only MPs representing voters of their own culture could perform. They are supported by a political sub-system which has its own characteristics and uniqueness.

LIST OF GRAPHS


SOUTHERN MAORI
IN % OF VALID VOTE © R M C.
% '35 '38 '43 '46 '49 '51 '54 '57 '60 '63 '66 '69 '72 '75 '78 '81 '84
E.T. TIRIKATENE B.E. 3:8:32
M.S.T.W.M. TIRIKATENE SULLIVAN
65 ELN 11/3/67
LAB
RA.
IND.
NAT.
DEM.
37·5
33·0
22·5
22·3
16·5
12·2
8·4
7·0
1·1
4·5
69·3
66·8
75·5
77·4
75·4
64·1
78·5
75·2
77·4
72·3
82·9
87·7
74·6
82·3
71·6
78·2 LAB
73·4 AVE
21·5
22·6
21·6
22·9
14·0
17·4
13·9
21·7
12·5
8·0
12·1
8·4
11·7
7·7
7·1
16·1 AVE.
8·6 M.M.
2·5 NAT.
2·8 NZP
2·3 IND'S
9·3
3·7
5·2
5·8
7·9
1·7 K.
4·9
5·8
1·0
3·1
1·5
4·3
5·5
3·5
1·4
1·0
1·9



GRAPH 1 : 50 Years of Maori Voting : 4 Maori Seats Combined (percentages of all valid voters)



GRAPH 3 : 50 Years of Maori Voting : Western Maori (% of valid vote)


EASTERN MAORI
IN % OF VALID VOTE © R.M.C.
%
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
'35 '38 '43 '46 '49 '51 '54 '57 '60 '63 '66 '69 '72 '75 '78 '81 '84
SIR AT NGATA GE 20-12-35
T.OMANA GE 24-9-43
GE 30-11-63
BE 12-8-67
P.T WATENE
P.B. REWETI
P.W TAPSELL
GE 24-11-81
NAT.
LAB.
RA.
IND.
I.L
66·5
41·3
28·7
30·6
24·7
51·1
48·9
55·8
44·2
61·7
63·1
60·7
59·9
38·3
36·9
34·0
21·7
18·4
51·5
55·0
22·1
24·7
34·2
30·8
32·2
21·7
19·4
13·9
63·8
74·8
74·0
72·7
62·0
58·8
84·2 LAB.
59·3 L AVE.
30·9 N AVE.
15·4
11·7
7·2 NAT
3·9 MM
2·8 NZP
1·5 SC



GRAPH 5 : 50 Years of Maori Voting : Northern Maori (% of valid vote)



GRAPH 6 : Phases of 50 Years of Evolution — Percentage Changes



GRAPH 7 : 50 Years of Maori Voting : Percentages of All Qualified Voters



GRAPH 8 : Graphs 6 and 9 compared



GRAPH 9 : A More Penetrating Analysis : % Changes in Qualified Vote, 4 Maori Seats Combined



GRAPH 10 : Percentage Change in Qualified Vote : Southern



GRAPH 11 : Percentage Change in Qualified Vote : Western



GRAPH 12 : Percentage Change in Qualified Vote : Eastern



GRAPH 13 : Percentage Change in Qualified Vote : Northern



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

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

GRAPH 16 : The Search for an Alternative in the 4 Maori Seats:
(i) 30 Years of Social Credit
(ii) 50 Years of Independents and Mini Parties



GRAPH 17 : 1935 to 1984—Phases in the 4 Maori Seats (% of qualified vote) : Southern



GRAPH 18 : 1935 to 1984—Phases in the 4 Maori Seats (% of qualified vote) : Western



GRAPH 19 : 1935 to 1984—Phases in the 4 Maori Seats (% of qualified vote) : Eastern



GRAPH 20 : 1935 to 1984—Phases in the 4 Maori Seats (% of qualified vote) : Northern